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Governing Insecurity examines the various efforts to regulate, constrain, or ban military
technology. In the process, it outlines the considerable variation in both the design of these
frameworks and in compliance outcomes that existing theoretical work fails to explain. In
this dissertation project, I present an original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD) to
provide new data and methods to quantitatively assess the design features of arms control
regimes and their effect upon state behavior—specifically compliance. I focus this analysis
on agreement type, membership, type of verification regime, and the decision to include
sunset provisions in four quantitative chapters. The dissertation concludes by considering
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1Part I
A Framework for Analysis
2Chapter 1
Towards a Scientific Study of Arms
Control
Debs and Monteiro note in their 2016 volume that “the history of international politics since
1945 is to a great extent the history of nuclear politics.”1 This history encapsulates many
of the theoretical debates between scholars of international relations—whether concerning
the effects of polarity on the international system, alliance dynamics, and the foreign policy
prerogatives of great powers. Beyond the competitive dynamics that are often associated
with scholarship on nuclear deterrence, however, nuclear politics have also provided a venue
for international cooperation. This project seeks to shed light on the oft-ignored practice of
cooperation in the nuclear era, in general, and the practice of arms control, in particular.
Specifically, I argue that the institutional design of arms control regimes both reflect and
shape nuclear politics and explain two phenomena of particular interest to scholars of inter-
national relations: first, the considerable variation in the design of international institutions
and, second, the considerable variation in the outcomes—or performance—of international
institutions.2
1.1 Introduction
In a 1960 Daedulus article following the publication of his most famous work, The Strategy
of Conflict, Thomas Schelling turns to the question of arms control.3 In the article, he poses
a series of rhetorical questions to policy-makers:
Do we wish the hydrogen bomb had never come along to make intercontinental
missiles economical? Do we wish that nuclear-powered aircraft had made airborne
1Alexandre Debs and Nuno P Monteiro, Nuclear Politics, vol. 142 (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
2Ranjit Lall, “Beyond institutional design: Explaining the performance of international organizations,”
International Organization 71, no. 2 (2017): 245–280; Tamar Gutner and Alexander Thompson, “The Politics
of IO Performance: A Framework,” . The Review of International Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010): 227–248.
3Thomas C Schelling, “Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization,” Daedalus 134, no. 4 (2005): 101–117.
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alert so cheap that retaliatory aircraft could stay aloft rather than be vulnerable
on the ground to a missile attack? Do we hope that no one ever discovers an
economical means of nullifying ballistic-missile submarines, so that neither side
can hope to preclude retaliation by sudden attack? Do we wish that warning
systems were so nearly perfect that ”false alarm” were virtually impossible, or so
poor that we could never be tempted to rely on them? Do we wish that missiles
had never become so accurate that they could be used to destroy an enemy’s
missiles in an effort to negate an enemy’s retaliatory threat? Do we wish that
radioactive fallout could not occur, or do we welcome it as a peculiarly retaliatory
(and hence deterrent) weapon effect that is of little use in a pre-emptive attack?
Do we wish that secrecy about weapons and weapon production were much more
difficult to maintain than it is, or welcome certain kinds of secrecy as a form of
mutually appreciated security against surprise attack?
In pursuit of “international order, “strategic stability,” and to arrest “arms racing be-
havior” the answers to these questions have often been yes. However, while the question of
“how” to achieve arms control remains central for policy-makers, academics have largely es-
chewed a scientific study of arms control. Writing in 1972, Chayes argues that “the literature
of arms control is singularly barren on the question of how a treaty or agreement actually
affects the behavior of states.”4 Today, we are little closer to building theory surrounding
the consequences of arms control and existing scholarship has hitherto failed to assess these
arrangements and their impact on arms racing behavior, instead relying explanations that
privilege norms, domestic politics, and great power politics to explain changes in state be-
havior. This dissertation project, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative methods to
examine a utilitarian theory of arms control design seeks to remedy this gap in the literature
by considering the effects of institutional design upon compliance.
Given contemporary noncompliance issues concerning arms control, this is a particu-
larly important topic. Russian noncompliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, Syrian noncompliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran’s recent
abrogation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) following U.S. withdrawal,
and North Korea’s sustained noncompliance with multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions
concerning the most dangerous of military technologies, nuclear arms, justify the renewed
focus on arms control and demonstrate the need for renewed academic attention and the use
of new methods of inquiry.
In this introductory chapter, I outline the challenges faced in the contemporary arms
control regime, discuss the genealogy of arms control, and provide a brief history of arms
control before briefly introducing the project and the chapters to follow.
4Abram Chayes, “An inquiry into the workings of arms control agreements,” Harvard Law Review, 1972,
905–969.
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1.2 A Brief History of Arms Control
Efforts to constrain, regulate, and ban the use—and tools—of force have been around for
as long as military technology itself. In the ancient world, arms control regimes focused on
the disarmament of those defeated in war. The Rome-Carthage Treaty of 201BC and the
Rome-Macedon Treaty of 196BC serve as historical examples of this phenomenon.5 As noted
above, the limits placed upon the German army of 100,000 men with no tanks or artillery
and no air force as part of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles serve as a more recent example of
“disarmament following a war.”6
Past examples of arms control reflect the discussions of “appropriateness” noted above.
During the Middle Ages, the Catholic church played a significant role in outlining the terms
of warfare in Europe throughout the early 1000s.7 In Poitiers, Limoges, and a number of
other European towns from 1000 to the early 1400s, religious leaders sought to create rules
that banned the practice of warfare against specific classes of people and temporally—on the
Sabbath.8 In 1139, Canon 29 of the Second Lateran Council banned the use of crossbows
against Christians and Catholics—an early documented example of banning particular classes
of weapons. In an example of 12th century export control, Canon 71 of the Fourth Lateran
Council banned weapons transfer to the non-Christian Saracens.9 These historical cases of
disarmament provisions, constraints on weapon use, and prohibitions of technology transfer
are, incidentally, broadly representative of contemporary regulatory mechanisms used to
regulate military technology—whether concerning nuclear weapons, capital ships, or small
arms.
In the past seven decades and with the advent of weapons with strategic (that is, exis-
tential) effects, efforts to control arms have arguably become increasingly salient: “[While]
the impulse to control and regulate the instruments of war is nearly as old as war itself...
the advent of nuclear weapons gave the enterprise new urgency.”10 This urgency led to early
efforts in the late 1940s and early 1950s to assure international control of nuclear technology
via the U.S.-led Baruch Plan that called for states to eschew the development of nuclear
weapons and submit to international inspections of sites engaged in nuclear weapon develop-
ment and testing. While this Plan did not succeed, governments later signed the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 aimed to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons beyond those states that had achieved a nuclear test by the signatory
date—the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China. The NPT—via
Article VI—also called for progress on the disarmament of all nuclear states.11 This new
5Stuart Croft, Strategies of arms control: a history and typology (Manchester University Press, 1996).
6Jozef Goldblat, Arms control: a survey and appraisal of multilateral agreements (Taylor & Francis Ltd,
1978).
7Stefan T Possony, “Peace enforcement,” The Yale Law Journal 55, no. 5 (1946): 910–949.
8The church would eventually allow fighting on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays with
protections for “clerics, nuns, pilgrims, women, children, and workers.”
9Croft, Strategies of arms control: a history and typology.
10Avis Bohlen, “The rise and fall of arms control,” Survival 45, no. 3 (2003): 7–34.
11The NPTs third pillar allows for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by all states—and has led to a
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category of strategic weapons directly led to a majority of the arms control frameworks in
force today. These arms control agreements involving the United States and the USSR (later
Russia) include those concerning the use, stockpiling, and eradication of classes of nuclear
warheads, delivery vehicles including SALT I and START I, and weapon systems designed
to destroy them—such as anti-ballistic missiles previously controlled by the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Whether these past examples of arms control will condition contemporary arms control
remains an open question.
1.2.1 Arms Control in the 21st Century
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty noted above was signed in 1987 by the United
States and USSR and is designed to ban ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with
a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. It, along with START I and the CFE Treaty
represented the high-water mark of arms control agreements involving the two great pow-
ers of the period. In July 2014, however, the United States accused Russia of developing
intermediate-range missiles in violation of its Treaty violations. This allegation was later
made specific—the United States objected to Russia’s development of the SSC-X-8 (9M729)
Iskander-K ground-launched cruise missile system. Russia, in turn, accused the United States
of violating the same treaty by deploying missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. As of
July 2019, the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission created “to resolve questions
relating to compliance with the obligations assumed” had failed to address the abrogation
of the treaty—calling into question the renewal of New START in 2021 and the future of
arms control negotiations between the two states.
Non-nuclear accords have also been under threat. The Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)—a universal rather than bilateral regime—designed to arrest the production, stock-
piling, and use of chemical weapons played by a limited role in responding to Syria’s use of
chemical weapons in Homs, Aleppo, and Douma in the course of its civil war. The failure to
enforce this arms control agreement was compounded by an attack involving a nerve agent
(Novichok, A-234) on Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury on March 4, 2018.
While states have failed to comply with both nuclear and non-nuclear arms control agree-
ments, efforts to address emerging technologies including hypersonic missiles, space-based
weapons, cyber weapons, and lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) have largely stalled in a
series of UN Group of Government Experts (GGE) processes.12
Overall, this does not present an auspicious report on the current status of arms control
as we enter what the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy describes as a “re-emergence
of long-term strategic competition.” As current arms control frameworks wane and others
number of nuclear cooperation agreements between states. Incidentally, the NPT is a singularly interesting
international agreement as it reifies sovereign inequality among states by separating the nuclear “haves”
from the “have nots.”
12Denise Garcia, “Future arms, technologies, and international law: Preventive security governance,”
European Journal of International Security 1, no. 1 (2016): 94–111.
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are being negotiatied, I argue that this is an appropriate historical moment in which to
empirically examine the historical record concerning the consequences of arms control both
to understand contemporary policy challenges but also to understand a form of international
cooperation that scholars often overlook—despite their representing a singularly hard bargain
for states to strike. To some extent, the richness in the design of arms control reflects this
difficulty in striking lasting bargains that impinge on the development of national armed
forces.
Among the over two hundred frameworks designed to regulate, constrain, or ban mili-
tary technology, there is considerable variation in their design—and particularly in terms
of their scope, membership, flexibility, and enforcement mechanisms. The consequences of
this variation, however, remain largely under-explored. Scholars have only recently started
considering the implications of intergovernmental arms control agreements—and these have
predominantly focused upon the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and its associated impact on nuclear proliferation.13 In answer to Fuhrmann and Lupus query
“do arms control treaties work?” The answer thus far appears to be yes—at least with regard
to the NPT. But does this finding travel? And what causes it? Is the finding explained by
the underlying technology being regulated or the specific institutional architecture deployed
around the NPT?
Fuhrmann and Lupu’s finding is in line with a broader contention put forward by Chayes
and Chayes that international agreements alter state behavior and expectations of states
parties in accordance with the terms of the agreement.14 How international institutions
achieve this effect, however, remains ripe for further examination. Given the substantial
variation in the design of arms control agreements in terms of their membership, design, and
rules, I posit in this dissertation that scholars of institutional design have an important role
to play in considering the mechanisms through which international regimes constrain state
behavior.
To that end, I provide a conceptual framework surrounding arms control in the next
section before turning to a brief history of arms control.
1.3 What is Arms Control?
Arms control has been explored by historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and in
the retrospective accounts of past arms control negotiators. In these accounts, there are two
13Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu, “Do arms control treaties work? Assessing the effectiveness of
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2016): 530–539; Sonali Singh
and Christopher R Way, “The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 859–885; Beth A Simmons and Daniel J Hopkins, “The constraining power of
international treaties: Theory and methods,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 623–631.
14Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2
(1993): 175–205; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Compliance without enforcement: state
behavior under regulatory treaties,” Negotiation Journal 7, no. 3 (1991): 311–330.
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competing narratives concerning intergovernmental efforts to regulate military technologies:
those of disarmament and arms control.
The disarmament narrative places arms control, in its various guises, within a discus-
sion concerning the (in)appropriateness of a particular weapon’s development, deployment,
and use. Often, this narrative notes the norms and taboos that led to the prohibition or
restricted the terms of use for specific categories of weapons—with subsequent consequences
on the intensity of conflict or the “destructiveness of war.” Recent debates surrounding the
regulation of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) and efforts to make sure that a “human
is in the loop” of weapons that might otherwise be autonomous reflect an interesting devel-
opment of this perspective as it engages with the question of “who” or “what” is allowed to
kill in war.15
Others suggest that arms control, rather than representing the “(in)appropriateness” of
methods of warfare, remains part of a broader “strategic” competition among states. This
narrative considers three aspects of arms control that influence the competitive dynamics
between states. I highlight each below.
First, the avoidance of opportunity costs associated with developing particular mili-
tary technologies.16 These opportunity costs vary based on the military technology but,
as Schelling and Halperin point out, avoiding “tit for tat” military spending offered an im-
portant benefit of arms control. Second, while not all arms control agreements are reciprocal
or symmetrical—with the Washington Naval Treaty offering a prototypical example of an
asymmetrical agreement—arms control agreements can also be used to reinforce a balance
of forces between adversaries in both a regional and global context.17 Third, arms control
negotiators point to the “stability enhancing” processes of arms control regimes. Past nego-
tiators in Washington noted, for example, the benefits of information exchanges and on-site
inspections that are often included as enforcement mechanisms in arms control agreements
for confirming intelligence gathered from other sources.
I argue in the dissertation to follow that this process-oriented conceptualization of arms
control best explains the variation in the institutional design and the consequences of arms
control regimes over time by pointing out, in simplest terms, that design matters.
15John Lewis, “The case for regulating fully autonomous weapons,” Yale LJ 124 (2014): 1309; Jurgen
Altmann and Frank Sauer, “Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability,” Survival 59, no. 5 (2017):
117–142; Michael C Horowitz, “When Speed Kills: Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence, and Stability,”
Deterrence and Stability, 2019, Incidentally, there are already a number of military technologies that leverage
automation in which humans are, in fact, fully “out of the loop.” For further details, see:Vincent Boulanin,
The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, technical report (SIPRI, 2019).
16Thomas C Schelling and Morton H Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control,” Twentieth Century Fund,
1961,
17The CFE Treaty offers an example of a regional arms control framework designed to maintain relative
parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact states at the end of the Cold War. The series of strategic arms
limitation agreements involving the United States and the USSR (and, latterly, Russia) offer examples of
agreements designed to maintain a global balance of forces using symmetrical nuclear warheads numbers
(though asymmetric deployments using different types of delivery vehicles).






Figure 1.1: This figure summarizes the stages of arms control as a process
1.4 Arms Control as a Process
In the section below, I outline the necessary conditions associated with producing arms
control. This involves the securitization of a specific technology by a state or states, the
entry of states parties into negotiation to bargain over the type and design of arms control,
an agreement’s entry into force (usually via domestic politics, and, finally, the practice of
arms control.18
1.4.1 “Securitization”
In this section, I outline the process of “securitization” through which a state perceives and
acts on a security-related use for a given technology.19 In the process, the technology is
“securitized” during the research and development or prototype phase.
There are a series of constructivist innovations that ground the concept of security that
18The process of arms control, like many other international processes, reflects the variety of disciplines
that might be used to understand it—from domestic politics-focused analyses of ratification processes to
analyses that privilege the challenges of inter-state bargaining under conditions of anarchy.
19Of course, the very development of technology is not exogenous, with governments often playing a key
role in developing new technology via industrial policy as well as indirect and direct investment.
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might be useful for considering how states choose to “securitize” a specific technology.20
In simple terms, securitization constitutes a “speech act”—a political process—by an actor
with political power. This speech act “securitizes an issue space, technology, or actor.21
Some recent examples of securitization concerning technology include nanotechnology and
supercomputing resources associated with new types of machine learning (often referred to
as “artificial intelligence”). When considering the process through which states identify
technologies—from advances in nuclear physics to genetic engineering—we might examine
the state-based decision-making processes that underpin this speech act in terms of a rational
calculation of the potential benefits and risks posed by the technology. As Roberts noted in
1993, “little research attention has been given to the diffusion of the scientific and techno-
logical foundation upon which these military capabilities must rest: for example, expertise
in computer-aided design and manufacturing techniques, microelectronics, aeronautics, com-
puter engineering, advanced materials development, and precision machining.22
Kroenig and Volpes work on 3-D printing is also illustrative here.23 3-D printing is not a
weapon per se, but is an innovative method through which a complex weapon technology—in
their article, a nuclear bomb—might be manufactured with lower barriers to entry than is
traditionally the case. At the same time, there are a series of economic uses for 3-D printing
that are likely to become more difficult in the event that the technology is “securitized”—that
is constrained, classified, and subject to export control and trade restrictions. Indeed, policy-
makers are continually weighing the costs and benefits of securitization. These costs and
benefits are driven by domestic political considerations as well as the perceived opportunities
for the state and threats to the state from adversary use of a particular technology.24 The
latter might also be described as representing uncertainties over preferences and the behavior
of other states as well as uncertainty about the state of the world into which the technology
represents an exogenous shock to the extant order.25
Future work might consider the pathways of securitization prior to a technology’s deploy-
ment. For my purposes, however, it is most important to note that the decision to regulate
a military technology is taken prior to the intergovernmental negotiations that shape arms
control—the practice of which is the subject of this dissertation.
20Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose, “Governing insecurity: contingency planning, protection, resilience,”
Economy and Society 38, no. 2 (2009): 230–254.
21O. Waever, “Securitization and desecuritization,” in On security (Columbia University Press, 1995).
22Brad Roberts, “From nonproliferation to antiproliferation,” International Security 18, no. 1 (1993):
139–173.
23Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe, “3-D printing the bomb? The nuclear nonproliferation challenge,”
The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 7–19.
24The state often remains a unitary actor in these analyses but it is worth noting that there are a number
of constituencies associated with decisions to regulate technologies—not least the private sector that often
attempts to shape the regulatory preferences of their respective governments and, occasionally, international
actors.
25This approach mirrors Putnams work on two-level games.Robert D Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic
politics: the logic of two-level games,” International organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460.
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1.4.2 Arms Control Negotiations
Following securitization, governments face a question: Are domestic regulatory arrangements
appropriate/adequate for addressing the security challenge posed by the technology? If not,
are intergovernmental negotiations necessary and/or desirable?
In a case in which domestic regulation is adequate, intergovernmental arrangements are
rarely used beyond efforts to harmonize regulations across countries (serving to establish best
practices and lessen transaction costs for private firms). In the latter case, the first question
facing policy-makers is what to control. While this may sound simple in theory, it is often
difficult in practice with states disagreeing over whether particular technologies or uses of
a technology should be the subject of an arms control agreement both prior to and during
arms control negotiations.26 This difficulty is explained by the stakes of arms control used to
address some of the most destructive, expensive, and consequential military technologies ever
created—not least nuclear weapons. According to past arms control negotiators, the debates
concerning the definition of types of nuclear warhead and categories of delivery vehicles in
the START framework or those chemical precursors that should be included in Schedule 2
by the OPCW are as contentious as the design of the regime designed to regulate them.
Upon deciding what is regulated, states face a second challenge: negotiations concerning
how to control the technology. This challenge is, in my estimation, reflected in the institu-
tional design decisions undertaken by states during the negotiation process and represents a
central focus of this dissertation project.
1.4.3 Design
Upon agreeing that a military technology requires intergovernmental regulation, arms control
negotiators have a number of options at their disposal concerning how the technology may
be regulated. These options stem both from past examples of arms control as well as being
conditioned by the type of military technology in question, the past experience of arms
control negotiators, as well as the state’s force posture. In discussions with those in the room
during the negotiations of SALT, CFE, START, and New START, a number of negotiators
noted the importance and use of heuristic devices on the part of arms control negotiators
to overcome negotiating challenges and arrive at policy solutions that each side could live
with.27 These design considerations present a rich source of variation between different types
of arms control agreements. This variation, as briefly noted above, can be viewed across a
number of institutional design parameters including the scope and membership of an arms
control regime, the types of enforcement mechanisms employed to monitor an agreement,
and the length of the agreement. Each of these design parameters are explored in stand-
26Sarah Elizabeth Kreps and Anthony Clark Arend, “Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional
Theory of Adherence to International Legal Regimes,” Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 16 (2006): 331.
27Often, members of the negotiations spoke glowingly of the leadership provided by the Heads of Delega-
tion to each of the negotiations.
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alone chapters of this dissertation to follow. 28 It is worth noting that in practice arms
control negotiations rarely take place in one room. Rather, representatives of states parties
are usually dispersed across a number of locations in which they are empowered to represent
their respective government on particular issues—whether the definitions of key provisions
in the Treaty, technical verification measures to be included in the Treaty, or the reporting
obligations to be included in the Treaty. The number of meetings and rounds of talks also
vary from one arms control regime to another.
In both the negotiation and institutional design conversations, political considerations
external to discussions between states parties also lurk in the background. In the United
States, for example, the inter-agency involving relevant Cabinet departments and Congres-
sional delegations play a central role in shaping U.S. negotiation priorities. Upon successful
negotiations, these political considerations external to the negotiations themselves become
central as states parties decide whether to sign and subsequently ratify an agreement prior
to its entry into force.
1.4.4 Entry into Force
Generally speaking, states—partiuclarly in bilateral contexts—do not conclude negotiations
until it is clear that the agreement will be signed by their respective executives and ratified
by their constituents to enter into force. In multilateral contexts, this is complicated by
the fact that a subset of states can conclude and sign an agreement without consensus.
Upon signature, international agreements are subject to ratification procedures that vary by
state—but that nominally involve a process informed by domestic politics. In Russia, for
example, the Duma ratifies arms control agreements while in the United States the Senate
is given this responsibility. Recent work from Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz examines the
challenge associated with ratification process by identifying a credibility gap facing dovish
(generally, Democratic) Presidents (described as a “ratification premium”) that complicates
their efforts to achieve arms reduction via ratification by Congress.29
Following the ratification of an agreement, an agreement’s entry into force is contingent
upon a period following the signature and ratification of the agreement by all or a subset of
state parties or on a specific date specified by the Treaty. Article XIV of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, for example, notes that the Treaty will enter into force 180 days after
the last of the 44 states included in Annex 2 of the agreement deposits its instruments of
ratification. Of these states, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States, have signed
28In this project, I focus primarily on nuclear military technologies—with existential consequences—and
those agreements that primarily concern the regulation of these technologies, but there are also a number
of arms control components included within broader international agreements. The Treaty of Versailles,
for example, includes an arms control component in calling for the disarmament of Germany. More recent
agreements to end civil conflicts—such as the Dayton Accords to address civil war in the former Yugoslavia—
also arguably include arms control components related to the disarmament of former combatants.
29Sarah E Kreps, Elizabeth N Saunders, and Kenneth A Schultz, “The Ratification Premium: Hawks,
Doves, and Arms Control,” World Politics 70, no. 4 (2018): 479–514.
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but not ratified the Treaty while North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not signed the
Treaty—thus the Treaty has not yet entered into force.
There are also numerous historical examples of arms control agreements that upon sig-
nature have not been ratified, including SALT II which was signed by both parties following
ten years of negotiations but that upon the outbreak of the USSR-Afghan War, the United
States decided not to ratify. The USSR, in turn, did not ratify the Treaty. The Arms Trade
Treaty, signed by the United States in 2013 and awaiting ratification offers a more recent
example.
1.4.5 Arms Control in Practice
For those agreements that enter into force, they become examples of arms control in practice—
with some requiring annual reporting of data to states parties, hosting a prescribed number of
inspections, or taking part in intergovernmental organizations. The practice of arms control
also involves making decisions concerning whether to comply with an arms control obligation,
or not. There are, as I note in the following chapters, varying types of provisions included in
agreements to monitor and enforce arms control agreements including information exchanges
and on-site inspections as well as a number of ad hoc and intergovernmental organizations
that support arms control agreements that states sign up to—as described in greater detail
in Chapter 5. These mechanisms, I argue, affect decisions to continue to comply with an
agreement and eschew the development and deployment of specific military technologies, or
not.
Having outlined the process of arms control, I now turn to existing work concerning the
regulation of military technology.
1.5 Understanding Arms Control
Scholars of international security have long attempted to determine the effects of technology
upon international relations. This effort has hitherto led to two avenues of research. The
first led scholars to consider the effects of technology upon the stability in the international
system. Van Evera and others came to the argument that “offensive” weapons were desta-
bilizing while, conversely, “defensive” weapons were stabilizing.30 In recent years, however,
the thesis that technology plays an exogenous role in determining stability has been called
into question with a number of scholars noting the need for further research regarding the
mechanisms through which technology impacts state behavior.31
30Stephen Van Evera, “The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War,” International
Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 58–107; Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, defense, and the causes of war,” International
Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 5–43; Charles L Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann, “What is the offense-defense balance
and how can we measure it?,” International security 22, no. 4 (1998): 44–82.
31Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, “The new era of counterforce: Technological change and the future
of nuclear deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9–49; Ryan Snyder et al., “Correspondence:
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A second avenue of research focuses on the impact of nuclear weapons upon international
affairs and arms control against the backdrop of nuclear deterrence. Indeed, much as been
made of the effects of nuclear technology, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, and
second-strike capabilities and their associated impact upon strategic stability.32 Even as the
Cold War ended, nuclear weapons have remained central to discussions in security studies—
even if most of this discussion has centered on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their
role in inter-state competition.33 Academic engagement on the question of cooperation in
the shadow of nuclear politics is altogether more limited.34
In one of the best recent examples engaging with arms control, “Do arms control treaties
work?,” Fuhrmann and Lupu focus exclusively on examining the effect of a nuclear treaty, the
NPT.35 Other treaties, however, are left out of the analysis and which aspects of the treaty are
“working” remains an open question. There is also a danger that in focusing exclusively on
agreements that seek to limit proliferation or the numbers of nuclear weapons, the literature
fails to account for secondary technologies that share strategic consequences. Roberts, for
example, notes that “in neither government nor academe does one find a sense of how the
new strategic environment has redefined what responses to proliferation are both necessary
and possible, or a concept of how these pieces of the puzzle fit together. The result is an
emphasis on fine-tuning old approaches, a tendency to apply outdated conceptual models to
new challenges, and disarray in policy.”36 This research project represents a small effort to
address these concerns by investigating a larger number of empirical cases and to consider
how the variation in the institutional design of arms control agreements affect compliance
outcomes.
The dissertation to follow offers a renewed consideration of arms control regimes across a
variety of military technologies using both quantitative and qualitative insights to consider
the lessons learned from the past seventy years of efforts to constrain the development and
New Era or New Error? Technology and the Future of Deterrence,” International Security 43, no. 3 (2019):
190–193.
32Bernard Brodie, “Nuclear weapons: strategic or tactical?,” Foreign Affairs 32, no. 2 (1954): 217–229;
Schelling and Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control”; Francis J Gavin, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear
Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” International Security 34, no. 3 (2010): 7–37; Kenneth N
Waltz, “Why Iran should get the bomb: Nuclear balancing would mean stability,” Foreign Affairs 91 (2012);
Debs and Monteiro, Nuclear Politics.
33Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons: Past Scholarly
Successes, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Research Opportunities,” Journal of Conflict Resolution
61, no. 9 (2017): 1853–1874.
34Steve Weber, Cooperation and discord in US-Soviet arms control, vol. 166 (Princeton University Press,
1992). For recent work in this space, see: Jane Eugenia Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic
Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2014); Sarah
E Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements,” Foreign Policy Analysis 14, no. 1 (2018):
127–147; Fuhrmann and Lupu, “Do arms control treaties work? Assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty.”
35Fuhrmann and Lupu, “Do arms control treaties work? Assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty.”
36Roberts, “From nonproliferation to antiproliferation.”




Figure 1.2: This figure shows the basic argument of the dissertation to follow.
deployment of strategic weapons.
1.6 Research Question
In simplest terms, this dissertation considers one central question:
• What are the variable effects of design parameters used in arms control frameworks on
compliance?
In the process, I make a series of choices concerning those institutional design parameters
representing the independent variable that are of theoretical interest (and that reflect existing
scholarship concerning institutional design). I also argue that a primary dependent variable
of interest in terms of arms control agreement outcomes is compliance—given that states
that negotiate, sign, and ratify agreements might be reasonably expected to abide by the
terms of the agreement and when they fail to do so, this represents an interesting empirical
puzzle for analysis. In the section below, I discuss compliance and the institutional design
parameters that are the subject of this dissertation and provide brief definitions that are
subsequently used to code the Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD). Both concepts are
explored in greater detail in the chapters to follow.
1.6.1 The Dependent Variable: Compliance
There are, of course, a variety of outcome variables that might be of interest to scholars
of arms control. These include the status of weapon proliferation (the number of weapons
developed, deployed, and used), patterns of state power, and instances of inter-state disputes.
This line of inquiry might, for example, allow scholars to consider what the marginal effect
of employing arms control with stringent verification regimes are on global arms numbers.
While these alternative outcome variables are no doubt of interest and may be the focus
of future work, in this project I examine compliance as the outcome variable of primary
interest.
How and why states comply with their international obligations has long presented in
a puzzle to scholars of international relations—particularly when these obligations are in
tensions with their perceived national interest. While some argue that international institu-
tions shape compliance preferences, others argue that the design of international institutions
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shape compliance outcomes.37 As noted above, much of the existing literature has focused
on environmental and economic institutions rather than security regimes.38 To some extent,
this is explained by non-security domains offering a comparatively rich empirical record from
which to garner insights. The major problem with basing our understanding of compliance
from this limited set of empirical cases, however, is that the dynamics of international co-
operation may be entirely different in non-security domains. This distinction between “high
politics” involving security concerns and “low politics” involving economic policy has been
made elsewhere in the international relations canon.
In this project, I examine instances of compliance and non-compliance in the context of
nuclear arms control—in which states face security-related trade-offs and opportunity costs
as they make decisions that affect their respective military capabilities.39 While episodes
of compliance and non-compliance are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, it is worth
noting that there are a number of instances in which states have alleged that others are in
non-compliance or have made the decision to no longer comply with the obligations of an
arms control agreement. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty, and INF Treaty each represent agreements that have, variously, faced compliance
challenges during their existence. Within the Arms Control Design Dataset, I define compli-
ance and non-compliance as follows: When all states parties in an agreement abide by the
terms of the agreement in a given agreement-year or country-agreement-year, it is coded as
compliant. If a state party to an agreement fails to abide by the terms of a treaty, then it
is coded as non-compliant. The dataset itself relies on academic, historical, and journalistic
sources to make a determination of compliance in each instance.40
Now, I turn to the institutional design parameters that are theorized to affect compliance
outcomes in the context of arms control.
1.6.2 The Independent Variable: Institutional Design
In this section, I outline the institutional design parameters theorized to affect compliance
outcomes. In the process, I draw on a rich literature concerning the effects of institutional
design on international relations.41 These design choices include decisions concerning the for-
37For an argument of the former, see Chayes and Chayes, “On compliance”; Chayes and Chayes, “Com-
pliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties.” On the latter, see Carmela Lutmar,
Cristiane L Carneiro, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Formal commitments and states’ interests: Compliance
in international relations (Taylor & Francis, 2016).
38See Aakre et al. (2016) for a recent example of work examining compliance in the context of climate
change: Stine Aakre, Leif Helland, and Jon Hovi, “When does informal enforcement work?,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 60, no. 7 (2016): 1312–1340.
39In future work, the ACDD will be broadened to include non-nuclear cases. For now, nuclear cases both
serve as cases of arms control for which we have historical accounts and empirical data while also offering
the opportunity to, as best we can, compare apples to apples.
40These choices and all of the episodes of non-compliance included in the ACDD are discussed in Chapter
3.
41Vinod K Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting (Cornell
University Press, 1998); Barbara Koremenos, “Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement
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malization, centralization, flexibility, rules, strength, scope, and membership of a regulatory
regime, as well as decisions to include verification mechanisms in the regulatory framework
and how each design consideration shapes state behavior.
As is the case with the compliance literature, much of the empirical and theoretical work
concerning institutional design focuses on non-security cases. Given the existing research
concerning institutional design in non-security settings, however, there is good reason to
believe differences in design matter and may shape agreement outcomes.42 With that said,
how variation in design characteristics of international regimes impact agreement outcomes
remains under-specified in the broader international political economy literature, in general,
and in the arms control literature, specifically.
Fortunately or unfortunately, arms control represents a series of “hard cases” for in-
ternational cooperation when compared to economic and environmental regimes given the
sovereignty costs associated with cooperating with the agreement and the existential conse-
quences for the state that complies with an agreement while another does not. As Keohane
notes in his 1990 treatise on multilateralism, “to investigate the impact of institutions on
interests, one possible approach is to identify the situations in which institutional rules are
“inconvenient”: that is, in which they conflict with governments’ perceptions of what their
self interests would be if there were no such institutions.”43 Taking weapon systems off of
the table and making missile fabrication facilities available to inspectors represent examples
of such an inconvenience, though the word may downplay its seriousness.
In the chapters to follow, I focus on four specific institutional design characteristics.
First, I examine how the scope (or type) of an agreement might shape compliance out-
comes. In the process, I compare patterns of compliance and non-compliance among agree-
ments designed to prohibit the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, agreements
designed to limit the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, agreements designed
to ban testing of nuclear weapons, and softer agreements that control nuclear technology for
the purposes of nuclear risk reduction. In the analysis, I find that agreements that are more
ambitious in terms of constraining state behavior are at increasing risk of non-compliance.
Second, I examine how varying types of verification regimes shape patterns of compliance
to test whether the conventional wisdom that stringent and intrusive verification regimes are
desirable. In the process, I also consider the variation in the types of institutions charged
with monitoring arms control regimes. An analysis of the empirical record suggests that the
flexibility,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 289–325; Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal,
“Hard and soft law in international governance,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456; Felic-
ity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, “Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations
(IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements,” The Review of International Organizations
8, no. 2 (1990): 193–220; Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, The politics of global regulation (Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2009); Joseph Jupille et al., Institutional choice and global commerce (Cambridge University
Press, 2013).
42Ronald B Mitchell, “Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance,” Interna-
tional Organization 48, no. 3 (1994): 425–458.
43Robert O Keohane, “Multilateralism: an agenda for research,” International Journal 45, no. 4 (1990):
731–764.
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most intrusive types of verification are not, as is currently believed, more likely to lead to
compliance.
Third, I compare those agreements that are designed to last in perpetuity to those agree-
ments that include a termination clause after a specific period of time. Interestingly, those
agreements that have termination clauses perform better than those that are designed to
last of indefinite duration.
Finally, I analyze how the membership of an agreement affects compliance outcomes.
While there is disagreement in the existing literature over the relative benefits of bilateral,
minilateral, and multilateral frameworks, the analysis of existing arms control agreements
suggests membership may matter less than currently believed.
Each of these institutional design variables are considered in their own respective chapter,
outlined in the section below while I also engage with prior treatments of the institutional
design of arms control that account for the delegation, obligation, and precision of an agree-
ment and consider the systemic context in which agreements are complied with by testing
for Cold War effects and the fact that a number of arms control agreements build upon one
another.44
1.7 Chapter Outline
In the following two chapters, I outline a “Framework for Analysis.” In it, I examine the
existing academic literature pertaining to compliance and institutional design before outlin-
ing the research design and quantitative methods used throughout the dissertation project.
In the second “Analysis” section of the dissertation, I analyze the effects of arms control
upon state behavior and pay particular attention to the four institutional design variables
noted above. The final chapters of the dissertation examine a series of contemporary cases
of arms control while reflecting on the findings of the dissertation both for our scholarly
understanding of arms control as well as international cooperation. I then discuss how these
findings may be salient in discussions of what arms control agreements ought to look like in
the 21st century.




Institutional Design in Theory
Abstract
In this chapter, I examine existing theoretical scholarship concerning how the design of in-
ternational institutions affects patterns of international cooperation. First, I discuss existing
theory pertaining to compliance before turning to a series of theoretical approaches to insti-
tutional design. Finally, I conclude the chapter by pointing to the various institutional design
characteristics of arms control agreements that shape state behavior—and that represent the
focus of the quantitative chapters to follow.
2.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, this dissertation is concerned with how the design of arms control
agreements shapes the behavior of states party to the agreement. The theoretical importance
of this work is driven by two puzzles.
First, and as a number of scholars have pointed out, the design of international insti-
tutions varies from regime to regime. A number of institutions, like the NPT for example,
place binding commitments on states parties and involve a formal institution to monitor
these commitments. At the same time, states also use informal, ad hoc arrangements to
address specific international issues without an enforcement mechanism. The G-20, G-8,
and BRICS processes each serve as contemporary examples of these informal institutions.1
Theory concerning the conditions under which states choose each type of agreements and the
consequences of these choices remain, as Vabulas and Snidal point out, under-determined.
Second, compliance with international regimes varies from agreement to agreement and
state to state. For example, the vast majority of states party to the NPT have eschewed
the development of nuclear weapons—and some the development of nuclear technology for
1Vabulas and Snidal, “Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (II-
GOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements.”
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peaceful purposes altogether. However, other states that have signed up to the Treaty—
most notably Iran and North Korea—have failed to abide by its restrictions on uranium
enrichment.2 Outside of security regimes, compliance with climate change accords and in-
ternational economic institutions including the World Trade Organization have also varied
considerably, with little by of theorizing how the the institutional design of the agreements
affect state behavior.
This variation—as well as the interaction between agreement design and state behavior—
remains under-examined in the institutional design literature despite the potential for the
academy’s understanding of design characteristics to shape downstream consequences. This
dissertation seeks to address this gap in the theoretical literature by providing an empiri-
cal analysis of institutional design in the context of arms control and tracking compliance




Figure 2.1: This figure outlines the argument of the dissertation as a whole.
In the chapter to follow, I examine the existing literature concerning the institutional
design of international institutions. Then, I examine existing treatments of compliance.
Finally, I outline how theoretical approaches to institutional design and compliance will be
applied to the research design outlined in Chapter 3.
While this chapter reviews a considerable portion of the academic literature pertaining
to international institutions from realist, liberal, constructivist, and rationalist perspectives,
it is by no means exhaustive as scholars have long sought to understand the conditions
under which cooperation among states “breaks out.”3 As such, this work does not repre-
sent a treatise on international cooperation.4 Instead, it focuses on a particular cooperation
2Other states—including India, Pakistan, and Israel—have avoided joining the regime altogether.
3Charles Lipson, “International cooperation in economic and security affairs,” World Politics 37, no.
1 (1984): 1–23; Joseph M Grieco, “Realist theory and the problem of international cooperation: Analysis
with an amended prisoner’s dilemma model,” The Journal of Politics 50, no. 3 (1988): 600–624; Robert
Jervis, “From balance to concert: a study of international security cooperation,” World Politics 38, no. 1
(1985): 58–79; Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation, and trust in world
politics (Springer Nature, 2007); Katja Weber, “Hierarchy amidst anarchy: A transaction costs approach to
international security cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1997): 321–340.
4Duncan Snidal, “Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation,” American Political Sci-
ence Review 85, no. 3 (1991): 701–726; Peter M Haas et al., Knowledge, power, and international policy
coordination (University of South Carolina Press Columbia, SC, 1992); Scott Barrett, “A theory of full
international cooperation,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, no. 4 (1999): 519–541; James D Fearon, “Bar-
gaining, enforcement, and international cooperation,” International Organization 52, no. 2 (1998): 269–305;
Stephan Haggard and Beth A Simmons, “Theories of international regimes,” International Organization 41,
no. 3 (1987): 491–517. Milner, in particular, provides a useful review of this literature in her 1992 arti-
cle: Helen Milner, “International theories of cooperation among nations: Strengths and weaknesses,” World
Politics 44, no. 3 (1992): 466–496.
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challenge—arms control—as a prism through which to (re)assess existing international the-
ory.5
2.2 Institutional Design in Theory
The academic debate surrounding the effects of international institutions has been driven,
in large part, by whether and how institutions shape state behavior.6 Indeed, cooperation
under conditions of anarchy—particularly related to government decisions concerning their
security—has long been a focus of international relations scholarship.7
However, much of the existing literature concerning the design of international insti-
tutions and their effects upon international cooperation have leveraged comparatively rich
empirical examples of international cooperation concerning economic cooperation—engaging
with debates concerning compliance with GATT/WTO rulings and state participation in
supranational institutions—and environmental agreements.8 The same is true of existing
work related to escape clauses that allow states to leave an agreement—and of which sunset
clauses represent a subset.9 While this is understandable given the relatively high number
of these types of agreements, it perhaps ignores the class of agreements that are most diffi-
5The dissertation also seeks to re-examine the conventional wisdom among policy-makers concerning the
appropriateness and hypothesized effects of various types of arms control agreement designs.
6John J Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3
(1994): 5–49; Robert O Keohane and Lisa L Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory,” International
Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 39–51.
7Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Beth A. Sim-
mons, “Treaty compliance and violation,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 273–296; Beth
A Simmons, “International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary
affairs,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 819–835; Michael Tomz, Democratic default: Do-
mestic audiences and compliance with international agreements (Stanford University Press, 2002); Kenneth
W Abbott, “Trust but verify: The production of information in arms control treaties and other international
agreements,” Cornell International Law Journal 26 (1993): 1; Mitchell, “Regime design matters: intentional
oil pollution and treaty compliance”; Harald Muller, “Compliance politics: A critical analysis of multilateral
arms control treaty enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (2000): 77–90; Chayes and Chayes,
“Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties”; Chayes, “An inquiry into the
workings of arms control agreements”; Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of international regimes.”
8Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Abbott and
Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”; Koremenos, “Loosening the ties that bind: A
learning model of agreement flexibility”; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The
rational design of international institutions,” International organization 55, no. 4 (2001): 761–799; Mattli
and Woods, The politics of global regulation; Oran R Young, Compliance & public authority: A theory with
international applications (RFF Press, 2013); Ronald B Mitchell, “Problem structure, institutional design,
and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements,” Global Environmental Politics 6,
no. 3 (2006): 72–89.
9Krzysztof J Pelc, “Seeking escape: The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements,” Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2009): 349–368; B Peter Rosendorff and Helen V Milner, “The optimal
design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape,” International Organization 55, no. 4
(2001): 829–857.
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cult to reach—that is, cooperative frameworks pertaining to security concerns. Additionally,
existing work on security institutions primarily focuses on ceasefire agreements and peace
agreements in the context of inter- and intra-state conflict rather than on arms control..10
Building upon existing theory and empirical advancements and following the example
of Kreps—who first quantitatively explored the institutional design of arms control in the
context of the role of legalization affecting the entry into force of agreements—this project
asks the question of whether theory developed to describe and explain patterns of cooperation
in the realm of “low politics” have effects in the domain of “high politics.”11
Indeed, scholarly inquiry into the causes and consequences of arms control agreements
have been altogether more rare and have tended to focus on individual case studies of specific
agreements, historical accounts, and future-oriented policy prescriptions rather than empiri-
cal inquiry.12 In the sections to follow, I examine the existing literature drawing from several
theoretical traditions within international relations—beginning with realist approaches—
that address the question of how institutional design characteristics might shape patterns of
state behavior.
2.3 Institutional Institutions and Realpolitik
Perhaps the most well-known approach to institutions—including arms control—from the
realist canon comes from the work of Mearsheimer in which he writes that “institutions have
10Barbara F Walter, “Designing transitions from civil war: Demobilization, democratization, and commit-
ments to peace,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 127–155; Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of paper?
Agreements and the durability of peace,” International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 337–372; Brett Ash-
ley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements?,” The Journal of
Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 1118–1132; Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, “Making and keeping peace,” Inter-
national Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 261–292; Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, “Fostering peace after
civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (2009):
737–759; Aila M Matanock, Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2017); Virginia Page Fortna, Peace time: Cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace
(Princeton University Press, 2018).
11Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
12Chayes, “An inquiry into the workings of arms control agreements”; Richard Dean Burns, “Arms Control
and Disarmament,” A Bibliography. Santa Barbara, 1977, Abbott, “Trust but verify: The production of
information in arms control treaties and other international agreements”; Emanuel Adler, “The emergence
of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms
control,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 101–145; Croft, Strategies of arms control: a history
and typology ; Ivo H Daalder, “The future of arms control,” Survival 34, no. 1 (1992): 51–73; Fuhrmann and
Lupu, “Do arms control treaties work? Assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty”;
Nancy W Gallagher, “Bridging the gaps on arms control,” Contemporary Security Policy 18, no. 2 (1997):
1–24; Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, “Constructing non-proliferation and arms control: The norms of
Western practice,” Contemporary Security Policy 19, no. 1 (1998): 23–54; Robin Ranger, Arms and Politics,
1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context (Macmillan of Canada, 1979); Joseph S Nye,
“Arms control after the cold war,” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 5 (1989): 42–64; Marc Trachtenberg, “The Past
and Future of Arms Control,” Daedalus, 1991, 203–216; Thomas C Schelling, “What went wrong with arms
control?,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (1985): 219–233.
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minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability
in a post-Cold War world.”13 Scholars of the realist tradition remain skeptical concerning
the utility of treaties and international law without an associated coercive apparatus that
reflect inter-state power dynamics—that is, a powerful state to exercise coercion. Privileg-
ing relative gains concerns and characterizing the relations between states as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma in which trust is difficult to achieve, realist scholars have tended to be skeptical
concerning the role of arms control, specifically, and international institutions, in general..14
Valentino, Huth, and Croco, for example, contend that “whatever pressures toward restraint
these treaties may exert on their signatories appear to be overwhelmed by the strategic in-
centives that combatants face to prevail and limit the costs of war to their own citizens.15
Similarly, Bohlen argues that “treaties are powerless to deter determined cheaters, in part
because they lack enforceable sanctions for violations. For that reason, the response to vio-
lations will necessarily lie in political or military action by the international community or
individual states outside the treaty or regime.”16 Following this line of argument, a number
of analysts and policy-makers continue to argue that arms control has been and will always
be a dangerous illusion.17
Others within the realist tradition treat arms control as a useful but ultimately peripheral
process that can reduce the costs and risks of competitive security policies at the margins.18
Within this process, international institutions represent a cipher or manifestation of state
power. Gavin, for example, suggests that “identifying the nuclear arms race as the driving
force behind the Cold War—instead of the geopolitical and ideological conflicts between the
Soviet Union and the United States—has led many analysts to overstate the importance
of arms control treaties and regimes, both in the past and today.”19 Harking back to dis-
armament as a condition of victory, Betts argues that there remains a “gap between the
instinctive appeal of the idea [arms control] in liberal cultures as they settle epochal con-
flicts, and its inherent defects in relations among independent states as they move from peace
toward war.”20
In discussions concerning how states design institutions and how they work, realist schol-
arship also tends to privilege relative power between state parties with the suggestion that
institutional design choices favor the more powerful over the less powerful. In a study
13Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions.”
14Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214;
Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland Press, 1979); Van Evera, “The cult of the
offensive and the origins of the First World War”; Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institu-
tions.”
15Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco, “Covenants Without the Sword International Law
and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” World Politics 58, no. 3 (2006): 339–377.
16Bohlen, “The rise and fall of arms control.”
17Colin S Gray, “Arms control does not control arms,” Orbis 37, no. 3 (1993): 333–348.
18Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma.”
19Gavin, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War.”
20Richard K Betts, “Systems for peace or causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new
Europe,” International Security 17, no. 1 (1992): 5–43.
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of CoCom—a military technology export control framework—and economic containment,
Mastanduno suggests that hegemonic leadership plays an integral role in maintaining co-
operation among states within an institution.21 Further, as Benvenisti and Downs observe,
“a fragmented legal order provides powerful states with much needed flexibility... the exis-
tence of multiple contesting institutions removes the need for them to commit themselves
irrevocably to any given one.22 This helps them to manage risk, and it increases their al-
ready substantial bargaining power. Kreps and Arend—in what they describe as a positional
theory of adherence—also include aspects of state power in their explanation of why states
comply with international regimes: “the most significant determinants of behavior are the
position of that state in the international system.”23 Moreover, “the nature of the treaty
regime, the extent to which the regime infringes on state sovereignty, the nature of veri-
fication [and] enforcement arrangements of that regime, and the normativity of the treaty
regime” represent subsequent considerations that affect patterns of cooperation and state
behavior.24
Broadly, realist scholarship suggests that arms control regimes constrain states only when
they allow themselves to be constrained or they are coerced into compliance. However, this
explanation fails to account for either the variation in institutional design frameworks used to
govern military technologies or the variation in state behavior within and among agreements.
Moreover, the existence of arms control frameworks that constrain the most powerful states
without constraining their less powerful adversaries offers something of a puzzle for this
theory. These scholars, perhaps unsurprisingly, rarely take the institutional design of arms
control agreements into account in their scholarship.
2.4 Normative Theory
Unlike scholars that view arms control as symptomatic of broader power relations, normative
scholars suggest that arms control agreements represent an outcome of a shift in the “logic
of appropriateness” concerning the developments and deployment of military technology
among states. Some scholars suggest that this process represents a “social process” among
and between states and subsidiary interest groups.25 In simple terms, they argue that specific
types of weapons systems have become normatively undesirable and that this has led to a
21Michael Mastanduno, Economic containment: CoCom and the politics of East-West trade (Cornell
University Press, 1992).
22Eyal Benvenisti and George W Downs, “The empire’s new clothes: political economy and the fragmen-
tation of international law,” Stan. L. Rev. 60 (2007): 595.
23Kreps and Arend, “Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to Inter-
national Legal Regimes.”
24Ibid.
25Nina Tannenwald, “The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use,”
International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433–468; Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists
beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics (Cornell University Press, 2014); Richard Price,
“A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo,” International Organization 49, no. 1 (1995): 73–103.
CHAPTER 2. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN THEORY 24
“taboo” against their use. Below, I point to scholarship on norms concerning nuclear use,
chemical weapons, and landmines to illustrate the normative approach to arms control.
With regard to weapons bans, in particular, constructivist scholars describe the eradica-
tion of specific classes of weapon technology in normative rather than strategic terms. Price,
for example, tracks the genealogy of efforts to ban and eradicate chemical weapons in a study
of mustard gas and nerve agents. Tannenwald, too, describes efforts to ban nuclear weapons
and the development of opposition to nuclear weapons in normative terms. This opposition,
she argues, is central to the non-use of nuclear weapons since the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, respectively. In both cases, the concept of a “taboo” has been used to describe
state compliance with a variety of norms.26 Work on landmines and small arms have followed
in this vein suggesting that norms against military technology become “institutionalized” in
arms control regimes.27
More theoretical work from constructivist scholars use “structurationist” approaches to
examine the domestic, national, and international drivers of international cooperation sur-
rounding arms control given “constructed” or “socialized” ideas of technology effects and
their consequences for international stability. Adler, for example, points to the role of thought
leaders—Brodie, Ellsberg, Hoag, Kahn, Kaufmann, Schelling, Halperin and Wohlstetter—in
disseminating ideas concerning the appropriate responses to the challenge posed by nuclear
weapons to states.28 Krause and Latham’s more recent scholarship also suggest that norms
and ideas internalized by states drive nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament poli-
cies lead to their receptiveness to traditional arms control frameworks.29
Normative scholars, then, tend to consider the conditions under which arms control
agreements are produced—rather than their design or consequences. Keck and Sikkink,
however, pose the central question for both scholars and policy-makers concerning arms
control: “[the] socialization literature theorizes the diffusion of norms over time and space,
but it is still puzzling as to why some norms seem to be internalized and complied with more
than others.”30 This puzzle serves as a motivating question for this project as it seeks to
explain both the observed variation in the institutional form of arms control agreements and
the subsequent effect of these varied characteristics on compliance.
26Tannenwald, “The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use”; Nina
Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb: Origins of the nuclear taboo,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005):
5–49; Price, “A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo.”
27Denise Garcia, Small arms and security: new emerging international norms (Routledge, 2006).
28Adler, “The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution
of the idea of nuclear arms control.”
29Krause and Latham, “Constructing non-proliferation and arms control: The norms of Western practice”;
Keith R Krause, Culture and security: multilateralism, arms control and security building (Routledge, 2012).
30Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics.
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2.5 Domestic Politics
Yet other scholars suggest that domestic politics plays a central role in conditioning state
behavior and international cooperation.31 The most obvious linkage between domestic pol-
itics and arms control stem from scholarship examining models of bureaucratic politics. In
research suggesting that domestic political imperatives decrease the likelihood of arms con-
trol, Miller points out that arms control represents an effort to interfere with the defense
policy process, to constrain certain kinds of weapons, options, and practices for the “greater
good” of national security.32 He goes on to note that this process engages the interests of
defense decision-making and weapons acquisition bureaucracies. These actors, he notes, seek
security not by constraining or eliminating weapons and military options but by providing
them.33 Thus, state compliance reflects the proclivities of domestic interest groups.
Functionalists, in particular, often argue that governments cooperate with each other be-
cause of increasing material demands from domestic actors.34 As Moravcsik argues, “states...
represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials de-
fine state preferences and act purposively in world politics.”35 Martin, Milner, Tomz, Leeds
and others have also suggested that domestic signaling by state leaders to the electorate
in democratic states impacts international cooperation and compliance with international
agreements.36 This analysis has come to focus on audience costs and the “hand-tying” na-
ture of international commitments on state leaders as drivers of domestic behavior. Jessica
Weeks has also made the argument that these audience costs impact autocratic leaders as
well as democratic leaders—though the respective causal mechanism varies on the basis of
regime type.37 With regard to public attitudes concerning arms control, there are few studies
and little theorizing concerning how domestic preferences percolate to policy-making. In-
deed, Platt in an 1982 RAND study found that public attitudes toward arms control have
been schizophrenic at best—despite the role of Congress in the ratification process of the
31Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adver-
saries.”
32Steven E Miller, “Politics over promise: Domestic impediments to arms control,” International Security
8, no. 4 (1984): 67–90.
33Ibid.
34Cheryl Shanks, Harold K Jacobson, and Jeffrey H Kaplan, “Inertia and change in the constellation of
international governmental organizations, 1981–1992,” International organization 50, no. 4 (1996): 593–627.
35Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics,” Interna-
tional Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–553.
36Lisa L Martin, Democratic commitments: Legislatures and international cooperation (Princeton Univer-
sity Press Princeton, 2000); Tomz, Democratic default: Domestic audiences and compliance with interna-
tional agreements; Brett Ashley Leeds, “Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and interna-
tional cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science, 1999, 979–1002; Edward D Mansfield, Helen V
Milner, and B Peter Rosendorff, “Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade
agreements,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 477–513.
37Jessica L Weeks, “Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve,” International Orga-
nization 62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64.
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United States.38 In follow-up work using country-agreement-year and dyad-agreement-year
data rather than agreement-year data, I explore the domestic determinants of institutional
design and compliance with arms control agreements.39
2.6 Utilitarian Theory
Finally, I turn to utilitarian approaches to institutional design and arms control. In simplest
terms, this theory suggests that “form follows function” and that institutional design rep-
resents deliberate attempts to solve bargaining and enforcement challenges—reflecting state
interests during the period in which international institutions are negotiated as well as an
attempt to subsequently shape state behavior.
Scholars from this tradition argue that arms control agreements, like other forms of
cooperation, offer tangible benefits to participants and that when they do, we should expect
them to be created—even among adversaries.40 Schelling alludes to the inherent cooperative
structure of these arrangements as “games in which, though the element of conflict provides
the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some
kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation.”41 What are these benefits? According to
Schelling and Halperin, arms control frameworks have three goals: to reduce the probability
of war by reducing uncertainty and crisis instability, to reduce the cost of war, and to reduce
the cost of preparing for war.42 In discussions with former arms control negotiators, many
note that negotiations have primarily focused on the ability of arms control to contribute
to crisis stability by allowing for greater predictability during crises.43 Yet others posit a
more tautological pursuit of arms control not for its benefits but as an end in itself: “the
‘arms race’ is commonly believed to be a major cause of international tension; it follows
that the “control of the arms race” is to be sought as a kind of end in itself.”44 Scholars
38Alan Platt, The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance, technical report (RAND Corpora-
tion, Santa Monica CA, 1982).
39As a result of choices taken to parse the arms control regime data, theory pertaining to domestic politics
are left out of the subsequent quantitative chapters.
40Hedley Bull, “The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age.(Studies
in International Security, II.),” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1962,
Keohane and Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory”; Susanne Therese Hansen, “Taking ambiguity
seriously: Explaining the indeterminacy of the European Union conventional arms export control regime,”
European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 (2016): 192–216; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft
law in international governance”; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international
institutions”; Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between
Adversaries.”
41Thomas C Schelling, “The strategy of conflict. Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 2, no. 3 (1958): 203–264.
42Schelling and Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control.”
43Interview with Amb. Linton Brooks, March 19, 2018. This account is consistent with other inteviews
carried out in Washington, DC under the Chatham House Rule.
44Trachtenberg, “The Past and Future of Arms Control.”
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of institutional design—of both functionalist and rational persuasions—have considered how
the design characteristics of international agreements reflect these utilitarian considerations.
Others have also suggested that existing institutions adapt to new circumstances with shifting
priorities and institutional structures that reflect these utilitarian considerations.45
Following the functionalist literature that points to the variety of roles that international
institutions play in international relations, institutionalist theory began to consider the role
and purpose of international organizations in the form of regime. Institutionalist scholars
have defined regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international re-
lations.”46 Further, scholars suggested that the variation in international institutions was
driven “by purposes they serve, the instrumentalities they use, and the functions these in-
strumentalities actually perform.”47 These institutions provide a “set of mutual expectations,
rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments allowing for
cooperation to occur.48 But, why would sovereign states create these institutions that im-
pinge upon their ability to act?
In simple terms, institutions offer states a pathway toward a desired end. Some scholars
suggest that states pursue their interests strategically and use multilateral institutions when
unilateral actions are unavailable or unlikely to have the desired effect. They further argue,
“treaties are signed on the basis of material cost-benefit calculations.”49 Koremenos, Lipson,
and Snidal go further to suggest that regime design and attempts to change regimes represent
the sum of rational, utilitarian, and purposive interactions among states.50 They go on
to argue that “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they
design institutions accordingly.”51 In a similar vein, Keohane and Martin suggest that, “when
states can jointly benefit from cooperation we expect governments to attempt to construct
such institutions.”52 What are these benefits? “Institutions can provide information, reduce
transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination,
and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.”53 These benefits are also arguably
easier to achieve in an environment with repeated games.54 Recent work, reflecting research
on “institutional nesting,” has also pointed to the importance of the “institutional context”
45Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting.
46Stephen D Krasner, International regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983).
47John Gerard Ruggie, “International responses to technology: concepts and trends,” International orga-
nization 29, no. 3 (1975): 557–583.
48Ibid.
49Hansen, “Taking ambiguity seriously: Explaining the indeterminacy of the European Union conven-
tional arms export control regime”; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”;
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions.”
50Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions.”
51Ibid.
52Keohane and Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory.”
53Ibid.
54Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International
Organization 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–735; Robert Axelrod and Robert O Keohane, “Achieving cooperation
under anarchy: Strategies and institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–254.
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in which new agreements are embeddedas well as the existing and prior agreements among
prospective partners in “new” agreement.55
Unlike theories that privilege the domestic drivers of arms control frameworks, this theory
suggests that utility is derived from the benefits of achieving arms control and that institu-
tional design follows—that is, form follows function. Bohlens account of arms control during
the Cold War underscores this theory: “in a period marked by uncertainty, tension and
enormous potential for instability—especially within the former Soviet Union—the treaties
created a structured and predictable environment.”56 As hand-wringing over the future of
arms control in the 21st century continues, this structured and predictable environment is
what many scholars and policy-makers view as being at stake.
The information and commitment problems that James Fearon outlines in the “Ratio-
nalist Explanations of War are illustrative of the challenges facing states as they attempt to
create arms control institutions.57 In the realm of arms control, Gallagher suggests, “mis-
perceptions, not objective conflicts of interest, are the primary cause of arms races, security
dilemmas, and deterrence instabilities.”58 As a consequence one of the goals of arms control
frameworks are to provide information about state intentions.59 This reality underlines the
importance of verification mechanisms included in a variety of arms control frameworks.
In the dissertation to follow, I examine several hypotheses informed by the theoretical
approaches discussed above using the both quantitative and qualitative methods using an
original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD) described in greater detail in the chapter to
follow. There are a variety of impacts of institutional design worthy of scholarly attention. In
the proceeding chapters, I consider methods to address the effects of arms control agreements
with varying design characteristics (specifically the types of agreement, verification regimes,
flexibility mechanisms, and membership in an regime).
As Young notes in his work on environmental regimes, “the ultimate justification for
devoting substantial time and energy to the study of regimes must be the proposition that
we can account for a good deal of the variance in collective outcomes at the international
level in terms of the impact of institutional arrangements.”60
55Mark S Copelovitch and Tonya L Putnam, “Design in context: existing international agreements and new
cooperation,” International Organization 68, no. 2 (2014): 471–493; Miles Kahler, “Evolution, choice, and
international change,” Strategic Choice and International Relations, 1999, 165–96; Aggarwal, Institutional
designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting.
56Bohlen, “The rise and fall of arms control.”
57James D Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–
414.
58Gallagher, “Bridging the gaps on arms control.”
59Vince Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty? Risks and Options After New START, technical
report (Center for Naval Analyses, 2019).
60Oran R Young, International cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment
(Cornell University Press, 1989).
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2.7 From Theory to Analysis
To address this challenge, the dissertation proceeds by describing the quantitative methods
that leverage the empirical record associated with arms control to investigate how varying
the characteristics of arms control affects compliance. In the process, I introduce the Arms
Control Design Dataset (ACDD)—the first database used to track the design characteristics
of arms control regimes on the basis of their respective Treaty texts.
This dataset allows for an empirical analysis of the institutional design theories discussed
above in the context of security arrangements—adding an important set of observations to
the scholarly record as well as contributing to a re-examination of the accepted wisdom
surrounding the effects of institutional design. Not only does the analysis test whether




Compliance and the Variation in
Arms Control Design
Abstract
In this chapter, I outline the quantitative methods employed in the quantitative chapters of
the dissertation. Specifically, I outline the coding criteria of variables included in the Arms
Control Design Dataset (ACDD) before outlining the modeling approaches used to derive
the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year basis given the presence or
absence of specific institutional design parameters. The chapter also includes an account of
all episodes of non-compliance coded as the dependent variable in the analysis to follow.
3.1 Introduction
Much of the existing work concerning arms control considers the conditions under which
arms control occurs.1 Recent scholarship, for example, considers how leadership traits affect
adversarial cooperation and arms control treaty ratification.2 Research concerning the con-
sequences of arms control is altogether more rare. Fuhrmann and Lupu’s (2016) treatment
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in an article provocatively titled, “Do Arms
Control Treaties Work?” offers a primary example of scholarship aimed to assess the effects
1Betts, “Systems for peace or causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe”;
Andrew Kydd, “Arms races and arms control: Modeling the hawk perspective,” American Journal of Political
Science, 2000, 228–244.
2Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, “The Ratification Premium: Hawks, Doves, and Arms Control”; Michaela
Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, “Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach,” American Journal of
Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019): 53–66; Kreps, Saunders, and Schultz, “The Ratification Premium: Hawks,
Doves, and Arms Control.”
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of arms control—even if it focuses upon just one of the myriad agreements designed to limit
the development of nuclear arms. Indeed, it is rare that only one institutional design could
perform these functions in a satisfactory way. As a result arms control negotiators have
scope for choice.3
In this chapter, I outline a research design to quantitatively examine the consequences of
this choice and that expands the number of cases considered in the existing literature and
subjects them to a systematic investigation. In the process, I introduce the Arms Control
Design Dataset (ACDD) used for the empirical analysis in Chapters 4-7. First, I outline the
dependent variable of interest: compliance with an arms control agreement. Then, I describe
each of the independent variables that are subject to analysis in the following chapters while
also describing their prior treatment in the existing literature. Third, I describe the control
variables analyzed throughout this study. I then outline the modeling approaches used
within the study to follow within the quantitative chapters of the dissertation. Throughout,
I include a number of empirical examples to illustrate how each of the variables have been
coded—including an in-depth explanation of the coding criteria related to compliance and
non-compliance.
3.2 Introducing the Arms Control Design Dataset
(ACDD) v.1
In the section to follow, I introduce the original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD).
The dataset is designed to systematically track the design parameters of intergovernmental
arms control agreements from 1945 through June 2019. At this stage, the dataset focuses
on examples of nuclear arms control.4
3.2.1 Selection Criteria
In the initial build of the ACDD, I use Kreps’s list of forty-six nuclear-related arms control
agreements as the selection criteria for inclusion in the dataset.5 Of those, thirty-six meet
the condition of having entered into force and not representing an international institution
rather than an international agreement.6 I use this selection criteria to avoid researcher-
introduced bias into the dataset though there are a number of additional nuclear and non-
nuclear agreements coded and available for analysis.7
3Alexander Ovodenko and Robert O Keohane, “Institutional diffusion in international environmental
affairs,” International Affairs 88, no. 3 (2012): 523–541.
4I discuss the logic of this decision below.
5Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
6As noted in each of the quantitative chapters, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect states to comply
with agreements that have not entered into force. Kreps also considers the IAEA as a separate arms control




Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963
Hotline Treaty 1963
Space Treaty 1967
Treaty of Tlatelolco 1969
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1970
Accidents Measures Agreement 1971
ABM Treaty 1972
Seabed Treaty 1972
Interim Agreement, SALT I 1972
Zangger Committee 1974
Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement 1974
Nuclear Suppliers Group 1978
Moon Agreement 1984
Treaty of Rarotonga 1986
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime 1987
Intermediate Range Nuclear Material 1988
Threshold Test Ban Treaty 1990
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty 1990
India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement 1991
Lisbon Protocol 1991




Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia NWFZ) 1997
Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations 1997
Lahore Declaration 1999
Mongolia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 2000
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) 2002
Proliferation Security Initiative 2003
UNSC Resolution 1540 2004
Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2007
African NWFZ 2009
Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Treaty of Semei) 2009
New START 2010
Table 3.1: This table notes those agreements included in ACDD v.1 as well as the year that
they entered into force.
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3.2.2 Unit of Analysis: Agreement-Year
The ACDD is comprised of arms control design data on an agreement-year basis in which I
code institutional design characteristics on an annual basis. As such, it includes columns for
both Year and Agreement along with a column for Description. This agreement-year treat-
ment mirrors the past quantitative treatments of the institutional design of arms control.8 As
an example, the Missile Technology Control Regime established in April 1987 is included in
the dataset from 1987 until the present. Each of its institutional design characteristics, from
membership to scope is coded for each of the agreement years. When agreements end either
via a termination clause, like START I in 2009, or via abandonment, as was the case with the
ABM Treaty in 2002, they drop out of the dataset. The dataset is also sensitive to changes
in a regime over time (on an annual basis). For example, START I was multilateralized
following the end of the Cold War as former Soviet states were included in the regime. In
follow-up work, I envision using the agreement-year data to build a country-agreement-year
database.9
At the time of writing, the ACDD includes 1,187 agreement-years for analysis.
3.3 Analyzing Compliance: The Dependent Variable
As noted in Chapter 1, the dependent variable of interest is compliance on an agreement-year
basis. The ACDD treats this as a dichotomous measure of whether an agreement is complied
with on an annual basis. There are several criteria associated with coding compliance and
non-compliance using academic, historical, and journalistic sources.10 Primarily, I am con-
cerned with whether states parties perform actions that violate agreed treaty language. This
dichotomous measure does not assess whether non-compliance with an agreement proffers a
strategic advantage, non-compliance was accidental, or whether non-compliance enhances a
state’s military capacity vis a´ vis other states parties—each of which may be of interest for
follow-up study.
agreement.
7The minilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) involving Iran and the P5+1 serves as
an example of an agreement left out of Kreps’s list but is considered in the later chapters of this dissertation.
8Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
9Using country-agreement-year as the unit of analysis would allow for country-based control variables
such as regime type and GDP that may affect decisions to meet a state’s international obligations. The
challenge of such an approach is determining the appropriate scope of the countries to be included in the
dataset—whether the P5 or the nine states alleged to have nuclear weapons if focused on strategic arms
control agreements or an even broader set of states for an analysis of non-stategic arms control.
10Several volumes were helpful in drawing my attention to episodes of non-compliance with arms control
agreements. These include: Richard Dean Burns, The evolution of arms control: from antiquity to the nuclear
age (Praeger Security International, 2009); Goldblat, Arms control: a survey and appraisal of multilateral
agreements; Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (Sage, 2002);
James A Schear, “Arms Control Treaty Compliance: Buildup to a Breakdown?,” International Security 10,
no. 2 (1985): 141–182; Gloria Duffy, “Arms control treaty compliance,” Encyclopedia of arms control and
disarmament 1 (1993): 279.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 34
The consistent coding criteria for a determination of compliance and non-compliance
used in the analysis to follow is: An agreement-year is measured as in compliance if all
states parties are fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. If a state should fulfill their
obligations under the Treaty, it is scored as non-compliant within that agreement-year in
which the non-compliance occurs. It is possible for those agreements that have non-compliant
states parties to re-enter compliance as compliance is determined on an per-year basis. The
ABM Treaty serves as an example of an agreement in which states parties are non-compliant
before re-entering compliance. In this version of the ACDD, only agreement-years in which
an agreement has entered into force are included. If an agreement is abandoned, it is taken
out of the dataset. The CFE Treaty, for example, is taken out of the dataset following
Russia’s withdrawal from all of the Treaty’s obligations in 2015.
In the sections below, I describe several episodes of non-compliance included in the ACDD
dataset. In the dataset itself, agreement-years are coded as 0 when states parties are in
breach of an agreement during that year and are coded as 1 when the provisions set out
in the Treaty are met. I begin by examining several breaches of testing obligations before
turning to breaches of the ABM, INF, CFE, and NPT, respectively.
3.3.1 Non-Compliance with Testing Bans
Upon signing and ratifying the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the United States took the view
that any radiation released from an underground nuclear test that crossed an international
border was a violation of the agreement, whereas the Soviet view was that there had to be
fallout, for example, that the radiation so released was reaching the earth’s surface. This
disagreement may have contributed to a series of incidents in which air samples containing
radionuclides outside the borders of the USSR following underground Soviet test explosions,
which routinely led to U.S. charges that the treaty had been violated.11. The Soviet test of
15 January, 1965 serves as an example of such a test leading to Secretary of State Dean Rusk
to send a de´marche (or aide-memoire) to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin four days
later.12. In April 1966, an underground PIN STRIPE weapons test at the Nevada Test Site
also produced radioactive gases. According to recent documents published by the National
Security Archive at George Washington University, the State Department feared that U.S.
monitoring of French nuclear tests in 1972 via its NICE program may violate the LTBT.13
The September 1979 “South Atlantic flash” or Vela Incident represents the final episode of
11See Treaty Banning Nuclear Testing in the Atmosphere, Oceans, and Outer Space, 480 UNTS 43 (1963)
12Memorandum of Conversation, “Signals Received of an Explosion in the Soviet Union,” 19 January
1965, Secret; State Department aide memoire, 15 February 1965, unclassified, National Security Archive at
George Washington University.
13Phillip Odeen, NSC Staff, to Dr. Kissinger, “Observations of 1972 French Nuclear Tests,” 13 March
1972, enclosing memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to Kissinger, “Weapons Effect Data Collection
from 1972 French Nuclear Tests,” 3 March 1972; Burr, William (2013) National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 433.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 35
non-compliance associated with the LTBT in the dataset. In each of these instances, I code
these as examples of non-compliance in each agreement-year.
There are also a number of allegations of non-compliance that are not included in the
dataset. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974 and that limits the yield of under-
ground nuclear tests to under 150 kilotons by 1976 was a source of sustained consternation
given the difficulty in both designing nuclear tests that do not break a specific yield thresh-
old and difficulties associated with monitoring the yield of nuclear tests. A U.S. 1985 report
titled, “Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements,” suggests that during the
early 1980s “Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely viola-
tion of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 but these allegations
were not included in subsequent compliance reports.”14 More recently, the United States via
the Defense Intelligence Agency and White House has alleged that Russia has violated the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBTO has, at the time of writing, not corroborated
this claim using its international monitoring system.15 Given that the CTBT has yet to
enter force and the lack of documentation surrounding both allegations, I do not include
these episodes in the dataset.
3.3.2 The ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty, signed in 1972, was designed to limit the number of anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) complexes used to defend areas against nuclear missiles on a ballistic trajectory in
both the United States and USSR. The construction of the Yeniseysk-15 phased array radar
at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia in 1980 led to allegations by the United States in 1983
that the USSR was in violation of its commitments to the ABM Treaty 1983 until 1987
when construction was halted.16 Russia initially claimed that the site was designed for space
surveillance rather than an ABM mission before later noting that the site was in breach of
the ABM Treaty—the site was demolished in 1989. During this period, the United States
also complained that the USSR’s extensive antiaircraft system might be used in a way that
might violate the ABM treaty. This latter concern was driven, in part, by ambiguity in
the Treaty language concerning what constituted a “strategic” or “tactical” target.17 Given
these developments, the ACDD dataset codes the years following the allegation of breach in
1983 until the halting of the radar’s construction in 1987 as non-compliance.18
14“Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements” U.S. Department of State, Special Report No.
122, February 1985.
15Gordon, Michael (2019). “U.S. Says Russia Likely Conducting Low-Yield Nuke Tests, Defying Test Ban
Treaty” Wall Street Journal. May 29, 2019.
16This violation was reported by the United States to the ABM Treaty’s Standing Consultative Commis-
sion in autumn of 1983. See also: “United States: Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review”
August 31, 1988; Archived by the Federation of American Scientists.
17This ambiguity remains at issue today.
18This is arguably a conservative approach given that construction began in 1980 and the facility was not
demolished until 1989.
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In the late 1990s, new developments concerning missile defense technologies contributed
to efforts to amend the existing ABM Treaty by the Clinton administration. In an episode
reminiscent of the Krasnoyarsk episode noted above, Russia alleged on 18 April, 2000 that
the Globus-2 radar station under construction in the Norwegian town of Vardo represented
a violation of the ABM Treaty—noting that that prior to being located in Norway, the radar
was used in ABM tests in the United States. On December 13, 2001 President Bush officially
announced that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and exercising
the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty, with the effective date of withdrawal six months
following this announcement on June 13, 2002. At the time of the announcement, according
to NTI, “the United States already had begun testing a ground-based system designed to
intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The U.S. Navy had also been testing
some components of a shipboard missile intercept system.”19 In August 2001, the Pentagon
announced plans to deploy five ground-based interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska. Given the
developments in Norway, Alaska, and the decision to withdraw in 2001, I code agreement-
years 2000-2002 as an episode of non-compliance in the dataset.
As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation
Chris Ford noted at the 2019 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference referring to
the ABM and in a discussion of INF systems, the United States made the decision to exercise
the withdrawal provision in the Treaty rather than fail to abide by its commitments under
the Treaty—though it offers one of the rare examples of Treaty abandonment.
3.3.3 Non-Compliance with the INF Treaty
The allegations of non-compliance associated with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty from 2007 to 2019 are perhaps more clear-cut than those above.20 The INF
Treaty, designed to address “intermediate nuclear forces”—ground-launched ballistic missiles
(GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges of between 1,000 and
5,500 kilometers—and their destabilizing consequences in the European theatre, sought to
ban a specific type of nuclear delivery vehicle. A letter from President Obama to President
Putin on May 28, 2014, the United States disclosed its determination that Russia was in
breach of its INF obligations. According to the New York Times, “in May 2013, Rose
Gottemoeller, the State Departments senior arms control official, first raised the possibility
of a violation with Russian officials.”21 The violation centered on Russia’s deployment of
the 9M729 SSC-X-8 long-range ground-based cruise missile system that uses the Russian
Iskander launcher. Expert accounts concerning the range vary but are generally believed to
be between 300 miles and 3,400 miles—falling in the range addressed by the Treaty.
19Nuclear Threat Intitiative, “Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty).”
Available at: https://www.nti.org
20I discuss thee abrogation of the INF Treaty in greater depth in the following: Andrew W. Reddie,
“Design Matters: The Past, Present and Future of the INF Treaty,” Trust & Verify Issue No. 162.
21Gordon, Michael, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty” New York Times, July 28,
2014.
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In discussions with former government officials in Washington, DC, they suggest that
Russian plans to leave the INF Treaty predate the development and deployment of the 9M729
in 2007 and 2008. In the process, they note two factors that may have contributed to this
decision. First, that the INF Treaty is no longer in Russia’s strategic interest—particularly
given the perceived asymmetrical effects across the signatories. In simplest terms, the INF
Treaty impinges upon Russia’s regional freedom of action in a manner not commensurate
with the effects for the United States. Second, past negotiators noted that Moscow may
have perceived the abrogation of the Treaty as being “costless” given the lack of attention
paid to the Treaty following the sunset of its verification provisions, illustrated by the failure
of the Special Verification Commission to meet between 2000 and 2016.22
To bring these developments up to date at the time of writing, the United States has
initiated the withdrawal provision included in the Treaty with the agreement likely to be
abandoned in August 2019.
For the purposes of the analysis carried out later in the dissertation, the ACDD codes
the episode on non-compliance with the INF Treaty from 2007 through 2019.
3.3.4 Conventional Forces in Europe
Russia’s non-compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is more clear-
cut still given that it announced its intention to suspend implementation of the treaty de-
signed to limit conventional weapons deployments in Europe on December 12, 2007. Moscow
also made clear that it would not provide a required year-end account of its forces required
by the information exchange mechanism included in the Treaty. As a consequence of this
announcement, Russia would no longer provide information to information exchanges or
on-site inspections of its treaty-limited weapons including tanks, armored combat vehicles,
heavy artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. The Foreign Ministry announcement
also stated that Russia would not be “bound” by the Treatys arms ceilings and deployment
restrictions. While Moscow announced its intention to no longer implement the Treaty, they
remained a member of the Joint Consultative Group that governs the Treaty for almost eight
years.
Following failed attempts to bring Russia back into compliance amid broader arms control
discussions (not least New START negotiations in 2009), the United States announced that
it would “would cease carrying out certain obligations” regarding Russia under the Treaty.
On March 10, 2015, Moscow announced that it would no longer participate in meetings of the
Joint Consultative Group, suspending the Treaty—at which point it drops out of the ACDD
dataset. For the purposes of the ACDD dataset, this episode of non-compliance begins on
2007 and concludes in 2015.
22Article XIII of the INF Treaty notes that a meeting can be called “if either Party so requests”—but
neither Party made this request until Russia’s violation was made public.
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3.3.5 Lahore Declaration
The failure of India and Pakistan to comply with the Lahore Declaration for two years
following the Kargil crisis represents another example a non-compliance example included
within the dataset. The Declaration designed to recognize the nuclear dimensions of conflict
between the two countries and to create a series of confidence-building measures that reduce
the risk of nuclear conflict (accidental or otherwise) was completed in February 1999. By
May of the same year, the Kargil War had suspended these measures.23 A softening of
tensions between the two states in 2001 led both sides to re-engage in dialogue and the end
of this particular episode of non-compliance tracked by the ACDD.
3.3.6 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Episodes of non-compliance are also not limited to bilateral or minilateral contexts. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has also suffered a number of breaches associated
with failures to safeguard nuclear material or abide by nonproliferation commitments. In
the cases of Romania, South Korea, and Egypt, a single public noncompliance report from
the International Atomic Energy Agency that serves as the NPT’s monitoring organization
led the governments of those three states to policy remedies. In five cases involving Libya,
Syria, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, compliance issues were altogether more complicated.
The cases of North Korea and Iran are perhaps the most problematic from the perspective
of compliance, with the former eventually withdrawing from the Treaty. Below, I describe
episodes of non-compliance related to each.
North Korea’s accession to the NPT begins controversially. While Pyongyang accedes
to the Treaty in 1985, it fails to fulfill the obligations of membership spelled out in Article
III that involves completing a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within 18 months of
accession. Following the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from the Korean peninsula in
1991, North Korea signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on January 30, 1992. By
September of the same year, IAEA inspectors request clarifications of several issues provided
by North Korea in their provisional report to the Agency. In February 1993, the IAEA
demands access to two sites believed to hold nuclear waste. Pyongyang refuses this request
and is no longer in compliance with the Treaty. At the same time, Pyongyang makes its first
threat to withdraw from the Treaty by exercising Article X that reads, “Each Party shall in
exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to
the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice
shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.”24 Pyongyang subsequently announced that it is suspending its withdrawal
23For an excellent analysis of the nuclear dimensions of the Kargil crisis, see: Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine
Fair, Jamison Jo Medby, “Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella,” RAND, 2001.
24Article X, par. 1, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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on the eve of it taking effect. This marks the beginning of ten years in which North Korea
has a stockpile of plutonium in contravention of its NPT commitments—even as it engages
in a series of international negotiations culminating in the 1994 Agreed Framework. The
United States’ withdrawal from the Agreed Framework and allegation that North Korea
has nuclear weapons, culminates in North Korea restarting nuclear enrichment and ordering
IAEA inspectors out of the country. In response, the IAEA Board of Governors adopt a
resolution condemning North Korea’s decision to restart its nuclear reactor. On January
10, 2003 North Korea announces its withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), effective January 11.25 Iran has also been the subject of several episodes of non-
compliance associated with the NPT amid concerns that Tehran’s civilian nuclear industry
was being used to create a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The development of Iran’s
nuclear program—particularly its extensive nuclear fuel cycle and enrichment capabilities—
have been subject to international negotiations and a series of sanctions regimes since 2002
upon Tehran’s revelation of the previously undeclared Natanz Enrichment Complex26. Iran’s
non-compliance with the existing nonproliferation regime culminated in the negotiation of
the Joint Coomprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2014 and 2015 involving Iran and the
P5+1.27 The JCPOA, designed to last twenty-five years, limits Iran’s nuclear enrichment
capabilities and installs an IAEA inspection regime in return for sanctions relief.28 Following
U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, it remains to be seen whether Iran continues to comply
with the Agreement. The JCPOA, along with the Ban Treaty and the Singapore Summit
documents are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8 of this dissertation.
Each of these examples contribute to episodes of non-compliance related to the NPT
from 1993-2014.
3.4 Coding Institutional Design
As noted in the previous chapters, there is considerable variation in the design of various arms
control regimes. In the section below, I discuss the variables measured in the Arms Control
Design Dataset v.1. A number of these variables are subsequently used in the quantitative
analyses carried out in Chapter 4-7. All of the coding associated with institutional design
are derived from the respective arms control treaties.
25As Article X requires that a country give three months notice in advance of withdrawing, this decision
is particularly interesting. Rather than waiting three months, North Korea argues that it has satisfied that
requirement because it originally announced its decision to withdraw in March 12, 1993, and suspended the
decision one day before it was to become legally binding. This particular interpretation of international law
remains untested.
26This complex would later be the subject of one of the only cyber attacks with kinetic consequences via
the Stuxnet virus. For more on this, see Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, Crown Publishing, 2014.
27The P5+1 is comprised of the United States, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom, and Germany.
28Richard Nephew, “Triggers, Redlines, and the Fate of the Iran Nuclear Accord,” Arms Control Today
47, no. 10 (2017): 21–25.
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3.4.1 Arms Control Type
As noted in the previous chapters, arms control regimes address a variety of strategic prob-
lems.29 The NPT, for example, seeks to dampen the urge of non-nuclear weapon states to
proliferate, with scholars suggesting that this contributes to stability by limiting the number
of states that might find themselves involved in nuclear crises and subsequent existential
crises. The Hotline Treaty, too, seeks to enhance crisis stability by providing a mechanism
for strategic communication between the White House and the Kremlin. As a consequence,
analyses of arms control design must attempt to include the underlying arms control mission
associated with the agreement itself.
Within the ACDD, there are columns for five types of arms control agreements: 1) agree-
ments that do not attempt to “control” technology, 2) intergovernmental agreements focused
on the domestic control of military technologies, 3) steps taken to ban the testing of weapon
systems, 4) agreements that provide quantitative limits for specific military technologies,
and, finally, 5) regimes that proscribe the development and deployment of specific military
technologies. The dataset uses a series of dichotomous variables to separate agreements into
each category.30
One of the ways to conceptualize this typology is as a continuum of control over state
behavior from those agreements that do not attempt to control a military technology at all
like the Hotline Agreement, to those that are focused on risk reduction and export control
such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to those that impact weapon development in terms
of testing like the Limited Test Ban Treaty discussed above, to agreements that limit the
number of weapons allows in state arsenals such as START I and New START, to those
agreements that prohibit the development and deployment of entire classes of weapons as
the INF Treaty does.31 I use this schema to build a variable (TypeCat) that scores agreements
from 0 to 4 based on where they fall on this continuum.
In summary, I analyze the arms control type using both dichotomous and categorical
measures. This approach is mirrored in the consideration of verification considered in the
following section.
3.4.2 Verification
As with the types of arms control above, the types of verification regime examined in this
section are designed to be collectively exhaustive, but it is important to note that they are
29Schelling and Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control.”
30These are noted in the following columns in the dataset NoControl, Control, Testing, Limitation, and
Prohibition.
31It is worth pointing out at the outset that the analysis of various types of arms control agreement does
not always easily allow for the creation of a mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive typology given that
a number of arms control regimes include a number of cross-cutting responsibilities involving states parties
to the agreement. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, proscribes the development of nuclear
weapons in non-nuclear weapon states in Article II while also including an export control component in
Article I.
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rarely mutually exclusive as a large number of agreements employ a variety of institutional
mechanisms to monitor and verify agreements. The INF Treaty, for example, calls for the
exchange of data at the outset of the treaty framework to determine each state’s stockpiles of
Soviet SS-12s, SS-23s, SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s and U.S. Gryphon GLCMs and Pershing-IIs
followed by baseline on-site inspections followed to determine the veracity of these declara-
tions in the three-year period of elimination with a varying number of on-site inspections
allowed each year and “portal monitoring” at production facilities for a period of 13 years
until the sunset of the verification regime in 2001.
For the purposes of the analysis of verification regimes, I define three categories of coop-
erative monitoring and verification regime analyzed in this chapter: information exchanges
(V-INF ), on-site inspection regimes (V-OSI ), and challenge inspections (V-CI ). There is,
of course, a final category of agreements that do not specify or include a monitoring and
verification regime (NoVer).
Loosely, we might consider these types of monitoring and verification tools on a continuum
of “stringency” or “intrusiveness,” though I analyze each separately before constructing and
analyzing them as a categorical variable (String).
The dataset also includes a variable (VerDi) that denotes those agreements that include
a verification regime like the NPT discussed above—that are scored as 1—as opposed to
those that do not like the Wassenaar Arrangement—that are scored as 0.
The verification chapter also considers the types of organizations that are engaged with
monitoring and verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The V-Org column
provides the name of the verification organization, where available while OrgDi provides a
binary score of whether a verification organization exists for the agreement (scored as 1) or
not (scored as 0).
The analysis in Chapter 5 also examines how different types of verification bodies affect
compliance outcomes. These verification organizations, I argue, fall into three categories
that broadly reflect the membership of an agreement.
First, there are a number of agreements that have no verification organization attached
to them (NoOrg).
Second, there are tailored institutions designed to address compliance issues related a
specific treaty (Tailored). Tailored institutions that address implementation and compliance
issues have their origins in early efforts to control nuclear arms. SALT I’s Standing Consul-
tative Commission (SCC) offers the first example of this type of institution that continues to
be used today. The INF Treaty created the Special Verification Commission (SVC) charged
with meeting at the request of a state party to discuss compliance issues. The SVC also
played a key role in designing the on-site inspection rules and regulations that would be-
come part of the Protocol to the Treaty outlined above. Like the INF, the New START
Treaty includes the tailored Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to address the prac-
tical implementation of the treaty commitments of states parties. These institutions tend
to be bilateral or multilateral and have no permanent staff associated with them. These
Commissions involve government officials from the governments of states parties and are
often ad hoc.
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Rather than the ad hoc institutions involving representatives of states parties noted
above, intergovernmental organizations with professional and permanent staffs represent an
alternative type of verification organization (Intergov). The modal example in terms of nu-
clear weapon programs is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has a
role in supporting the implementation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) via its
safeguards agreements with non-nuclear weapons states. The IAEA has also been tasked
with overseeing safeguards associated with various treaties related to nuclear-weapon-free
zones (NWFZs) such as Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Semei) as well
as efforts to account for all nuclear material used for energy and research purposes in effort
to prevent their diversion to weapons programs—e.g. Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material. The UN’s 1540 Committee has also been given responsibility for the im-
plementation of UNSC 1540 in which states are obliged to “refrain from supporting by any
means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transport-
ing, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of deliv-
ery.”32 Treaty-specific organizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)—the implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention—and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)—the implementing body for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that has yet to enter into force—also serve as examples
of this type of organization. These types of institutions tend to have professional staffs, a
Secretariat, a budget supported by states parties, and limited integration into the broader
UN system.
3.4.3 Flexibility: Sunset Mechanism
There are a variety of flexibility provisions related to agreement design including optional
protocols that add to state obligations in relation to an agreement, reservations that abrogate
the responsibility of a state party to a specific aspect of an agreement, escape clauses that
set out a process for a state party to withdraw from an agreement, and termination clauses
that designate a date on which the responsibilities of the state party to a treaty will end.
Of these flexibility provisions, some have comparatively little variation—reservations and
optional protocols are exceedingly rare and escape clauses omnipresent.33 As an example
of the latter, Article XV (par. 2) of the INF Treaty reads, “Each Party shall, in exercising
its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that ex-
traordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior
to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”
32UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) updated in UNSC 1673 (2006), UNSC 1810 (2008), UNSC
1977 (2011).
33Escape clauses are often included in the penultimate or final article in an agreement and provide the
process through which a state party can withdraw from an agreement.
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The existence of termination clauses, however, vary both in terms of their inclusion
and in terms of their length among arms control agreements. In ACDD v.1, I include two
variables related to termination clauses or sunset mechanisms. The first is a dichotomous
measure (SunDi) that codes the presence or absence of a termination clause. Where present,
I also include a variable that measures the amount of time until the termination occurs
(TimetoSunset).
3.4.4 Membership
I use two different criteria for coding membership of agreements. The first borrows from
Vaynman’s doctoral work that splits agreements into those that are bilateral (involving two
states parties), minilateral (involving three to nine states parties), and large multilateral
agreements (involving 10 parties or more).34 Each of these types of membership associated
with an arms control agreement are provided their own column in the analysis: Bilateral,
SmMulti, and LgMulti. The dataset also includes a column that tracks the number of parties
(NumParties) in an agreement that occasionally varies while an agreement is in force.
The second criterion draws a dichotomous distinction between those agreements that are
bilateral and those are multilateral (involving three or more states parties) using a scored
dichotomous variable (Multilateral1 ). It is worth pointing out that as the dataset is composed
of agreement-years, there are agreements that transition between the categories. START I,
for example, negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union, was multilateralized by
the Lisbon Protocol upon the dissolution of the USSR to address the 3,000 strategic nuclear
weapons and 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons deployed within the newly independent states
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—increasing the number of states parties to the Treaty
from two to five. COCOM, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Missile Technology Control
Regime also steadily increased their respective numbers of states parties during the period
covered by the dataset.
Among those frameworks included in the dataset, there is one case that does not fall
simply into a coding criteria. I code the Mongolian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone—in which the
Mongolian government unilaterally declared that the government would not pursue nuclear
weapons technology—as a multilateral agreement in the dataset following the recognition of
this status by the United Nations.35
34Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adver-
saries.” It is worth noting that the definition of minilateralism varies beyond the methodological choice made
here as regimes and cooperative frameworks that include up to 30 states are occasionally described as being
minilateral. For the purposes of the ACDD, I use a range of three to nine states in order to compare my
analysis and findings with previous work.
35This status is enshrined within UN documents: A/55/56 S/2000/160.
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3.4.5 Control Variables
The analysis also includes a number of additional columns collected to serve as control vari-
ables for the analysis or to be of use in future work. The first set of these variables are those
coded by Kreps concerning the obligation, delegation, and precision of agreements. These
categorical variables are constructed by scoring each agreement in terms of its institutional
design parameters:
Obligation—Degree of agreement’s binding nature:
• 0 for “gentleman’s handshake”;
• 1 for formally binding;
• 2 for no reservations, declarations, understandings; and
• 3 no escape clauses.
Precision—Specificity of requirements embedded in agreement:
• 0 for aspirational in terms of numbers, behavior, timelines;
• 1 for specificity in terms of arms control behavior (e.g., action required on testing,
whether states can develop weapons or not); and
• 2 for specificity in arsenal numbers, thresholds, delivery vehicles, timelines for reaching
objectives.
Delegation—Degree to which states assign authority for the enforcement of the agreement
to third parties:
• 0 for no outside agency delegation, inspections, or specified monitoring;
• 1 for reporting of compliance through regular meetings or information exchanges;
• 2 for monitoring through states National Technical Means; and
• 3 for verification through on-site inspections.
36
I include these variables to engage with prior work on the institutional design charac-
teristics of arms control agreements and also to offer an alternative (and hopefully, clearer)
treatments of institutional design variables that avoid mixing different types of verification
regime as is the case with the delegation variable above.
The ACDD also includes a binary measure of whether an agreement-year falls into the
Cold War period (ColdWar1 ) and a dichotomous measure of whether an agreement-year
36Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
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represents a follow-on arms control agreement (Successor1 ) as is the case with New START
following on from START I.
In addition to the variables used in the analysis to follow, the ACDD includes a col-
umn that denotes whether the agreement in question serves as an example of adversarial
cooperation (Adverserial1Non0 ) per Vaynman’s definition of the term.37 It also includes a
column for future analysis to compare nuclear arms control against non-nuclear examples
(Nuc1Non0 ) and a continuous variable that tracks how long it takes for agreements to be
negotiated (NegotiationTime)
For use as an alternative outcome variables, the ACDD also includes global nuclear arms
data from the Nuclear Notebook (OverallNukes).38 A subsequent version of the ACDD that
includes country-agreement-year will also include country-level nuclear arms data.
3.5 Quantitative Approach
Ideally, an analysis of the variation of institutional design upon compliance would analyze
all instances of arms control frameworks in the context of state behavior. To do this, I use
longitudinal panel data including information concerning all design characteristics associated
with arms control regimes for all arms control agreement-years and country-agreement-years
would represent the independent variable. This would then be used in an analysis of the
dependent variable, in this compliance, to determine their relative effects.39 In the section
to follow, I provide descriptive statistics and describe the analytic approach taken to quan-
titative assess the effects of institutional design, primarily using probit regression methods.
3.5.1 Probit Modeling Approach
Probit—and logistic—models can be used for modeling the relationship between one or more
numerical or categorical predictor variables and a categorical outcome. Both require that
outcome variables be coded as 0 or 1. As noted above, the Compliance1 variable used in
this study is coded as such (with 1 denoting a compliance agreement-year and a 0 denoting
non-compliance agreement-year).40
37Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adver-
saries.”
38Hans M Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Arsenals, 1990–2018,” in Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Non-
proliferation (Elsevier, 2019), 3–35.
39Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg, “Making the most of statistical analyses: Improving
interpretation and presentation,” American Journal of Political Science, 2000, 347–361; Michael A Bailey,
Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, “Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting
data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017): 430–456; Arthur S Banks and Kenneth A Wilson,
“Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive,” Databanks International, 2013, Abbott, “Trust but verify: The
production of information in arms control treaties and other international agreements.”
40Using an alternative Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is arguably inappropriate for
models that include binary outcome variables as they can violate assumptions associated with the distribution
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In generalized linear models, instead of using Y as the outcome, I use a link function of
the mean of Y .
Yˆ = f(α + βx) (3.1)
in which Yˆ represents compliance and β represents the design characteristics examined in
this chapter.
For the link function for a probit model, the inverse standard normal distribution of the
probability is modeled as a linear combination of the predictors. The coefficients produced in
the estimation of the probit model represent the change in the Z-value for a one-unit change
in the independent variable (in this case the presence or absence of a specific institutional
design parameter). Because the probit uses a nonlinear function (the inverse standard nor-
mal distribution) to derive these coefficients, this distribution can subsequently be used to
calculate the predicted probability of compliance given particular institutional designs based
on the empirical record.41 This approach also allows to calculate the marginal effects of the
variable of interest. As an example, I can compare the predicted probabilities of compliance
between those agreements that are bilateral versus those that are not.42
Probit models can also account for the effects of co-variates by including them in the
model. When calculating the predicted probability of the independent variable of interest
against the outcome variable, however, the researcher faces a choice concerning how to
treat the co-variates—whether holding them at their mean or at specific values.43 Generally
speaking, I hold co-variates at their mean value except when considering specific institutional
designs.
The “quantitative analysis” sections in each of the subsequent chapters outlines the re-
spective processes of calculating the probit model coefficients and the predicted probabilities
of compliance given the specific independent variables of interest. Each chapter also in-
cludes a “sensitivity analysis” that considers the multicollinearity, homoskedasticity, and
independence in the data.
To address this, I use heteroskedastic probit models and a comparison of the stan-
dard errors and coefficient estimates provided by these models to assess whether the non-
independence of data points for the outcome variable or the regressors are a concern in each
of the analysis chapters to follow.
Alternative specifications that might also be used to address concerns surrounding the
independence of the data in the ACDD include fixed effect logistic and probit regression,
of errors. Recent scholarship, it is worth noting, has called this supposition into question and has led to
some debate in the methods literature: Atanu Biswas, Samarjit Das, and Soumyadeep Das, “OLS: Is That
So Useless for Regression with Categorical Data?,” in Advances in Analytics and Applications (Springer,
2019), 227–242.
41I use this particular feature of the probit model in each of the quantitative chapters and to consider
arms control regimes not included in the ACDD in chapter 8.
42The analysis of membership is the subject of chapter 7.
43This feature of the probit models built on the empirical data provided by the ACDD allow for a
calculation of the predicted probability of compliance in any given year for new arms control frameworks.
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mixed effects logistic and probit regression that model both binary outcomes and can include
random and fixed effects, and logistic regression with clustered standard errors.44
Throughout the sensitivity analyses, I find that the non-independence within the data
are negligible with the heteroskedastic probit model results (denoted by an HP after the
Model name) reported in each chapter.
3.5.2 Time Dependence
I also test whether the cross-sectional panel data considered in this analysis involving the
ACDD is temporally dependent in an effort “to take time seriously” as both a confounder and
driver of arms control outcomes. As Beck et al. note, if observations are temporally related
then the results provided by the standard probit and logit modeling approaches described
above may be misleading.45 To address this, I use Carter and Signorino’s cubic polynomial
approximation method that includes measures of time—t, t2, and t3—in the regression.46
In the analysis, t is the time since the last event.47 In this analysis, the event at issue is
a breach of an arms control agreement (t represents the time since the last event—that is,
a breach of the agreement).48 Perhaps unsurprisingly given that arms control outcomes in
one period are likely related to arms control outcomes in previous periods, the analysis in
the subsequent chapters shows that temporal dependence does have varying and marginal
effects on the findings presented in the dissertation.
The full results of the cubic polynomial approximations are included in the sensitivity
analysis sections to follow. Throughout, I run the analyses on those models that best ad-
dress the research findings described in the chapter. Usually, this involves re-assessing the
independent variable of interest alone before carrying out an analysis including design and
non-design control variables.
3.5.3 Selection Issues
As Downs et al. and von Stein have noted, analysis of observational data (and treaty data,
specifically) should consider selection effects in terms of causal inference.49 In simplest terms,
44More complex models might also be used to address concerns over the temporal dependence of the
results including the recent cubic polynomial approximation process described by Carter and Signorino—
though these are best suited to time-series and survival analyses.David B Carter and Curtis S Signorino,
“Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data,” Political Analysis 18, no. 3 (2010): 271–292.
45Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N Katz, and Richard Tucker, “Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section
analysis with a binary dependent variable,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 1260–1288.
46Carter and Signorino, “Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data.”
47Carter and Signorino explain the process of defining t on page 3 of the supplementary materials asso-
ciated with the article: ibid.
48The cubic polynomial approximation procedures offers several advantages in terms of performance,
simplicity, and interpretability compared to time dummy and spline-based alternatives.
49George W Downs, David M Rocke, and Peter N Barsoom, “Is the good news about compliance good news
about cooperation?,” International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406; Jana Von Stein, “Do treaties
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any outcome variables (in this case, compliance) must be measured against the predilection
of a state to take the same action in the absence of the variable of interest (in this case
arms control agreement design). It may also be the case that the variables driving the very
creation of an agreement with a particular design at the outset are also driving a state’s
decision to comply or not to comply with an agreement.
There are several potential approaches to addressing selection effects—though some sug-
gest that overcoming these selection issues are unlikely to be overcome statistically by using
available methods.50 One existing method used to address this issue is the use of propensity
scores, a statistical matching technique used to estimate the effect of a treatment variable (in
this case an agreement with a termination clause) by accounting for co-variates that predict
receiving the treatment.51 More recently, Lupu’s spatial model synthetic matching technique
offers another example of statistical matching methods applied to the challenges posed in
examining international agreements.52
Selection models offer an alternative, two-step statistical means of correcting for non-
randomly selected samples by treating the selection problem as an omitted variable problem
in which a first-stage probit equation estimates the selection process, and the results from
that equation are used to construct a variable that captures the selection effect.53 To do this
in the context of states signing onto an agreement, however, requires a country-agreement-
year cut of the ACDD in which correlates of countries signing an agreement can be used to
calculate whether the independent variable of interest affects state behavior.54
While it is possible, in principle, to further address selection bias by including arms
control agreements that were signed and did not enter into force—as well as arms control
agreements that were proposed but never negotiated, there would be significant concerns
regarding whether these arms control regimes that never enter a prototype phase are known
to researchers in a systematic, unbiased manner.55
constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4
(2005): 611–622.
50Gary King and Richard Nielsen, “Why propensity scores should not be used for matching,” Political
Analysis, 2016, 1–20; Sander Greenland, Judith A Schwartzbaum, and William D Finkle, “Problems due to
small samples and sparse data in conditional logistic regression analysis,” American Journal of Epidemiology
151, no. 5 (2000): 531–539.
51Simmons and Hopkins, “The constraining power of international treaties: Theory and methods”; Sim-
mons, “Treaty compliance and violation.”
52Yonatan Lupu, “The informative power of treaty commitment: using the spatial model to address
selection effects,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 4 (2013): 912–925.
53James J Heckman, “The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and
limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models,” in Annals of Economic and Social
Measurement, Volume 5, number 4 (NBER, 1976), 475–492.
54This approach offers the added advantage of addressing domestic-level factors that might influence state
behavior.
55This problem is particularly acute given the secrecy surrounding the existence and contours of arms
control debates between states in bilateral and multilateral contexts. As Kreps points out based on an
interview with James Goodby—a negotiator of the Limited Test Ban Treaty—strategic need and the decision
to undertake arms control “determine appropriate legal contours... not vice versa.” Kreps, “The institutional
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Conditional on an agreement entering into force, the analysis presented in this dissertation
evaluates why some agreements have higher or lesser predicted probabilities of compliance
based on their design characteristics given an analysis of those nuclear arms control agree-
ments included in the ACDD. In future work, a country-agreement-year treatment of the
data in the ACDD will most appropriately allow for the use of both matching protocols and
selection models to estimate the causal effects from the observational data provided by the
the cases included in the ACDD.56
Thus, the findings presented in the dissertation have the caveat, common among obser-
vational studies, that they provide a first cut at the causal relationship between institutional
design characteristics and compliance outcomes on an agreement-year basis.
3.6 Qualitative Approach
Alongside the quantitative approach noted above, I engage with a number of empirical cases
of arms control from the Arms Control Design Dataset as well as a few cases that are not
included in the dataset both to underline where the quantitative analysis is in line with
existing cases and where there may be exceptions to the general pattern described in the
modeling approaches. Arms control regimes that are explored in-depth include the INF
Treaty in Chapter 5 and the NPT in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, I reflect on the analysis
carried out in the quantitative chapters and use the ACDD as training data to assess a
numbre of contemporary arms control issues: the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons (also known as the “Ban Treaty”).
3.7 The Arms Control Design Dataset in Practice
In the chapters to follow, the variables described described above are used to reflect on pat-
terns of compliance given the various types of arms control challenges that agreements are
designed to address, what types of verification regimes are used to monitor and verify agree-
ments, whether including termination clauses to arms control agreements has the intended
effects, and whether including more parties in an agreement makes a difference to patterns
of compliance. In the process, the chapters engage with conventional wisdom concerning
which types of designs are “best” and examine whether these are, in fact, borne out in the
data.
design of arms control agreements”
56A country-agreement-year treatment will allow for regressors correlated with a state’s decisions to enter
an agreement in the selection equation separate from those regressors that are predicted to affect a state’s






The Dangers of Doing More: How
Agreement Type Affects Compliance
Abstract
Among the myriad frameworks designed to control arms, there is considerable variation in
their design—particularly in terms of their scope, membership, and flexibility. The causes
and consequences of this variation, however, remain unexplained. In this chapter, I use the
original “Arms Control Design Dataset” (ACDD) that tracks design characteristics of arms
control regimes on an agreement-year basis to examine the effect of arms control agreement
type—from test bans to arms limitation agreements—on compliance. In the process, I also
point to a number of empirical examples that vary in terms of this typology including the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, SALT Interim Agreement, START I, INF, and New START as
well as discussing the consequences of the analysis for future arms control agreements beyond
nuclear weapons.
4.1 Introduction
Are states more likely to comply with agreements designed to limit arms testing compared
to those that attempt to proscribe the development and deployment of entire classes of
weapons? How about agreements designed to limit the numbers of armaments in state
arsenals?
On one hand, export control or test bans that do not impinge upon the ability of states
to continue weapons development may be “easier” for states to comply with than agree-
ments that limit or proscribe weapons development given the relatively low opportunity
costs associated with foregoing nuclear testing compared to the years required to develop
and deploy weapon systems. On the other, having weapons in an arsenal means the oppor-
tunity to test remains omnipresent, potentially increasing domestic calls to perform testing
to maintain the arsenal. Given the potential for compliance outcomes to be shaped by the
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character of strategic problems that the arms control agreement is attempting to address,
analyzing the underlying arms control challenge associated with an agreement represents an
important—and under-explored—issue for scholarly inquiry.
In this chapter, I consider the variation in compliance outcomes across four types of arms
control agreement. First, those agreements that prohibit the development and deployment
of military technologies. Second, those agreements that limit the number of arms in state
arsenals. Third, those agreements that limit the testing of military technologies. And, finally,
intergovernmental agreements designed to promote domestic control of military technologies
via export control and risk reduction measures. In the process, I answer the following
empirical question:
• Does the underlying scope of the arms control agreement influence the likelihood of
compliance with the agreement?
In the following sections, I create a typology of arms control agreements before carrying
out an empirical examination of how compliance outcomes reflect the varying goals of agree-
ments using a series of regression models. In the process, I engage with existing theoretical
work concerning export control, test bans, arms limitation agreements, and ban treaties. I
conclude by reflecting upon how these lessons might apply to contemporary debates concern-
ing the appropriateness of using intergovernmental regulatory regimes to address emerging
technologies in general, and artificial intelligence in particular.
4.2 The Effect of Arms Control Type on Compliance
In this section, I draw on the theoretical debates discussed in depth in Chapter 2 to consider
how existing realist, utilitarian, and normative theories concerning international cooperation
and arms control might be usefully parsed in a discussion concerning the type of arms control
agreement and its attendant impact upon patterns of compliance with the agreement.
4.2.1 Epiphenonemal Arms Control
Perhaps the most well-known approach to international cooperation—of which arms con-
trol is an example—from the realist canon comes from the work of John Mearsheimer in
which he writes that “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold
little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War world.”1 Scholars of the realist
tradition remain skeptical of the utility of treaties and international law in driving state
behavior absent an associated coercive apparatus that reflects existing inter-state power
dynamics—regardless of their purpose. For example, Valentino, Huth, and Croco contend
that “whatever pressures toward restraint these treaties may exert on their signatories ap-
pear to be overwhelmed by the strategic incentives that combatants face to prevail and limit
1Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions.”
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the costs of war to their own citizens.”2 Francis Gavin, too, suggests that “identifying the
nuclear arms race as the driving force behind the Cold War—instead of the geopolitical and
ideological conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States—has led many ana-
lysts to overstate the importance of arms control treaties and regimes, both in the past and
today.”3 In scholarship examining disarmament as a condition of victory, Betts argues that
the “main problem is the gap between the instinctive appeal of the idea [of arms control] in
liberal cultures as they settle epochal conflicts, and its inherent defects in relations among
independent states as they move from peace toward war.”4 Realist scholars have also argued
that scholars and policy-makers promoting arms control as a cause of peace have the causal
arrow moving in the wrong direction and that peace, in fact, drives the creation of arms
control regimes. They go on to ask the question: “were, then, the agreements necessary?
Many of the [arms] reductions would have happened anyway, particularly in conventional
forces...”5 This perspective suggests a null hypothesis in which:
• H0: There is no pattern concerning types of arms control agreements and compliance.
With that said, some scholars within the realist tradition treat arms control as a useful
but ultimately peripheral process that can reduce the costs and risks of competitive security
policies at the margins.6 They might expect, for example, arms control agreements that
require a smaller shifts from state preferences to be more likely to succeed compared to
those in which state interests are at odds with a treaty. This argument, to some extent, is
also reflected in the contention of institutionalist scholars concerning how the scope of an
agreement is likely to shape outcomes discussed below.
4.2.2 Utilitarian Considerations
In contrast to the approaches that view arms control as epiphenomenal, utilitarian schol-
ars suggest that cooperative institutions—even among adversaries—offer states a pathway
toward the desired end and that state preferences become baked into cooperative frame-
works during the negotiation phase. A number of scholars, for example, have examined the
trade-offs that states pursue in bargaining.7 They further argue that cooperative frameworks
reflect rational calculations regarding material interest: “treaties are signed on the basis of
2Valentino, Huth, and Croco, “Covenants Without the Sword International Law and the Protection of
Civilians in Times of War.”
3Gavin, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War.”
4Betts, “Systems for peace or causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe.”
5Bohlen, “The rise and fall of arms control.”
6Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma.”
7Charles Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?,” International Organization 45, no.
4 (1991): 495–538; Fearon, “Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation.” Some scholars suggest
that states pursue their interests strategically and use multilateral institutions when unilateral actions are
unavailable or unlikely to have the desired effect.
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material cost-benefit calculations.”8 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, for example, suggest
that regime design and attempts to change regimes represent the sum of rational, utilitar-
ian, and purposive interactions among states. They argue that “states use international
institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”9 In a simi-
lar vein, Keohane and Martin suggest that “when states can jointly benefit from cooperation
we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions.”10 What are these ben-
efits? “Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments
more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation
of reciprocity.”11 Recent work, adding to previous research concerning institutional nesting,
has also pointed to the importance of the “institutional context” in which new agreements
are embedded—as well as the existing and prior agreements among prospective partners in
a “new” agreement.12
This theory suggests that the underlying strategic challenge becomes an intrinsic charac-
teristic embedded within the design of the agreement. An optimistic reading of this theory
might suggest that these design characteristics might overcome compliance challenges asso-
ciated with more difficult agreements by virtue of the design choices associated with each
type of agreement.
• H1: Overall patterns of compliance among agreements should remain similar regardless
of the type of agreement negotiated by states parties.
A more pessimistic proposition might suggest that compliance outcomes are baked into
the strategic dilemma that an arms control regime is designed to address, and that while
design characteristics might soften the likelihood of noncompliance, it remains a “hard”
problem that is likely to result in variance in relative performance based on agreement type.
• H2: Compliance with an arms control agreement may vary based on the strategic
challenge that it is designed to address.
It is also worth noting that scholars from the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective may
also expect more overall compliance with arms control agreements than the realist schol-
ars noted above, given their contention that agreements are designed to maximize compli-
ance. While violations of an agreement only occasionally lead to regime collapse, rationalist
scholars—and anecdotal evidence from policy-makers involved in arms control negotiations—
suggest that compliance represents a central concern of regime participants.
8Hansen, “Taking ambiguity seriously: Explaining the indeterminacy of the European Union conven-
tional arms export control regime”; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”;
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions.”
9Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions.”
10Keohane and Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory.”
11Ibid.
12Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Copelovitch and
Putnam, “Design in context: existing international agreements and new cooperation”; Kahler, “Evolution,
choice, and international change.”
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4.2.3 Arms Control and Logics of Appropriateness
Scholars engaged in debates concerning the appropriateness of researching, building, and de-
ploying specific types of military technologies, on the other hand, suggest that arms control
represents the outcome or manifestation of a shift in the logic of appropriateness concerning
the development and deployment of specific military technologies among states. Some schol-
ars suggest that this process represents a “social process” among states. In simple terms,
they argue that specific types of weapons systems have become normatively undesirable and
that this has led to a “taboo” against their use.
With regard to weapons bans, in particular, constructivist scholars describe the eradica-
tion of specific classes of weapon technology in normative rather than strategic terms. Price,
for example, tracks the genealogy of efforts to ban and eradicate chemical weapons in a study
of mustard gas and nerve agents. Tannenwald, too, describes efforts to ban nuclear weapons
and the development of opposition to nuclear weapons in normative terms. This opposition,
she argues, is central to the non-use of nuclear weapons since the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. In both cases, the concept of a “taboo” has been used to describe state compliance
with a variety of norms related to the banning of weapons of mass destruction.13
What normative theory does allow for is an explanation of arms control outcomes on
the basis of the types of agreement. Efforts to eradicate the development and deployment
of entire categories of weapons may be more likely to lead to compliance given the nor-
mative prohibition than those arms control regimes that are focused on constraining the
circumstances under which certain military technologies might be used or the numbers of a
particular weapon allowed in state arsenals.
This reflects a specific set of hypotheses concerning the direction of compliance outcomes
associated with the underlying strategic dilemma that an arms control regime is designed to
address:
• H3: Prohibition agreements should be more likely to yield compliance than efforts to
limit or otherwise control military technologies.
Indeed, this chapter focuses on reflecting on a puzzle noted by Keck and Sikkink in 2014:
“[the] socialization literature theorizes the diffusion of norms over time and space, but it is
still puzzling as to why some norms seem to be internalized and complied with more than
others.”14
13Tannenwald, “The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use”;
Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb: Origins of the nuclear taboo”; Price, “A genealogy of the chemical
weapons taboo.” Work on landmines and small arms have followed in this vein suggesting that norms
against military technology are “institutionalized in arms control regimes.Garcia, Small arms and security:
new emerging international norms
14Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics.
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4.3 A Typology of Arms Control
As noted in the previous chapters, arms control regimes address a variety of strategic prob-
lems.15 The NPT, for example, seeks to dampen the urge of non-nuclear weapon states to
proliferate, with scholars suggesting that this contributes to stability by limiting the number
of states that might find themselves involved in nuclear crises and subsequent existential
crises. The Hotline Treaty, too, seeks to enhance crisis stability by providing a mechanism
for strategic communication between the White House and the Kremlin. As a consequence,
analyses of arms control design must attempt to include the underlying raison d’eˆtre asso-
ciated with the agreement itself. In the section to follow, I consider international efforts
focused on the domestic control of military technologies, steps taken to ban the testing of
weapon systems, agreements that provide quantitative limits for specific military technolo-
gies, and, finally, regimes that proscribe the development and deployment of specific military
technologies. One of the ways to conceptualize this typology is as a continuum of control over
state behavior from those agreements that do not attempt to control a military technology
at all—like the Hotline Agreement—to those that are focused on risk reduction and export
control, to those that impact weapon development in terms of testing, to agreements that
limit the number of weapons allows in state arsenals, to those agreements that prohibit the
development and deployment of entire classes of weapons.16 In the section below, I describe
the four types of arms control agreements that might fit on such a continuum for use in the
empirical analysis to follow.
4.3.1 Technology Control
In this section, I discuss multilateral export control and risk reduction measures related to
specific military technologies, in turn. For the purposes of creating a useful typology for
analysis, I classify these arms control measures as “technology control.” The distinguishing
characteristic of this type of arms control is that it is non-binding and often described as
“soft law.”
Export control refers to national efforts to restrict the transfer of equipment, software,
and technology designated by the state as having implications for national security or for-
eign policy. There are a number of factors that states use to determine whether a specific
technology falls into these categories, including the potential impact of the technology upon
the proliferation of WMD, the consequences of the technology upon regional stability, hu-
15Schelling and Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control.”
16It is worth pointing out at the outset that the analysis of various types of arms control agreement
does not easily allow for the creation of a mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive typology given that a
number of arms control regimes include a number of cross-cutting responsibilities involving states parties
to the agreement. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for example, proscribes the development of nuclear
weapons in non-nuclear weapon states in Article II while also including an export control component in
Article I.
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man rights as well as other ethical considerations, and international commitments vis a` vis
sanctions regimes.
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group (NSG), Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and
the Wassenaar Arrangement each serve as prototypical examples of intergovernmental ex-
port control regimes. Each of these institutions comprises varying numbers of states that
contribute to lists of controlled technologies that domestic agencies are then tasked with
regulating. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, for example, has sought to control the spread of
nuclear technology to states outside of the existing nuclear safeguards regime via its guide-
lines in the Zangger “Trigger” List (INFCIRC/254) and “Dual Use” List that banned the
transfer of technology that represents a proliferation risk—growing from an original seven
members in 1975 when it was created in response to India’s first nuclear test to 48 member
states in 2017. The Australia Group—an informal, select grouping of states—was created
in 1985 by 15 states as a response to Iraqi use of chemical weapons to prevent the export of
chemical precursors used in the production of chemical and biological weapons. Currently,
the Australia Group’s 43 states regulate the export of 54 compounds, a number of which are
not explicitly mentioned in the Chemical Weapons Convention. The MTCR, established in
1987, addresses missile technology and associated delivery systems. The goal of the regime is
to prevent the proliferation of technology that allows for 500 kilogram payloads to be carried
more than 300 kilometers. The Wassenaar Arrangement, a follow-on arrangement of the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), offers an information-
sharing regime associated with conventional military technologies including tanks, military
aircraft, warships, missile systems, small arms, and, increasingly, Internet technology. These
arrangements attempt to provide supply-side constraints on military technology.
As well as export control mechanisms, there are a number of risk reduction regimes
designed to address other aspects of domestic policy—usually concerning nuclear technology.
The Nuclear Terrorism Convention, for example, outlines a series of best practices for states
to follow regarding the protection of nuclear power plants, sharing information regarding
terrorist threats involving nuclear weapons, and liaising with the IAEA to address crises.
The Proliferation Security Initiative similarly attempts to address the trafficking of WMD
materials and their associated delivery vehicles using domestic arrangements.
4.3.2 Testing Constraints
Rather than curbing exports—or limiting weapons numbers—testing constraints govern
whether and in what venues states can test specific military technologies.
The existing testing regime arose amid concerns surrounding the role of nuclear tests in
nuclear proliferation as well as environmental concerns related to nuclear testing. The Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), and Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT)—the latter having not entered into force—serve as examples of these
types of arms control arrangements. The LTBT entered into force in 1963 and banned atmo-
spheric, underwater, and space-based testing. It does not, however, prohibit underground
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testing.17 Reflecting the arms control debates that would follow, the test ban negotiations
that began in 1955 failed to address the question of how to verify compliance with the agree-
ment. The United States, fearing clandestine violation of any agreement (with particular
concerns about underground testing) did not want to create an uncontrolled regime. There
were also disagreements concerning the organization of a “Control Commission” to adminis-
ter inspections and organize “control posts” in each nuclear state and in the Pacific Ocean,
the number of permitted on-site inspections of each state, and the role of a veto over the
normal operation of the arms control regime. These disagreements reflected early debates
over the design of verification in subsequent arms control regimes discussed in later chapters
of this dissertation. The parties were unable to address these concerns, and the LTBT was
signed without a verification mechanism. These concerns concerning design, verification, and
compliance would later affect Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) negotiations.18 Following
the end of the Cold War, states revisited discussions surrounding a comprehensive ban on
nuclear testing—the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). To facilitate these discus-
sions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was created in Vienna,
Austria in 1996.
Despite the CTBT not entering into force (at the time of this writing), the CTBTO is al-
ready in the process of creating a series of verification mechanisms to prepare for the CTBT’s
entry into force. The first is an international monitoring system that includes seismic, hy-
droacoustic, infrasound stations that provide oceanic and underground monitoring as well as
radionuclide stations designed to detect radioactive debris. The CTBTO is also empowered
by the draft treaty to engage in state consultation/clarification, on-site inspections, and to
create confidence-building measures among states parties.19
While it might be easy to consider the creation of a nuclear testing regime as representing
a fairly low-cost method of arms control, the implementation of nuclear test bans have
consequences for the reliability of strategic weaponry, as the plutonium and uranium pits in
warheads degrade, leading to concerns that the U.S.-Russian testing moratorium from 1991
may affect efforts to modernize U.S. nuclear forces.20 As this dissertation goes to print in
2019, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted that “the U.S. Government, including the
Intelligence Community, has assessed that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons tests that
have created nuclear yield.”21
17With regard to compliance, and reflecting the importance of translating draft agreements appropriately,
there were a series of U.S. allegations in the early 1960s that the Soviets were in breach of the Treaty due to
nuclear material from underground weapons tests crossing the Soviet border. These allegations were driven,
in part, by a failure to agree upon the definition of debris in the agreement text.
18According to U.S. press reports in the 1970s, three underground tests (among the estimated 27 carried
out by the Soviet Union) are believed to have violated the 1974 TTBT and its 150-kiloton ceiling on tests
and another 13 tests in 1978 involving illegal “venting” of radioactive material—including krypton and other
fission products—into the atmosphere.
19The United States, China, India, Pakistan, DPRK, Iran, Israel, and Egypt have not ratified the CTBT
and all eight are required to sign and ratify the treaty before its entry into force.
20Author Interview, February 2019.
21Defense Intelligence Agency Statement of June 13, 2019. Available at:
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4.3.3 Arms Limitations
Arms control frameworks that involve arms limitations attempt to provide an upper-bound
number of weapons of a particular type that states must adhere to. Both the SALT and
START frameworks serve as examples of these types of arms limitation agreements in the
nuclear domain, while the 1923 Washington Naval Treaty that sought to asymmetrically limit
the construction of battleships, battlecruisers, and aircraft carriers serves as a historical non-
nuclear example.22 Below, I provide a brief account of efforts by the United States and USSR
to limit the number and type of strategic weapons that serve as examples of this type of
agreement.
Alongside the multilateral discussions in the early 1960s that resulted in the LTBT agree-
ment discussed above, the United States and USSR were engaged in contemporaneous efforts
to arrest the production of fissile material and limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons
leading to the U.S.-Soviet SALT I Interim Agreement signed and entered into force in 1972
alongside the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. SALT I represented the first attempt to
limit strategic offensive arms between the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War and froze
the number of fixed land-based ICBM launchers and ballistic missiles on submarines. The
original agreement, slated to sunset in October 1977, was extended indefinitely by both
parties.
The SALT II Agreements negotiated throughout the 1970s and signed by the United
States and USSR in 1979 set a ceiling of 2,400 ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy
bombers, and air to surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs). This ceiling was to be reduced to
2,250 by January 1981. Despite both parties initially abiding by the Agreement, the treaty
never entered into force and was invalidated by the United States exceeding the limits of the
Agreement by deploying a new heavy bomber equipped with long-range cruise missiles in
1986. Following SALT I and the SALT II Treaty that never entered force, the Treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) negotiations following the
end of the Cold War called for gradual reductions in the arsenals of both parties to 1,600
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 “accountable” warheads. This amounted to an
approximately 50 percent decrease in ballistic missile warheads available to each side.
For some types of military technologies, however, efforts to curb their numbers have been
considered inadequate. This has led to efforts to proscribe their development, deployment,
and use. Of these, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, colloquially known
as the “Ban Treaty,” serves as just the most recent example. The section below considers a




22The Washington Naval Treaty is particularly interesting given the potential return of asymmetrical arms
control following recent developments surrounding intermediate range ballistic missiles, concerns surrounding
the extension of New START in 2021, and the development of non-strategic nuclear weapons—including
hypersonic weapons.
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4.3.4 Prohibition
At the outset of this section, it is important to re-emphasize the conceptual distinction be-
tween disarmament and arms control. While disarmament represents the practice of taking
a military technology out of a state’s arsenal and often reflects moral sentiments concerning
the appropriateness of a weapon system, arms control practices are more varied and reflect
a strategic calculation among states parties. Trachtenberg, for example, argues that arms
control on occasion is about ensuring the successful use of a military technology rather than
taking it off the table.23 He notes, “a retaliatory capability as something to be enhanced,
not degraded—something to be made more secure, less accident-prone, less in need of strik-
ing quickly to avoid its own destruction, less capable of gaining advantage from a sudden
attack.”24 Schelling, specifically, suggests that “it could be an open question whether we
ought to be negotiating with our enemies for more arms, less arms, different kinds of arms,
or arrangements superimposed on existing armaments.”25 Bull in The Control of the Arms
Race also notes the potential for the practice of arms control without disarmament. Put
simply, arms control is inclusive of disarmament but not restricted to it.26 In this section,
I provide two examples of efforts to prohibit the development and deployment of military
technologies, one concerning nuclear weapons—the bilateral INF Treaty—as well as a non-
nuclear example—the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention that followed the 1925
Geneva Protocol.
The INF Treaty was designed to address the gap in the regulation of nuclear weapons
in the SALT framework that limited only the number of long-range ballistic missiles. This
regulatory gap led the USSR, in particular, to develop and deploy SS-20 missiles of interme-
diate range (with ranges of 3,000-5,500 kilometers). These missiles led to concerns on the
part of European states and the United States that European states were at risk from the
Soviets achieving a fait accompli in the region before NATO forces would be mobilized to
respond. Unlike the SALT provisions, however, the INF Treaty negotiations focused on the
elimination of an entire class of weapons—intermediate range missiles (IRMs) and shorter-
range missiles (SRMs)—from state arsenals in a quid pro quo arrangement. The Treaty also
banned the flight-testing and production of the missiles as well as the production of their
launchers. To verify the Treaty, states parties were allowed on-site inspections at missile
operating bases and missile support facilities.
Chemical weapons offer an alternative, non-nuclear example of a technology—in this
case specific chemical compounds—that has been banned for use as a military technology.
Following the use of mustard gas and other types of chemical warfare in WWI, the 1925
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
23Trachtenberg, “The Past and Future of Arms Control.”
24These arguments are also explored in older theoretical work:Brodie, “Nuclear weapons: strategic or
tactical?”; Schelling, “The strategy of conflict. Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory.”
25Schelling, “Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization.”
26Bull, “The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age.(Studies in
International Security, II.).”
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Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare banned the use of chemical agents—
gaseous or solid—from use in war. The Chemical Weapons Convention signed in 1991—and
entered into force in 1997—further prohibited all states from producing or retaining chemical
weapons with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) tasked
with determining those chemical compounds that states are prohibited from stockpiling for
military purposes.
In summary, arms control frameworks have a variety of goals and, as noted in the exam-
ples above have varying forms of membership, verification provisions, and flexibility mecha-
nisms that are the subject of analysis in subsequent chapters. Below, I outline the use of the
empirical record to shed light on how the type of arms control agreement influences patterns
of state compliance.
4.4 Quantitative Analysis
Having outlined the various types of arms control agreements that states have developed
to address advancements in military technologies, I move now to considering the question
of how agreement type affects compliance outcomes—in this case using empirical data to
investigate agreement compliance.
To test the hypotheses noted above, I carry out a series of regression analyses using the
original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD).
4.4.1 The Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD)
For the purposes of this chapter, I use a subset of strategic—that is, nuclear—arms control
agreements that entered into force from Kreps’s list of strategic arms control agreements
as my selection criteria.27 While this subset does not include agreements that deal with
other regimes like the Chemical Weapons Convention or those agreements with secondary
strategic consequences such as the Open Skies Treaty, it provides a useful tool for case
selection with the intention of minimizing researcher-introduced bias. It also usefully allows
for a comparison across a number of alternative dependent variables related to strategic
weapons that are correlates of compliance. Among the 48 agreements considered by Kreps,
I leave out those that never entered into force and those that are institutions rather than
agreements. For example, while both the United States and USSR signed the SALT II
Agreement designed to cap strategic forces and curtail development of new missiles in 1979,
it was not ratified by the United States in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and subsequently expired in 1985 without entering into force. As a result, I do not include
that agreement or those like it, including the Antisatellite Agreement of 1978, START II, or
27Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.” This list also reflects those compiled
by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Federation of American Scientists, and Jozef Goldblat’s work. Goldblat,
Arms control: a survey and appraisal of multilateral agreements; Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide
to Negotiations and Agreements.
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START III.28 The primary justification for this decision is that states cannot be reasonably
expected to comply with arms control agreements that did not enter into force—even if they
made the decision to sign them. Using this case selection criteria, the dataset used in this
chapter includes thirty-six agreements comprising 1,187 agreement-years.29
In the section below, I introduce the variables coded within the Arms Control Design
Dataset.
4.4.2 The Dependent Variable: Measuring Compliance
In the analysis, I use a dichotomous measure of compliance as the dependent variable that
reflects allegations of breaches in treaty compliance and treaty violations.30
Unlike treaty obligations that are spelled out in agreements, coding compliance involves
taking into account allegations of breaches from historical, journalistic, and government
records. Where available, I use accounts in popular U.S. and international presses to cor-
roborate noncompliance on an agreement-year and country-agreement-year basis.31
The ACDD includes a number of episodes of non-compliance across various types of arms
control agreements. The 1999 Kargil crisis, for example, led to the abandonment of vari-
ous confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to nuclear risk reduction included within
the Lahore Declaration—itself an example of an arms control regime that falls within the
“technology control” category of arms control agreements.32 The ACDD also includes several
incidences of non-compliance with commitments under test ban regimes. The most famous
of these violations occurred during the Soviet Chagan test in 1965, which was designed to
produce a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). The 140-kiloton blast, however, led to ra-
dioactive material being detected in Japan. The United States alleged that the the Soviets
had violated its commitment concerning a ban on atmospheric or underground nuclear tests
that caused “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”33 The Soviets, in turn, alleged
that the Pin Stripe underground test in 1966 and the Baneberry Shot test in 1970 at the
Nevada Test Site violated the Treaty. Episodes of non-compliance associated with arms lim-
itation agreements include the multilateral CFE Treaty that set limits on force deployments
28I also do not include the IAEA as an arms control agreement. While it does provide a role managing
nuclear safeguards as an institution in support of several arms control agreements, it does not—in my
estimation—constitute an arms control agreement in and of itself.
29All arms control agreements are weighed equally within the dataset.
30The coding criteria for measuring compliance is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. The coding
criteria for the dependent variable is also consistent across the chapters—and is included in each for the
benefit of the reader and to go alongside the discussion of measurement concerning each independent variable
of interest.
31The unit of analysis for this study is the former, agreement-year.
32S Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War
Europe,” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 127–152.
33Article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water.







Table 4.1: The categorical agreement type variable.
in Europe. Russia announced its intention to suspend its implementation of the agreement
in 2007 and Moscow decided to suspend the agreement in March of 2015. Episodes of non-
compliance related to arms control designed to proscribe the development and use of specific
military technologies include the ABM Treaty in the 1980s and the INF Treaty since 2008.
4.4.3 Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study reflect the categories of arms control type discussed
above. This involves the creation of dichotomous variables reflecting those agreements that
include aspects of technology control (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group), testing
bans (such as the TTBT), arms limitation (such as New START), and prohibition of
arms development altogether (such as the ABM Treaty).
To the extent that these four types of agreements represent a continuum of arms control,
I also create a categorical variable, agreement type in which each agreement is coded on a
5-point scale from 0-4.34
4.5 Results
In the section below, I examine the relationship between the type of arms control and patterns
of compliance on an agreement-year basis. As Figure 4.1 makes clear, there are episodes of
noncompliance across each type of arms control agreement that serve as the independent
variable of interest for the study.
To begin, I test the effect of each type of arms control agreement on compliance using
a probit regression model.35 This model is most appropriate for dealing with dichotomous
34Agreements designed to control military technologies via export control or risk reduction receive a score
of 1, test bans a score of 2, limitation agreements a score of 3, and prohibition agreements a score of 4.
Agreements like the Hotline Agreement that do not seek to regulate a specific military technology receive a
score of 0.
35A probit model uses a cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution to
define f (*)—rescaling the values of the dependent variable to fall between 0 and 1. Hence, whatever α+ βx
equals, it can be transformed by the function to yield a predicted probability.
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Figure 4.1: This figure provides a compliance count of agreement-years across different types
of agreements. Red signifies non-compliance while green signifies compliance.
dependent variables in the context of social science research. The choice of a standard probit
model also requires that the underlying data does not violate an assumption of homoskedas-
ticity.36
The probit regression equation is:
Yˆ = f(α + βx) (4.1)
in which Yˆ represents compliance and β represents the design characteristics examined in
this chapter.
Table 4.1 reports the results of each type of arms control regime regressed against patterns
of compliance.
Model 1 reports a negative and statistically significant correlation between agreements
designed to prohibit military technologies and compliance. This finding is in line with the
36This assumption is interrogated in the sensitivity analysis, below, in which the analysis is re-run using
robust clustered standard errors using a heteroskedastic probit model.
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theory that arms control agreements that are “more difficult” represent a more significant
compliance challenge. Mirroring this theory, Model 2 suggests that arms limitation agree-
ments are negatively correlated with non-compliance of arms control regimes with statistical
significance.
Model 3 finds no statistically significant relationship between testing regimes and non-
compliance while Model 4 reports no statistically significant correlation between testing
regimes and arms control regimes designed to control military technology for the purposes
of export control or risk reduction and patterns of compliance.
Overall, these results suggest two inferences. First, there is variation in compliance
with an arms control framework on the basis of the type of strategic problem that it is
designed to address. Second, that prohibition agreements and, to a larger degree, arms
limitation agreements are correlated with non-compliance with an arms control agreement
on an agreement-year basis.
Table 4.2: Probit models reporting the effect of arms control agreement type on treaty
compliance on an agreement-year basis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Prohibition -0.31 (0.11)∗∗∗
Limitation -0.78 (0.15)∗∗∗
Testing Ban 0.07 (0.19)
Technology Control 0.07 (0.12)
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.0 -247.0 -260.4 -260.3
Constant 1.71 (0.08) 1.72 (0.07) 1.57 (0.06) 1.55 (0.08)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To interrogate these findings while engaging with a series of control variables that may
also impact regime compliance, I construct a categorial variable that codes each agreement-
year in the dataset on the basis of whether it corresponds to technology control (1), test ban
(2), arms limitation (3), or prohibition (4). Models 5-8, reported in Table 4.2, assess the
correlation between agreement type and compliance while considering a number of design-
and non-design-related control variables.
Model 5, using this categorial agreement type variable suggests that a one-unit increase
in agreement type decreases—with statistical significance—the predicted probability of com-
pliance. The finding remains robust across a number of models, including a series of control
variables.
In Models 6, I include other design variables theorized to affect compliance, including
whether the agreement is multilateral, what type of verification regime is used to monitor
the agreement, and whether the agreement is of finite or indefinite duration. This result
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pertaining to agreement type holds across a number of models that include both design-
related control variables. These findings will be revisited in the following chapters.
In Model 7, I include two additional control variables theorized to affect compliance.
First, I include a dichotomous variable to account for whether the agreement-year (the
unit of analysis for the study) occurs during the Cold War. Given that the Cold War
conditions a majority of agreement-years within the dataset and Soviet-American patterns
of adversarial cooperation were reflected in a number of agreements, this is an important
driver of compliance to take into account. With that said, theories diverge with regard
to the postulated effect of the Cold War on arms control regime compliance: On the one
hand, the Cold War’s stabilizing influence may contribute to higher levels of compliance;
On the other, the mutual distrust intrinsic in the conflict may decrease both the likelihood
of compliance within adversarial agreements and the reputation costs of noncompliance.
Suggesting support for the former logic, the Cold War dummy in this analysis reports a
positive correlation with compliance.
Second, I include a dichotomous variable that accounts for whether the arms control
agreement builds upon a prior agreement. In theory, successor agreements may be more likely
to yield compliance outcomes on the basis of prior successful negotiation and enforcement.
For example, the arms limitations included in SORT built upon those outlined in START
I and included in the START II and START III negotiations before being superseded by
the entry into force of New START. Interestingly, this analyis suggests that successor status
does not have a statistically significant effect on compliance outcomes.
In Model 8, I include all of the control variables and use this model for the translation
of the probit model coefficients into predicted probabilities.
Table 4.3: Probit models for the effect of arms control agreement type using a categorical
variable on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Agreement Type -0.29 (0.05)∗∗∗ -0.46 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.52 (0.08)∗∗∗ -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.46 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.43 (0.17)∗∗
Stringency 0.17 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗
Sunset 0.66 (0.27)∗∗ 0.73 (0.32)∗∗
Successor 0.05 (0.23) -0.20 (0.31)
Cold War 0.30 (0.16)∗ 0.31 (0.16)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -242 -227.6 -240 -225.1
Constant 2.38 (0.17) 2.25 (0.19) 2.31 (0.18) 2.22 (0.20)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As discussed in Chapter 3, coefficients from probit models are more difficult to interpret
than those from ordinary-least-squares regressions, as an increase in probability attributed
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Table 4.4: This table shows the predicted probability of compliance for a given agreement-
year on the basis of agreement type holding all control variables at their mean value.
Agreement Type Predicted Probability of Compliance
No Control 99.8 %
Technology Control 99.3 %
Test Ban 97.6 %
Limitation 93.4 %
Prohibition 85.0 %
to a one-unit increase in a independent variable of interest is dependent on the values of
the control variables. As a result, scholars often report the positive and negative values of
the coefficients and their statistical significance rather than engaging with the values of the
coefficients themselves. However, the results above can be used to calculate the predicted
probability of the dependent variable of interest, in this case compliance.
Using Model 8, I calculate the predicted probability of compliance in any agreement-
year using the coefficients noted in Table 4.2. For a given agreement-year, the predicted
probability of compliance is given by the following equation:
ˆCompliance = F (2.22−0.47(AgType)+0.43(Multi)+0.19(String)+0.73(Sun)−.20(Succ)+0.31(CW))
(4.2)
where f is the cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
and the values of each control variable are fixed.
This equation allows for the calculation of the predicted probability of compliance for
each type of agreement on an agreement-year basis holding each of the covariates at their
mean value.37 The results are shown in Table 4.3. As predicted by both the dichotomous
(Models 1-4) and categorical treatment (Models 5-8) of agreement type show that the
predicted probability of compliance in any given agreement-year decreases as one moves up
the agreement type continuum.38
For agreements that are non-binding and do not have any form of technology control,
there is a 99.8 percent probability of compliance in any given agreement-year. For technology
control agreements, this percentage falls slightly to 99.3 percent. For test bans, the chances
of compliance in any agreement year are 97.6 percent. For arms limitation agreements, there
is a 93.4 percent change of compliance in any given agreement-year. Finally, for agreements
that seek to proscribe the development and deployment of specific military technologies, the
chances of compliance with an agreement on a year-on-year basis falls to 85 percent in any
37This approach is most common in social science research, though one could also hold the covariates at
their zero value to assess the relative absence of the covariates.
38These results are consistent with an analysis using alternative modeling approaches. In the Appendix
to this chapter, I include a parallel analysis using logistic regression rather than the probit model described
here.
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Figure 4.2: This figure shows the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year
basis with 95 percent confidence intervals shown as dashed lines.
given agreement-year. This result reflects the broader findings noted in Table 4.1, suggesting
that agreements that seek to “do more” have an increased chance of non-compliance.
These results can also be down in graph form. Using the categorical agreement type
variable and holding the control variables from Model 8 at their mean values, Figure 4.2
plots the predicted probabilities of complying with each type of agreement on a percentage
basis with 95 percent confidence intervals. At each point on the x -axis, agreement type, the
y-value, the predicted probability of compliance, matches those values reported above.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In the section below, I perform a series of econometric tests on the results of the analysis
above to test the appropriateness of the modeling choices and specifications chosen to run
the analysis. I begin by testing for the multicollinearity of variable effects on compliance
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Table 4.5: This table shows the Variance Inflection Factor for the probit model including
all four design variables and the Cold War and Successor control variables used in Model 8,
above.
Variables Agreement Type Stringency Multilateral Sunset Cold War Successor
VIF 1.74 1.86 1.56 1.61 1.04 1.68
outcomes.
4.6.1 Multicollinearity
To do this, I use a variance inflation factor (VIF) to measure how easy it is to achieve the
same model outcomes from a linear regression using the other predictors. The square root
of the VIF tells you how much larger the standard error of the estimated coefficient is in
respect to a case when that predictor is independent of the other predictors.
A general guideline is that a VIF larger than 5 indicates that the model has problems
estimating the coefficient..39 Table 4.5 below shows the VIF for Model 8 described in Table
4.3, above.
The results of this analysis suggest that multicollinearity, in which the explanatory vari-
ables are highly correlated, is not a concern for the analysis carried out above. I turn now
to a consideration of the independence of the data points provided by ACDD’s panel data.
4.6.2 Independence and Heteroskedasticity Probit Results
The existing methodological literature suggests that models using panel data may internal-
ize substantial cross-sectional dependence within the error term. This may occur due to the
presence of shocks common to the data points, unobserved phenomena that ultimately be-
come part of the error term, or temporal dependence. To address concerns surrounding the
independence of both the outcome variables and the regressors, I run a series of regression
models with clustered standard errors that adjust for non-independence across agreements
and across years. As I use standard probit models above, I use heteroskedastic probit models
here.40
To do this, I assess whether the circumstances in which the variability of a variable is
unequal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it exist in the underlying
data used in the standard probit models above. This test is particularly important given
that heteroskedasticity in these models can represent a violation of standard probit (and
logit) model specifications, which assume homoskedastic errors.
39Christopher Glen Thompson et al., “Extracting the variance inflation factor and other multicollinearity
diagnostics from typical regression results,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 39, no. 2 (2017): 81–90.
40The appendix to this chapter also includes the standard logistic regression models for this chapter.
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Below, I use the probit regression equation in Model 5 to test for heteroskedasticity when
using the Agreement Type independent variable, shown below:
1 = F (2.38− 0.29(AgType) (4.3)
Recall, the standard errors within the standard probit model associated with the constant
and the agreement type variable are, 0.17 and 0.05 respectively.
I subsequently calculate the Huber-White robust standard errors—also known as heteroskedasticity-
consistent (HC) standard errors—reported in the Table 4.6.41
Table 4.6: This table shows the calculation of coefficients and robust standard errors using
Model 5 that examines the effect of agreement type on the predicted probability of compliance
Variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error p <0.05
Constant 2.39 0.13 Yes
Agreement Type -0.29 0.04 Yes
The minimal difference in standard errors suggests that the agreement type and com-
pliance data are homoskedastic—and likely fulfill the criteria for using a standard probit
model. However, the difference—if negligible—suggests that a subsequent analysis of the
models using robust clustered standard errors in a heteroskedastic probit model may be
warranted. I carry out and report this analysis, below. In the process, I check whether the
findings related to the direction and statistical significance of the effects reported in Models
5-8 are consistent.42. I focus on Models 5-8 from the standard probit above as they serve as
the quantitative basis for the finding that more prohibitive arms control agreements reduce
the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year basis.
Table 4.7: Heteroskedastic probit models for the effect of arms control agreement type on
treaty compliance on an agreement-year basis
41I use the sandwich R package to carry out this analysis.Achim Zeileis, “Object-oriented computa-
tion of sandwich estimators,” Journal of Statistical Software 16, no. 9 (2006); Halbert White et al., “A
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity,” Econo-
metrica 48, no. 4 (1980): 817–838.
42These results are titled as Model 5HP to Model 8HP in which HP refers to “heteroskedastic probit” for
ease of reading
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(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5HP Model 6HP Model 7HP Model 8HP
Agreement Type -0.29 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.46 (0.06)∗∗∗ -0.29 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.47 (0.06)∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.46 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.43 (0.16)∗∗∗
Stringency 0.17 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗
Sunset 0.66 (0.29)∗∗ 0.73 (0.42)∗∗∗
Successor 0.05 (0.24) -0.20 (0.35)
Cold War 0.30 (0.24)∗ 0.31 (0.17)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -242 -227.6 -240 -225.1
Constant 2.39 (0.13) 2.25 (0.14) 2.31 (0.10) 2.22 (0.09)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Comparing the results using the standard probit and those of the heteroskedastic probit
using robust clustered standard errors does not change the direction of the effect nor the
statistical significance of the results reported above.
4.6.3 Time Dependence
I now turn to the question of whether the findings outlined above are driven by temporal
dependence.
To address this, I use Carter and Signorino’s cubic polynomial approximation method
described in Chapter 3 to include t, t2, and t3 in several regression models described above.
In these models t represents the time since the last “event.”43 In this analysis, the specific
event at issue is a breach of an arms control agreement. Thus, t represents the time, in years,
since the last episode of non-compliance on an agreement-year basis.
I report two models including t, t2, and t3. The first model presents the independent
variable of interest while the second includes the independent variable of interest alongside
the additional design characteristics and control variables.
Table 4.8: Cubic polynomial approximation probit models for the effect of arms control
agreement type on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
43Carter and Signorino, “Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data.”
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(5) (5) (8) (8)
Model 5 Model 5CP Model 8 Model 8CP
Agreement Type -0.29 (0.05)∗∗∗ -0.32 (0.08)∗∗∗ -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.40 (0.10)∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.43 (0.17)∗∗ 0.28 (0.24)
Stringency 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.21 (0.09)∗∗
Sunset 0.73 (0.32)∗∗ 0.65 (0.42)
Successor -0.20 (0.31) 0.60 (0.45)
Cold War 0.31 (0.16)∗ 0.72 (0.22)∗∗∗
t 1.08 (0.15)∗∗∗ 1.00 (0.14)∗∗∗
t2 -0.09 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.08 (0.01)∗∗∗
t3 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -242 -121.9 -225.1 -109.1
Constant 2.38 (0.17) -0.03 (0.32) 2.22 (0.20) -0.59 (0.39)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As Table 4.8 shows, the cubic approximation probit models for Model 5 and Model 8
(denoted as Model 5CP and Model 8CP) above underline the main finding of the chapter
concerning the effect of agreement type on compliance outcomes in the ACDD dataset.
There are minimal differences in the regression coefficients and no change in the statistical
significance of the result for the independent variable of interest, agreement type.
4.6.4 Selection Effects
As discussed in Chapter 3 and as Downs et al. and von Stein have noted, when an indepen-
dent variable is itself a strategic choice on an outcome there are significant selection effects
that must be taken into account when analyzing observational data.44 In simplest terms, any
outcome variables (in this case, compliance) must be measured against the predilection of a
state taking the same action in the absence of the variable of interest (in this case an arms
control agreement). As both the choice of a state to undertake an arms control agreement of
a specific design and the decision to comply with an agreement on an agreement-year basis,
the research in question .45
Thus, the findings presented in this chapter have the caveat, common among observa-
tional studies, that they provide a first cut at the causal relationship between institutional
design characteristics and compliance outcomes on an agreement-year basis.
44Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?”;
Von Stein, “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.”
45In the chapters that follow, the Agreement Type variable itself is used as a regressor to account for
the “difficulty” of an agreement conditioning the effects of the independent variables concerning verification,
termination clauses, and membership, respectively.
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4.7 Conclusion
The theoretical results of this analysis using the ACDD data are two-fold. First, compliance
outcomes vary based on the scope of the agreement. Second, the analysis above suggests that
agreements that attempt to curtail the number of weapons or prohibit states from deploying
military technologies represent the most likely types of arms control agreement that states
parties are likely to violate. In the chapters to follow I examine how the design characteristics
of these agreements may also contribute to compliance and/or non-compliance. Reflecting
on the hypotheses discussed above, this section considers how the results of this analysis
interact with existing theoretical research.
I begin by considering hypotheses from normative theory. Normative scholars suggest
that logics of appropriateness are embedded within arms control regimes—particularly those
that ban the development and use of certain military technologies including nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons that a number of scholars suggest are “unusable” regardless of the
context. As noted above, this logic is used to explain the non-use of biological, chemical,
and nuclear weapons in the existing literature.46 However, the results above suggest that
more restrictive arms control regimes designed to limit, ban, or otherwise constrain the
development and deployment of nuclear weapons are negatively correlated with compliance
outcomes—the opposite finding that normative scholars might expect:
With that said, the development and deployment of nuclear weapons is not the same
thing as using them in anger. As a result, the jury remains out regarding the contribution
of logics of appropriateness related to the use of proscribed military technologies. What
this analysis does suggest, however, is that arms control agreements designed to prohibit the
development and deployment of nuclear weapons have the highest predicted probability of
noncompliance.
I turn now to a consideration of realist scholarship. Realist scholars, particularly those
who see little value in international institutions, are likely to find mixed support for their
theoretical propositions embedded within the findings of this chapter. On the one hand, it
appears that states largely abide by their agreements. Indeed, even among those agreements
that fundamentally limit state behavior by limiting their arsenal and prohibiting the devel-
opment of certain types of weapons, an analysis of the empirical record suggests that states
party to an agreement will comply 85 percent of the time in any given agreement-year. On
the other, those agreements in which states are most likely to renege on their commitments
are those that realists might expect—those that affect the material security of the state by
limiting or prohibiting the development of specific military technologies.
Among institutionalist scholars, who might expect fairly static measures of compliance
across varied types of agreements as each is crafted to address different arms control chal-
lenges, I find limited support given the top-line finding that compliance outcomes appear
to vary based on the scope of the agreement. An alternative proposition might suggest
46Tannenwald, “The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use”; Price,
“A genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo”; Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the bomb: Origins of the nuclear
taboo.”
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that compliance outcomes are baked into the strategic dilemma that an arms control regime
is designed to address and that while design characteristics might soften the likelihood of
noncompliance, it remains a “hard” problem and as a result the relative performance of an
agreement is likely to vary based on agreement type.
The analysis above has two clear implications. First, there is variation in patterns of com-
pliance on the basis of the arms control challenge that an agreement is seeking to address—
given the selected sample of agreement-years addressing nuclear weapons. Second, to the
extent that there is a continuum of arms control types, those agreements that are most
restrictive in terms of managing state behavior represent the most significant compliance
challenges. So, what can be learned from this analysis? In the section below, I consider the
policy relevant aspects of the analysis above, note a series of avenues for further research,
and outline the chapter to follow.
Considering the contemporary challenges to international security posed by emerging
technologies, from hypersonic missiles to cyber weapons, this analysis suggests that it is
essential for policy-makers to first assess the types of policy solutions being proposed in
the bargaining phase surrounding regime creation to address these technologies. They must
also consider their downstream consequences for compliance—and particularly the degree to
which it restricts state behavior. For example, it may be the case that softer, norm-based
commitments focused on risk reduction and export control represent a more propitious path
forward concerning efforts to regulate emerging technologies and engender state compliance
compared to regulatory efforts to prohibit their development and deployment altogether.
Alternatively, policy-makers might consider including measures to address the downstream
risks of non-compliance in agreements that limit or prohibit certain types of state behavior.
These might include, for example, verification measures that detect noncompliance early
or flexibility mechanisms that allow states parties to revisit the strategic problem that a
particular arms control agreement is designed to address.
In terms of the contemporary efforts to create a ban on nuclear weapons via the TPNW, or
“Ban Treaty,” and calls to address a slew of new military technologies such as autonomous
weapons that a number of civil society groups and governments have called to ban, the
empirical record of non-compliance with agreements that proscribe the development and
deployment of specific types of military technology are worthy of further consideration: In
simple terms, be careful what you wish for. While prohibition agreements may read well in
principle, more work is needed to unpack the causes of non-compliance and why these types
of agreements are particularly susceptible to violations.
With that goal in mind, in the chapter to follow I investigate how various types of verifica-
tion regime “work” in support of arms control to parse debates about the appropriate institu-
tional designs and technical tools to be used in pursuit of compliance. Specifically, I examine
how various verification regimes—from information exchanges to inspection regimes—affect
compliance. In the process, I also point to a number of empirical examples that vary in terms
of their verification regime type including the IAEA (NPT), Special Verification Commission
(INF), Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Bilateral Consultative Commission (START) as well
as discussing the consequences of the analysis for future arms control agreements beyond
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nuclear weapons.
Appendix
The choice to use probit or logit models is generally considered to be one of personal prefer-
ence when dealing with dichotomous outcome variables. As a reminder, OLS regressions are
inappropriate as the errors from a linear probability model with dichotomous outcome vari-
ables violate homoskedasticity and normality of errors assumptions, resulting in invalid stan-
dard errors. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is increasingly disagreement about whether
these drawbacks inherent within OLS methods necessitate the use of probit or logit estima-
tors.
Below, I carry out an identical analysis to those carried out using probit regression
methods using logistic regression. The number associated with each model remains the
same with those using a logistic regression denoting an L. For example, Model 1 above can
be compared to Model 1L, below.
Table 4.9: Logit models reporting the effect of arms control agreement type on treaty com-
pliance on an agreement-year basis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1L Model 2L Model 3L Model 4L
Prohibition -0.66 (0.25)∗∗∗
Limitation -1.56 (0.28)∗∗∗
Testing Ban 0.16 (0.41)
Technology Control 0.16 (0.26)
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.0 -247.0 -260.4 -260.3
Constant 3.09 (0.18) 3.11 (0.15) 2.78 (0.13) 2.74 (0.16)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
While the coefficient estimates change, their sign and statistically significance remain the
same using either both the probit and logit modeling approaches.
Table 4.10: Logit models for the effect of arms control agreement type using a categorical
variable on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
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(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5L Model 6L Model 7L Model 8L
Agreement Type -0.59 (0.11)∗∗∗ -0.94 (0.14)∗∗∗ -0.56 (0.12)∗∗∗ -0.95 (0.14)∗∗∗
Multilateral 1.02 (0.34)∗∗∗ 0.99 (0.34)∗∗∗
Stringency 0.36 (0.13)∗∗∗ 0.36 (0.13)∗∗∗
Sunset 1.51 (0.63)∗∗ 1.14 (0.76)∗∗
Successor 0.23 (0.34) -0.47 (0.69)
Cold War 0.74 (0.34)∗∗ 0.63 (0.35)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -242 -227.6 -240 -225.1
Constant 4.49 (0.39) 4.18 (0.42) 4.31 (0.41) 2.22 (0.20)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As is the case above, the results remain the same in terms of both the sign associated
with the coefficient and the statistical significance of the result—suggesting that the results
are not sensitive to the choice of modeling approach.
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Chapter 5
Is More Better? The Effects of
Verification Regime Type on
Compliance
Abstract
Much has been made of how to craft verification mechanisms that “work” in support of arms
control—leading to debates about the appropriate institutional designs and technical tools
to be used in pursuit of compliance. However, the causes and consequences of the inclusion
of verification mechanisms in existing and historical arms control agreements have not been
subject to systematic empirical analysis. In this chapter, I use the original “Arms Control
Design Dataset” (ACDD) that tracks design characteristics of arms control regimes on an
agreement-year basis to examine the effect of various verification regimes—from informa-
tion exchanges to challenge inspections—on compliance. In the process, I also point to a
number of empirical examples that vary in terms of their verification regime type, including
the IAEA (NPT), Special Verification Commission (INF), Nuclear Suppliers Group, and
Bilateral Consultative Commission (START) as well as discussing the consequences of the
analysis for future arms control agreements beyond nuclear weapons.
5.1 Introduction
Doveryai, no proveryai.
During meetings with Ronald Reagan, Suzanne Massie taught the U.S. President a fa-
mous Russian proverb that loosely translates as, “Trust, but verify.” The phrase was repeated
by the President on many occasions—including during the signing of the now-troublesome
INF Treaty in 1987—as well as other diplomats in reference to recent efforts to govern and
regulate the use of various technologies in warfare. For example, U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry, responding to Syria’s use of chemical weapons, noted that “Trust but verify...
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is in need of an update. And we have committed here to a standard that says, ‘Verify and
verify’... If we can join together and make this framework a success and eliminate Syrias
chemical weapons, we would not only save lives, but we would reduce the threat to the
region, and reinforce an international standard, an international norm.” Verification has,
indeed, become something of panacea for policy-makers.
In general, measures specified in international agreements designed to monitor and verify
compliance with a particular regime have been theorized to contribute to compliance.1 As
Reagan argued in 1987, the INF Treaty should include “extensive verification procedures
that would enable both sides to monitor compliance with the treaty.”
In the years since, the inclination to include monitoring and verification mechanisms in
arms control agreements has represented something of a conventional wisdom. Whether
verification mechanisms perform as advertised, however, has not been analyzed empirically.
In this chapter, I use the Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD) to examine the varying
efforts used to monitor and verify compliance within arms control agreements to answer two
related research questions:
• Do verification regimes contribute to compliance?
• What are the relative effects of various types of verification regimes upon compliance?
Of the more than one hundred frameworks designed to regulate, constrain, or ban mili-
tary technology, there is considerable variation in their design—particularly in terms of their
scope, membership, verification mechanisms, and flexibility. The consequences of this varia-
tion, however, have yet to be systematically observed and examined—by academics or arms
control negotiators.2
In the process, I adjudicate between two arguments: First, that verification regimes con-
tribute to “trust” and therefore represent a necessary condition for compliance. Second, that
verification regimes may offer a politically necessary but insufficient condition for compli-
ance. The quantitative analysis below suggests that the latter is more likely to represent
reality.
In the following, I examine the existing literature pertaining to verification in the context
of arms control. Then, I introduce the original Arms Control Design Dataset and describe
how monitoring and verification are measured. I then present a series of models that suggest
that the conventional wisdom concerning the effects of various types of verification requires
1Kosta Tsipis, David W Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, Arms control verification: The technologies
that make it possible (Pergamon Books Inc., Elmsford, NY, 1986).
2The absence of a robust discussion pertaining to the causes and consequences of arms control agreements
have contributed to a reliance upon the heuristic inclinations of arms control negotiators concerning which
types of monitoring and verification measures are most appropriate. In a series of interviews with previous
U.S. and British negotiators of SALT I, START I, CFE, SORT, and NPT extension in 1995, the personal and
past experience of the negotiators in the room was consistently heralded as a driver of the success in terms
of reaching an agreement and of driving the inclusion of various design characteristics in the agreements
themselves.
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further examination. Finally, I consider the case of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, which offers useful within-case variation with regard to the effect of verification
on compliance.
5.2 Verification and Arms Control
At the outset, it is worth noting that—like arms control more generally—I treat verification
as a process rather than as an outcome. This process can be considered in one of two ways—
a technical challenge and a political process. There is a tendency (usually among engineers
and physicists) to conceptualize verification as a technical challenge.3 For example, remote
sensing, hyper- and multi-spectral satellite imaging, radar imaging, infrared surveillance,
seismological monitoring, information barriers, and zero-knowledge processes for verification
each contribute to the technical aspects of verification.4 While there is a steady prolifera-
tion of technologies and processes that contribute to enhanced monitoring and verification
procedures, it is worth noting that among policy-makers there is an understanding that 100
percent verification is not possible.5 As a consequence, designers of arms control agreements
have used the standard of “effective verification” in which state parties to an agreement have
adequate time to respond to a breach of an agreement. Negotiators for the New START
agreement in Geneva, for example, decided to include 18 on-site inspections per year in an
attempt to meet this standard.6 And while the technical aspects of arms control are no
doubt important, I argue, for the purposes of this paper, that monitoring and verification
remains a political process—often contingent upon states parties agreeing to monitoring and
inspection procedures.
In the section below, I outline the variety of institutional mechanisms created to address
monitoring and compliance issues.
5.2.1 Types of Verification Regime
The types of verification regime examined in this section are designed to be collectively
exhaustive, but it is important to note that they are rarely mutually exclusive as a large
number of agreements employ a variety of institutional mechanisms to monitor and verify
3David Hafemeister, Kosta Tsipis, and JJ ROMM, “The verification of compliance with arms-control
agreements,” Scientific American 252, no. 3 (1985): 29–35.
4Tsipis, Hafemeister, and Janeway, Arms control verification: The technologies that make it possible;
Moritz Kutt, Malte Gottsche, and Alex Glaser, “Disarmament Hacking 2.0: Toward a Trusted, Open-
Hardware Computing Platform for Nuclear Warhead Verification,” in 57th Annual Meeting of the Institute for
Nuclear Materials Management, Atlanta, GA (2016); Sebastien Philippe et al., “A physical zero-knowledge
object-comparison system for nuclear warhead verification,” Nature Communications 7 (2016): 12890.
5This was repeatedly discussed in various meetings with arms control negotiators involved in START I,
INF, CFE, and New START negotiations. See also: Amy F Woolf, “Monitoring and Verification in Arms
Control,” Congressional Research Service 41201 (2011).
6Interview with Dr. Mona Dreicer. March 29, 2019.
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agreements. The INF Treaty, for example, called for the exchange of data at the outset of
the treaty framework to determine each state’s stockpiles of Soviet SS-12s, SS-23s, SS-20s,
SS-4s, and SS-5s and U.S. Gryphon GLCMs and Pershing-IIs. Baseline on-site inspections
followed to determine the veracity of these declarations in the three-year period of elimination
with a varying number of on-site inspections allowed each year and “portal monitoring” at
production facilities for a period of 13 years until the sunset of the verification regime in
2001. Below, I define the three categories of cooperative monitoring and verification regime
analyzed in this chapter: information exchanges, on-site inspection regimes, and challenge
inspections. Loosely, we might consider these types of monitoring and verification tools
on a continuum of “stringency” or “intrusiveness,” though I analyze each separately before
constructing and analyzing them as a categorical variable, stringency. There is, of course,
a final category of agreements that do not specify or include a monitoring and verification
regime.
A number of regimes also call for the use of unilateral “national technical means”—
a euphemism for a government’s use of intelligence assets to verify compliance with an
agreement while others include mechanisms that note a commitment among states parties
to limit efforts to obfuscate the intelligence picture provided by these technical means.
Article V of SALT I first mentions, but does not define, the term:
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this
Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification
at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which
impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions
of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.7
National technical means of verification involve the use of a number of intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance platforms such as satellites to obtain multi- and hyper-spectral
imagery and seismology stations designed to detect underground nuclear tests and, more
recently, missile tests. In practice, most states use intelligence assets to assess both ally and
adversary behavior. While future work may consider unilateral information collection, this
analysis begins by considering information exchanges before moving onto on-site inspections
and challenge inspections that are often used to verify this information.
7SALT I, Article V.
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5.2.2 Information Exchange
In contrast to the unilateral activities undertaken within the “national technical means”
regime, information exchange offers a bilateral or multilateral activity in which states share
information related to a military technology of interest.
Under INFCIRC-153 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, non-
nuclear weapon states have an annual reporting requirement to divulge the balance of nuclear
material in the country and its various uses—whether in medical imaging, nuclear energy
programs, or basic research. This regime is designed to both deter and detect the diversion
of nuclear weapon for proscribed activities (in normal cases, weapon development).
Information exchanges are also common at the outset of agreements as governments
divulge existing stockpiles of weapons, the state of their weapon development programs, and,
in some cases, their locations. In some agreements, this information is used as a baseline for
a subsequent inspection regime.
In existing treatments of arms control, those agreements that include only a clause related
to national technical means of verification and that are limited to information exchanges are
most often classified as “low monitoring” regimes rather than “high monitoring” regimes
that involve putting inspectors on the ground in country.8
5.2.3 On-Site Inspection Regimes
As mentioned above, the bilateral and multilateral information sharing regimes are subject
to corroboration via on-site inspections. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are a large variety of
types of inspection regimes with rules concerning where the inspections take place, who is
permitted to perform the inspection, how long the inspection will last, how many inspections
can be performed (usually measured on an inspection per year basis), and what type of
inspections are appropriate. These types of regime are the subject of lengthy negotiations
and varying on the basis of appropriateness given the technology being regulated.
The INF Treaty, used as an example throughout this section, includes a specific number
of inspections to be carried out each year that varied as the agreement aged. Article XI,
par. 5 notes that:
Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph
for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right
to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after
entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the
subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last
five years. (Article X, par. 5)
9
8Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adver-
saries.”
9INF Treaty, Article X, par. 5.
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During the first three years of the Treaty, also described as the “elimination phase,” the
inspections were designed to compare the data received during the exchange of information
between the USSR and the United States at the culmination of the negotiations and to track
progress toward the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (specifically, a ballistic
missile with a range of 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers).
Interestingly, while a number of arms control agreements make clear that there should be
an inspection mechanism associated with a treaty, policy-makers, engineers, and scientists
were often left to craft the specific rules and procedures associated with an inspection regime
after the Treaty was completed. Often, these would take the form of a memorandum of un-
derstanding or a protocol to the treaty. The Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to The
INF Treaty serves as just one example. The Protocol itself outlined the process for carrying
out the on-site inspections associated with the regime, including the minutiae associated
with inspections such as the pre-inspection requirements (Article III), the notifications of an
inspection that both serve as a notice to the inspected state that inspectors are arriving, and
a number of requirements related to leaving the inspected location in an unchanged state
(Article IV). This process is designed to deter and prevent states from moving weapon stock-
piles prior to inspection. There are also general rules concerning responsibilities undertaken
by the inspectors themselves:
Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with
the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this
obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended. (Article VI, par. 2)
The Annex to the Protocol also outlines the privileges and immunities provided to inspectors
while they are carrying out inspections.
While the majority of on-site inspection regimes are discontinuous—that is, inspectors
enter and subsequently leave the inspected state—the INF and START I Treaty both pro-
vided for continuous “portal monitoring” to address specific aspects of the Treaty. Article
VI of the INF Treaty notes that neither party shall “produce” intermediate-range or shorter-
range missile, missile stage, or launcher. To verify this prohibition, both the United States
and the Soviets had the right to station up to 30 on-site inspectors on the perimeter and on
the transportation portals of a former INF final missile assembly or production plant. The
United States created a portal monitoring system to monitor both rail and road traffic into
and out of the Votkinsk Machine Building Factory in the Ural Mountains while the Soviets
decided to observe a former rocket motor production plant in Magna, Utah.
In START I, the portal monitoring system provided for an accurate count of the number
of ballistic missiles leaving Soviet facilities and a more accurate estimate of the total number
of mobile ICBMs in their respective force. The portal monitoring regime is described by
Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service as:
perimeter/portal continuous monitoring systems (PPCMS) consisted of fences
surrounding the entire perimeter of the facility and one restricted portal through
which all vehicles large enough to carry items limited by the treaty (such as the
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first stage of a mobile ICBM) had to pass. The portal contained scales and other
measuring devices that the countries could use to determine whether the vehicle
carried an item limited by the treaty.10
In cases of both discontinuous and continuous monitoring, on-site inspections are rou-
tinized by design. The challenge for policy-makers, however, becomes what activities occur
at the sites outside of inspection windows or at sites that are undeclared in information
exchanges by parties to a Treaty.
5.2.4 Challenge Inspection Regimes
The answer to the last question is the creation of a mechanism that broadens the scope of
inspection beyond the routinized regime noted above. In part to address the concerns that
states remain able to abrogate their commitments vis a` vis the development and deploy-
ment of proscribed military technologies, policy-makers turned to challenge inspections—
particularly in multilateral contexts. A challenge inspection occurs when a state party be-
lieves that another party to an arms control agreement is undertaking a prohibited activity.
This state party then challenges the other party to allow inspectors to investigate the alleged
breach. Unlike the on-site inspection regime noted above, challenge inspections can occur
anywhere and anytime with substantially fewer limits on inspector access and disclosure.
Negotiations surrounding one of the early nuclear-adjacent arms control frameworks, the
Seabed Treaty (the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof), illustrates the difficulty of negotiating and creating an institutional framework.
The negotiations, starting in 1969 and culminating with the Treaty entering into force in
1972, involved the dissemination of two drafts—one by the USSR and another by the United
States. These two drafts differed on the issue of verification with the Soviets—using the
recently drafted Outer Space Treaty as a guide—proposing that all installations and struc-
tures on the seabed be open to inspections. According to the U.S. Department of State, the
United States “felt that to attempt to inspect for the emplacement of all kinds of weapons
would make the problems connected with verification virtually insuperable.”11 To address
this dissensus, Article III, Par. 2 of the Treaty would go on to establish one of the early
“challenge” inspection processes related to arms control:12
If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfillment of
the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts
and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts
10Woolf, “Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control.”
11Narrative and Treaty text from the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. “Treaty on
the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof” Available at:‘https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5187.htm
12In the ACDD, the first challenge inspection process was included in the Antarctic Treaty which entered
into force in 1959.
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shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State
Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties
concerned shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification as may
be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations
or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described
in Article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal
State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such
consultation and cooperation. After completion of the further procedures for
verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the
Party that initiated such procedures. (Article III, par. 2)
More recently, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), used a hybrid
system of what the Treaty describes as “passive” inspections of declared sites and limited
number of “challenge” inspections included as a proportion of the number of overall inspec-
tions undertaken each year—until Russia announced its suspension of the agreement in 2015.
Challenge inspections have also been included in treaties creating regional nuclear-weapon-
free zones including the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and Treaty of Bangkok in
Southeast Asia.
In comparison to the on-site inspection regime noted above, challenge inspections vary
in a three important ways. First, inspection sites can be either declared or undeclared via
information exchanges. Second, inspected parties generally have less time to prepare for
the inspection. And third, challenge inspections are generally intrusive as activities with
longer time horizons such as portal monitoring are no longer viable. As a consequence,
challenge inspection regimes are most often considered at the “high” end of the monitoring
and verification continuum.
5.2.5 Verification and Enforcement Institutions
As well as varying in terms of verification design, there have also been a variety of monitoring
and verification institutions created to address the implementation and verification of arms
control. These fall into two categories that broadly reflect the membership of an agreement.
First, there are tailored institutions designed to address compliance issues related a spe-
cific treaty. Tailored institutions that address implementation and compliance issues have
their origins in early efforts to control nuclear weapons. SALT I’s Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) offers the first example of this type of institution that continues to be
used today. The INF Treaty created the Special Verification Commission (SVC) charged with
meeting at the request of a state party to discuss compliance issues. The SVC also played a
key role in designing the on-site inspection rules and regulations that would become part of
the Protocol to the Treaty outlined above. Like the INF, the New START Treaty includes
the tailored Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to address the practical implementa-
tion of the treaty commitments of states parties. These institutions tend to be bilateral or
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multilateral and have no permanent staff associated with them. These Commissions involve
government officials from the governments of states parties and are often ad hoc.
Rather than the ad hoc institutions involving representatives of states parties noted
above, intergovernmental organizations with professional and permanent staffs represent an
alternative type of verification organization. The modal example in terms of nuclear weapons
is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has a role in supporting the imple-
mentation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) via its safeguards agreements with
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The IAEA has also been tasked with overseeing safe-
guards associated with various treaties related to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) such
as Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Semei) as well as efforts to account for
all nuclear material used for energy and research purposes in effort to prevent their diversion
to weapons programs—e.g. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The
UN’s 1540 Committee has also been given responsibility for the implementation of UNSC
1540 in which states are obliged to “refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors
from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”13 Treaty-specific orga-
nizations such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—the
implementing body for the Chemical Weapons Convention—and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)—the implementing body for the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty that has yet to enter into force—also serve as examples of this type of organi-
zation. These types of institutions tend to have professional staffs, a Secretariat, a budget
supported by states parties, and limited integration into the broader UN system.
As with the design of arms control agreements themselves, the relative effects of each
type of organization responsible for implementation and verification concerns in arms control
remains under-studied.
5.3 Verification in Theory
As U.S. President Reagan’s remarks make clear, there is an expectation that the form of an
arms control agreement follows function. That is, agreements that have stringent verification
mechanisms are expected to engender greater compliance. Indeed, when “assessing” arms
control agreements, the ability to come to an agreement with high levels of monitoring and
verification for the agreement are viewed as a success: “verification has become the most
important standard against which arms control agreements—both past and prospective—
are measured.”14 This presents a challenge given what has been described as a verification
paradox: “the paradox of nuclear arms control is that monitoring strategic weapons is easiest
13UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) updated in UNSC 1673 (2006), UNSC 1810 (2008), UNSC
1977 (2011).
14William C Potter, “Verification and arms control,” 1985,
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when it’s needed least, and hardest when it’s needed most.”15
In the section to follow, I outline the functionalist, evolutionary, and norm-setting aspects
verification from a theoretical perspective. These theories subsequently link to a series of
hypotheses concerning the probabilistic effect of verification design on patterns of compliance
and non-compliance.
Scholars of institutional design have long pointed to the variety of institutional forms in
the design of international agreements—whether related to their “bindingness,” formaliza-
tion, membership, and degree of legalization.16 Much of this work explains the variation in
institutional design in terms of two limiting factors. First, the agreement between parties to
the agreement. Second, the role that an institution is designed to play—whether in terms
of trade, environmental protection, or collective security. In simple terms, “form follows
function.”
In considering arms control, specifically, “the common conception is that treaties are not
complied with because they are unenforceable, and that the cure for this condition is treaties
‘with teeth.’”17 This contributed to the hypothesis that increasing the “verifiability” of an
agreement would contribute to compliance.18 In practice, this stance has been reflected in cri-
tiques of existing verification institutions such as the Standing Consultative Committee—the
bilateral body created to address implementation and compliance issues related to strategic
arms limitation.19
Similar to the theory that form follows function, an evolutionary perspective of arms con-
trol suggests that lessons learned from past agreements—and their performance—contribute
to decisions to make verification and enforcement mechanisms increasingly robust.20 This
also, to some extent, reflects the theoretical work regarding institutional learning—though
in this case, the “learners” are states.21
Beyond the functionalist and evolutionary explanations noted above, it is also worth
pointing out the normative importance of arms control agreements—as well as their sub-
15Nancy W Gallagher, “The politics of verification: Why ‘how much?’ is not enough,” Contemporary
Security Policy 18, no. 2 (1997): 138–170.
16Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Miles Kahler,
“Multilateralism with small and large numbers,” International Organization 46, no. 3 (1992): 681–708; Kal
Raustiala, “Form and substance in international agreements,” American Journal of International Law 99,
no. 3 (2005): 581–614; Vabulas and Snidal, “Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental
organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements”; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and
soft law in international governance”; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international
institutions.”
17Chayes and Chayes, “Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties.”
18Stephen M Meyer, “Verification and risk in arms control,” International Security 8, no. 4 (1984): 111–
126.
19Sidney N Graybeal and Michael Krepon, “Making better use of the standing consultative commission,”
International Security 10, no. 2 (1985): 183–199.
20Burns, The evolution of arms control: from antiquity to the nuclear age.
21Ovodenko and Keohane, “Institutional diffusion in international environmental affairs”; James G March
and Johan P Olsen, “The institutional dynamics of international political orders,” International Organization
52, no. 4 (1998): 943–969.
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sidiary verification regimes—which has little to do with arms control outcomes and more to
do with pointing to an ethical or moral imperative. Often, the normative aspects of verifica-
tion (and arms control more generally) are ignored in favor of the “performative” aspects of
arms control. Given new efforts to create normative frameworks without verification mech-
anisms to address frontier military technologies including weapons deployed in space and
cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, this offers an important avenue of future research.
As Guthe points out:
Some agreements may not lend themselves to verification and will inevitably be
violated, but might still be valuable for setting international norms. The Bio-
logical Weapons Convention is a good example. For most agreements, however,
the Reagan Administration maxim of “trust but verify” should be amended, in
light of the case studies covered here, to “verify but still don’t trust.” The party
entering the agreement should carefully develop the monitoring, verification and
prospective enforcement measures required to deter and detect any cheating, no
matter how unlikely it might appear at the time.22
As noted in the theory chapter of this dissertation, there is also a null hypothesis suggest-
ing that there is no effect of institutional design on outcomes and that alternative variables
contribute to non-compliance. Meyer, for example, points to the “difficulties [that] eventu-
ally arise because it is assumed incorrectly that the political context that exists at the time
the agreements are signed will persist through their lifetime.”23 In other words, the political
environment conditions both the process of verification and the outcome of the arms control
agreement.
5.4 Hypotheses
Reflecting the theories noted above, the hypotheses below account for the effects of verifica-
tion regime type on compliance. In the section below, I detail how verification regimes that
vary in terms of intrusiveness affect compliance.
5.4.1 The Conventional Wisdom
In line with both the functional and evolutionary perspectives concerning the effect of veri-
fication, H1 reflects the conventional wisdom that “more” verification is better:
• H1: If a verification regime is more stringent, then it will have a positive effect on
compliance.
22Kurt Guthe et al., “Securing Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” 2016,
23Meyer, “Verification and risk in arms control.”
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5.4.2 The Null Hypothesis
The next hypothesis accounts for the null, in which the design of a verification regime has
no effect on compliance—and in which other variables may, in fact, be driving compliance
outcomes. The null also accounts for non-functional drivers of verification regime inclusion
such as domestic political considerations.
• H0: The design of a verification regime has no effect on compliance.
5.4.3 Surveillance Bias and Selection
Finally, I account for the H1’s opposite:
• H2: If a verification regime is more stringent, then it will have a negative effect on
compliance.
There are two theoretical drivers that may result in H2: a selection effect, and a surveil-
lance bias effect. The first, a selection effect, relates to the intrinsic difficulty (or ease)
associated with compliance with an arms control agreement prior to agreement design that
may influence both the design of an agreement and the outcome of the agreement: those
agreements that states were going to find most difficult to comply with regardless of the
design of the arms control agreement may include the most stringent verification regimes.
The second, surveillance bias—also described as detection bias—is an under-explored
phenomenon in international relations scholarship that has its roots in medicine.24 There,
the premise of surveillance bias is that the construction of mechanisms to detect a particular
outcome will lead to an increased detection of this outcome. By way of analogy, a hammer
(representing a verification regime)will constantly search for and find a nail (noncompli-
ance). Thus, those agreements that have a more stringent verification mechanism—a larger
hammer—may have a higher probability of detecting non-compliance.25
The type of institutional body used for determining how to implement and verify an arms
control agreement may also increase or decrease the likelihood of the severity of surveillance
bias. For example, those agreements that have formal institutions with professional staffs
may be more likely to fall victim to surveillance bias as the detection of non-compliant
activity may reflect upon the utility of institution. Alternatively, those institutions that are
more closely tied to the practice of state competition may lead to realpolitik considerations
in making (or not making) allegations of noncompliance.
24Paolo Vineis and Anthony J McMichael, “Bias and confounding in molecular epidemiological studies:
special considerations.,” Carcinogenesis 19, no. 12 (1998): 2063–2067.
25I am thankful to Prof. Kathryn Sikkink for her advice concerning the integration of surveillance bias
as a cause of noncompliance into this chapter.
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5.5 Research Design
To address the question of how verification mechanisms impact compliance, I use the ACDD
dataset that compiles nuclear-related arms control agreements that have been negotiated and
entered into force between 1945 and 2019 and codes each based on its design characteristics.
The dataset, composed of time-series panel data, is designed for longitudinal analysis.
For the purposes of this chapter, I use a subset of nuclear arms control agreements
that entered into force from Kreps’ list of arms control agreements used to examine the
drivers of ratification and non-ratification as the case selection criteria.26 While this subset
does not include agreements that deal with other strategic threats such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention or those agreements with secondary strategic consequences such as
the Open Skies Treaty, it provides a useful tool for case selection with the intention of
minimizing researcher-introduced bias. It also usefully allows for a comparison across a
number of alternative dependent variables related to nuclear weapons that are correlates of
compliance. Among the 48 agreements considered by Kreps, I leave out those that never
entered into force and those that are institutions rather than agreements in this analysis.
The primary justification for this decision is that states cannot be reasonably expected to
comply with agreements that never entered into force—even if they made the decision to
sign them. Using this case selection criteria, the dataset used in this chapter includes 40
agreements comprising 1,187 agreement-years.27
In this analysis, I consider two sets of independent variables related to the discussion
above: verification design characteristics and verification organization.
5.5.1 Verification Variables
The first set of independent variables consider the types of verification regimes included in
the arms control agreement measured in two ways. The first provides a column for each
of the following verification regime types: information exchange, on-site inspection regime,
and challenge inspection regime (described in greater detail above). The second involves




(+Inf Exchange+On-Site Inspection+Challenge Inspection) (5.1)
The equation allows for an analysis of those agreements that place higher verification
requirements upon states parties against those that do not.
26Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements” This list also reflects those compiled by
the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Federation of American Scientists, and Jozef Goldblat’s work.Goldblat, Arms
control: a survey and appraisal of multilateral agreements; Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to
Negotiations and Agreements
27All arms control agreements are weighed equally within the dataset.
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Figure 5.1: This figure shows the variation in “strength” of the verification regime with
compliance agreement-years shown in green and non-compliance agreement-years shown in
red.
5.5.2 Verification Organization Variables
The second set of independent variables I consider is the type of organization used to im-
plement and verify the agreement. As noted above, I categorize these institutions into the
following: tailored institutions that are created on an ad hoc basis and standing intergov-
ernmental organizations that are given a verification and monitoring role.
5.5.3 Dependent Variable: Compliance
In the analysis, I use a dichotomous measure of compliance as the dependent variable.28
As described in the previous chapter, treaty obligations that are spelled out in agreements
while coding compliance involves taking into account allegations of breaches from histori-
cal, journalistic, and government records. Where available, I use accounts in popular U.S.
28The coding criteria for measuring compliance is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. The coding
criteria for the dependent variable is also consistent across the chapters—and is included in each for the
benefit of the reader and to go alongside the discussion of measurement concerning each independent variable
of interest.
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and international presses to corroborate noncompliance on an agreement-year and country-
agreement-year basis. For example, the construction of the Yeniseysk-15 phased array radar
at Krasnoyarsk in 1980 led to allegations by the United States in 1983 that the USSR was
in violation of its commitments to the ABM Treaty. More recently, Russian deployment of
the 9M729 on the Iskander launcher in 2008 represented a breach of the INF Treaty. Rus-
sia, in response, argued that U.S. missile defense forces were also in breach of the Treaty.
Compliance, for the purposes of this study, relates to states abiding by the letter of their
agreements.
Using these variables, I test the effect of each type of verification regime on patterns
of compliance on an agreement-year basis. To do this, I use a probit regression equation
appropriate for analysis when considering a dichotomous dependent variable:29
Yˆ = f(α + βx) (5.2)
I use the same model to assess the effect of varying verification regimes on compliance
outcomes in any given agreement-year.
5.6 Results
In the section below, I outline the results of several probit regression models that measure
the effect of verification mechanisms on compliance dichotomously and by using a categorical
variable, stringency. I subsequently turn to an examination of the effects of the types of
organization carrying out the verification.
5.6.1 Verification Regime Type and Compliance
Models 1-4 consider the effect of verification regime (information exchange, on-site inspec-
tion, and challenge inspection) on the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-
year basis. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5.1 and in graph form in Figure
5.2.
Table 5.1: Probit model results for the effect of verification regime type on compliance
29A probit model uses a cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
to define f (*)—rescaling the values of the dependent variable to fall between 0 and 1. Hence, whatever
α + βx equals, it can be transformed by the function to yield a predicted probability of compliance on an
agreement-year basis. Alternative model specifications for are included in the Appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No Verification -0.18 (0.12)
Information Exchange 0.10 (0.12)
On-Site Inspection -0.01 (0.12)
Challenge Inspection -0.29 (0.12)∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -259.3 -260.1 -260.5 -257.7
Constant 1.66 (0.08) 1.53 (0.08) 1.58 (0.08) 1.68 (0.08)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Model 1, the absence of a verification regime has a negative but statistically in-
significant effect on the predicted probability of compliance. Model 2, testing the effects of
information exchange, reports a positive but statistically insignificant result. Model 3, exam-
ining the effect of on-site verification regimes reports a negative and statistically insignificant
result. In each of the three models, I cannot reject the null that each of the design character-
istics do not impact the predicted probability of compliance. In Model 4 assessing the effect
of challenge inspection regimes, the model suggests that there is a negative and statistically
significant effect on the predicted probability of compliance in a given agreement-year.
This analysis provides two propositions. First, recalling the result of Model 4, arms
control outcomes vary based on verification design. Second, challenge inspection regimes,
posited as the most stringent and subsequently most likely to induce compliance, may have
unintended consequences.
Given the patterns of non-compliance in the dataset shown in Figure 5.1, this result is
perhaps unsurprising—and suggests that to the extent that verification impacts compliance,
there may be a “goldilocks” level of verification.
To examine the impact of verification in the aggregate, I turn now to an examination of
the categorical stringency variable.
Table 5.2: Probit models for the effect of stringency of verification mechanism on treaty
compliance on agreement-year basis
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Figure 5.2: This figure graphs the regression results from Models 1, 2, 3, and 4.
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Stringency -0.02 (0.05) 0.17 (0.07)∗∗ -0.01 (0.05) 0.19 (0.07) ∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.46 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.43 (0.17)∗∗
Sunset 0.67 (0.27)∗∗ 0.73 (0.32)∗∗
Agreement Type -0.46 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗
Cold War 0.34 (0.15)∗∗ 0.31 (0.16)∗
Successor 0.32 (0.23) -0.20 (0.31)
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.3 -227.6 -257.1 -206.5
Constant 1.61 (0.09) 2.25 (0.19) 1.49 (0.09) 2.22 (0.20)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Model 5, evaluating the effect of verification regime on the predicted probability of com-
pliance, finds a negative and statistically insignificant relationship between the two. In
Models 6 and 8, which account for a series of institutional design characteristics theorized to
impact compliance, a one-unit increase in the stringency of an agreement is correlated with
an increase and statistically significant effect on compliance. Model 7, accounting for a Cold
War control variable and a control variable to account for whether an agreement represents
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Table 5.3: This table shows the predicted probability of compliance on the basis of the
stringency of the verification regime measured in Model 8 holding all control variables at
their mean value.
Verification Type Predicted Probability of Compliance
No Verification 93.9 %
Information Exchange 95.9 %
On-Site Inspection 97.3 %
Challenge Inspection 98.2 %
Figure 5.3: This figure shows the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year
basis with 95 percent confidence intervals shown as dashed lines.
a follow-on, or successor, agreement, finds the same negative and statistically insignificant
finding as Model 5. Incidentally, the results in Model 7 mirror those in Chapter 4 concerning
Cold War effects and the relative lack of successor agreement effects.
Using the coefficients reported in Model 8—and holding each of the control variables
at their means—Table 5.3 shows the predicted probabilities of compliance for each type of
verification regime. These results are also plotted with their 95 percent confidence intervals
in Figure 5.3
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In aggregate, this analysis suggests that the inclusion of verification regimes may have
a positive effect on the predicted probability of compliance. It is also suggests, however,
that this distribution may be n-shaped. That is, arms control regimes with no verification
regime are at substantial risk of non-compliance while the most stringent regimes that include
challenge inspection regimes also share this risk. With regard to the conventional wisdom
that more verification is better, the results of this analysis suggest that this is only the
case up to a point. The analysis also suggests that there may be a need to engage with
theory concerning the negative relationship between the most stringent verification regimes
and patterns of compliance—whether on the basis of selection or detection bias discussed
above.30
5.6.2 Verification Organization Analysis
Having discussed how the type of verification regime affects compliance, I turn now to as-
sess how different types of organizations charged with addressing monitoring, verification,
and compliance concerns might affect compliance outcomes using the same probit regression
method. As noted above, I compare organizations that are tailored to address a specific
agreement (usually on an ad hoc basis), such as the INF’s Special Verification Commis-
sion, with those agreements that task intergovernmental organizations, such as the IAEA,
OPCW, or CTBTO, with implementing the monitoring and verification of an arms control
agreement—usually with professional staffs.
Table 5.4: Probit models for the effect of verification organization type on compliance
(9) (10)





Constant 1.72 (0.08) 1.63 (0.07)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Using Models 9 and 10, I calculate the predicted probability of compliance for those
agreement-years with each type of organization overseeing monitoring, verification, and com-
pliance. For ad hoc, treaty-specific agreements, there is a 90.3 percent chance of compliance
on an agreement-year basis. For agreements involving intergovernmental organizations, the
predicted probability of compliance for a given agreement-year is 92.4 percent—suggesting
a relative performance benefit for those agreements that involve international institutions.
30These results are consistent with an analysis using alternative modeling approaches. In the Appendix
to this chapter, I include a parallel analysis using logistic regression rather than the probit model described
here.
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Table 5.5: This table shows the Variance Inflection Factor for the probit model including
all four design variables and the Cold War and Successor control variables used in Model 8,
above.
Variables Stringency Agreement Type Multilateral Sunset Cold War Successor
VIF 1.86 1.74 1.56 1.61 1.04 1.68
5.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In the section below, I carry out a series of econometric tests to assess the modeling specifi-
cations and the results reported in the quantitative analysis above.
5.7.1 Multicollinearity
First, I test the multicollinearity of the standard probit model. To do this, I use a variance
inflation factor (VIF) to measure how easy it is to achieve the same model outcomes from
a linear regression using the other predictors. The square root of the VIF tells you how
much larger the standard error of the estimated coefficient is in respect to a case when that
predictor is independent of the other predictors.
A general guideline is that a VIF value larger than 5 or 10 indicates that the model
has problems estimating the coefficient..31 Table 5.5 below shows the VIF for Model 8 that
includes the independent variable of interest and each of the control variables used in the
study.32
The results of this analysis suggest that multicollinearity, in which the explanatory vari-
ables are highly correlated, is likely not a concern for the analysis above.
5.7.2 Independence and Heteroskedasticity Probit Results
The existing methodological literature suggests that models using panel data may internalize
substantial cross-sectional dependence in the errors. This may occur due to the presence of
shocks common to the data points, unobserved phenomena that ultimately become part of
the error term, or past events influencing subsequent events. To address concerns surrounding
the independence of both the outcome variables and the regressors, I run a series of regression
models with clustered standard errors that adjust for non-independence across agreements
and across years.
To do this, I assess whether circumstances in which the variance of a variable is unequal
across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it exist in the underlying data
31Thompson et al., “Extracting the variance inflation factor and other multicollinearity diagnostics from
typical regression results.”
32These results are similar to those in Chapter 4.
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used in the probit models above. This test is particularly important given that heteroskedas-
ticity in these models can represent a major violation of the non-linear model specifications,
which assume homoskedastic errors.
Below, I use a heteroskedastic probit model using Huber-White robust standard errors—
also known as heteroskedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors—reported in Models 5HC-
8HC
Table 5.6: Heteroskedastic probit models for the effect of stringency of verification mechanism
on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5HP Model 6HP Model 7HP Model 8HP
Stringency -0.02 (0.05) 0.18 (0.07)∗∗ -0.01 (0.05) 0.20 (0.07) ∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.44 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.42 (0.16)∗∗
Sunset 0.83 (0.34)∗∗ 0.86 (0.52)∗
Agreement Type -0.48 (0.06)∗∗∗ -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗
Cold War 0.34 (0.15)∗∗ 0.31 (0.17)∗
Successor 0.45 (0.26) -0.11 (0.43)
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -242 -222.7 -253.7 -220.6
Constant 1.61 (0.09) 2.29 (0.14) 1.48 (0.09) 2.23 (0.10)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Consistent with the analysis carried out in Chapter 4, there are no appreciable differences
in results using the heteroskedastic probit model with robust clustered standard errors.33
5.7.3 Time Dependence
I now turn to the question of whether the findings outlined above are driven by temporal
dependence.
To address this, I use Carter and Signorino’s cubic polynomial approximation method
described in Chapter 3 to include t, t2, and t3 in several regression models described above.
In these models t represents the time since the last “event.”34 In this analysis, the specific
event at issue is a breach of an arms control agreement. Thus, t represents the time, in years,
since the last episode of non-compliance on an agreement-year basis.
I report two models including t, t2, and t3. The first model presents the independent
variable of interest while the second includes the independent variable of interest alongside
the additional design characteristics and control variables.
33I use the sandwich R package to carry out this analysis.Zeileis, “Object-oriented computation of sand-
wich estimators”; White et al., “A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct
test for heteroskedasticity.”
34Carter and Signorino, “Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data.”
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Table 5.7: Cubic polynomial approximation probit models for the effect stringency on treaty
compliance on agreement-year basis
(5) (5) (8) (8)
Model 5 Model 5CP Model 8 Model 8CP
Stringency -0.02 (0.05) 0.02 (0.06) 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.21 (0.09)∗∗
Agreement Type -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.40 (0.10)∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.43 (0.17)∗∗ 0.28 (0.24)
Sunset 0.73 (0.32)∗∗ 0.65 (0.42)
Successor -0.20 (0.31) 0.60 (0.45)
Cold War 0.31 (0.16)∗ 0.72 (0.22)∗∗∗
t 1.12 (0.15)∗∗∗ 1.00 (0.14)∗∗∗
t2 -0.09 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.08 (0.01)∗∗∗
t3 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.3 -130.9 -225.1 -109.1
Constant 1.61 (0.09) -1.04 (0.24) 2.22 (0.20) -0.59 (0.39)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The models including t, t2, and t3 are in line with the analysis and findings reported
above with the coefficient from Model 8 (0.19) and Model 8CP (0.21) broadly similar in
terms of both value and statistical significance.
5.7.4 Selection Effects
As discussed in Chapter 3 and as Downs et al. and von Stein have noted, when an indepen-
dent variable is itself a strategic choice on an outcome there are significant selection effects
that must be taken into account when analyzing observational data.35 In simplest terms, any
outcome variables (in this case, compliance) must be measured against the predilection of a
state taking the same action in the absence of the variable of interest (in this case an arms
control agreement). As both the choice of a state to undertake an arms control agreement of
a specific design and the decision to comply with an agreement on an agreement-year basis,
the research in question .
In this agreement-year-based analysis of the ACDD, the analysis does not consider that
the “enforce-ability” of the agreement as well as the underlying probability of compliance
for states parties varies and that this variation affects both the choice of institutional design
designed into the arms control regime as well as the compliance outcome. The analysis above,
does not, for example, preclude that states might choose the highest level of verification for
the hardest cases and so its unsurprising that they do get failure.
35Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?”;
Von Stein, “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.”
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Thus, the findings presented in this chapter have the caveat, common among observa-
tional studies, that they provide a first cut at the causal relationship between institutional
design characteristics and compliance outcomes on an agreement-year basis.
5.8 Case Analysis: The INF Treaty
To engage with the empirical findings noted above, I examine the INF Treaty. Given recent
events surrounding Russia’s breach of the Treaty and the declaration by both the United
States and Russia that they will leave the Treaty in late 2019, focusing on this Treaty offers a
policy-relevant case for analysis. For the purposes of qualitative comparison, it offers useful
within-case variation as its verification regime sunsetted in 2001.
Numerous experts have explored the geopolitical and strategic ramifications of US with-
drawal from the Treaty. Podvig, for example, has argued that Russia’s violation fails to
“reach the level that would justify destruction of a key disarmament agreement, most likely
bringing irreparable damage to the larger arms control architecture.” US officials, on the
other hand, have argued that triggering the 60-day notification period for withdrawal (which
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on 4 December 2018) is warranted by Rus-
sia’s alleged noncompliance. Pompeo’s ultimatum states that Russia must return to “full
and verifiable compliance” with the INF Treaty or the United States would provide its offi-
cial notification of withdrawal from the Treaty, in accordance with Article XV, par. 2. As
outlined in the Treaty, withdrawal enters into effect six months after this notification, which
must include “a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.”36
While much has been made in the policy literature of the political failures that have
contributed to this crisis, what has been largely ignored in the debate is the part played
by weaknesses in the structural design of the INF Treaty itself. This case study examines
the structural design of the INF Treaty and argues that its flaws—specifically the sunset of
its verification regime in 2001—has contributed to the difficulty in addressing allegations of
noncompliance within the current arms control framework. This design flaw also conditions
the prospects for the INF Treaty regime moving forward amid heated debates concerning the
appropriateness of withdrawal, amendment, or replacement of the Treaty and the respective
consequences for the future of nuclear arms control.
5.8.1 Origins of the INF Treaty
The INF Treaty was designed to address “intermediate nuclear forces”—ground-launched
ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges of
between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers—and their destabilizing consequences in the European
theatre. From the informal, bilateral negotiations in 1980 to discuss limiting intermediate-
range nuclear forces, the verification regime associated with any agreement weapons repre-
36INF Treaty, Article XV, par. 2.
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sented a central concern. Six years of formal negotiations took place concerning the timeline
and benchmarks related to the removal of intermediate systems, their deployment beyond
Europe, and the inclusion and design of the verification regime, as well as the creation of
the Special Verification Commission (SVC) mentioned above “to meet at the other partys
request” as a forum to resolve implementation and compliance issues.37 The Commission was
also charged with interpreting the Protocol on Inspection and outlining the characteristics
and use of inspection equipment.
Throughout its first two decades, the INF Treaty represented a significant—and, ar-
guably, the signature—achievement of arms control in that it prohibited the development
and deployment of an entire class of weapons that were adjudged to be destabilizing. Follow-
ing the Washington Summit in 1987, approximately 2,600 missiles were dismantled during
the three-year elimination period. The INF Treaty was also part of a broader suite of Euro-
pean and transatlantic arms control agreements, including the 1992 Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). As
Kimball and Reif note, the INF Treaty also “marked the first time the superpowers had
agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and
utilize extensive on-site inspections for verification.”38 The Treaty was also multilateralized
following the end of the Cold War with the inclusion of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.39
5.8.2 Verification Design
Perhaps because of its roots in the Cold War, the inspection procedures outlined in the
Treaty to verify compliance were both numerous and robust.
The protocols on “inspection” and “elimination” outlined several on-site inspection pro-
cesses. These included baseline inspections to compare the site against data provided during
an initial comprehensive data exchange, as well as six-monthly information exchanges fa-
cilitated by the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, closeout inspections of INF facilities as
they are taken oﬄine, a limited number of short-notice inspections of declared and formerly
declared INF facilities, and elimination inspections to confirm that the procedures outlined
in the Agreed Statement on Inspection (1988) were being followed. The inspection regime
included a number of requirements vis a` vis notification procedures as well as annual quotas
concerning the number of inspections allowed. In the first three years of the Treaty, each
Party was allowed 20 inspections in each year. In the following five years, this was reduced
to 15 inspections before a further reduction to 10 inspections per year in the final five years
of the inspection regime ending in 2001.
The Treaty also allowed the United States to undertake continuous portal monitoring—an
intrusive verification measure for monitoring missile assembly plants—of any Soviet facility
manufacturing a GLBM with a rocket stage “outwardly similar” to a stage of a GLBM
37INF Treaty, Article XIII.
38Arms Control Association et al., The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty at a glance, 2017.
39The effect of bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral arms control frameworks are the topic of Chapter
7 to follow.
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limited by the Treaty. The Soviet Union received a similar right to monitor the U.S. facility
that formerly built the Pershing rocket motor.
5.8.3 The INF Regime in Practice
By at least 2011, however, the United States believed that Russia was an INF compliance
concern. According to members of the U.S. Administration, these concerns were raised in
several meetings with Russian diplomats throughout 2013, and in July 2014 the United
States officially accused Russia of violating the Treaty. In the 2014 edition of its Compliance
Report, the U.S. State Department alleged that Russia began the covert development of a
mobile, intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile designated as 9M729 (SSC-8) in
2008, and that this weapon system was not in compliance with Russia’s INF obligations
not to “possess, produce, or flight-test” missiles prohibited by the Treaty. The basis for
this conclusion remains unclear but Washington has at various times noted that the missile
system has been flight-tested as a ground-launched cruise missile to ranges prohibited by
the Treaty. From the US perspective, these relatively low-cost and survivable capabilities
provide Russia with more options to strike allied military targets and populations without
consuming Russia’s inventory of strategic offensive weapons and theatre-strike resources,
such as sea-launched cruise missiles. Following repeated denials from Moscow that such a
weapon existed, the United States in 2016 called the first meeting of the SVC for 13 years
to address Russian compliance issues—and the 30th such meeting of the Commission since
the inception of the Treaty. Another meeting of the SVC followed in December 2017.
During both SVC meetings, Moscow denied that the weapon system was in breach of
the Treaty and little progress was made to address the alleged INF violations. Moscow
has subsequently accused the United States of violating the Treaty through the deployment
of missile defence systems to Eastern Europe. Specifically, Russia argues that the Mk-41
launch system for air defence missiles can also be used to fire cruise missiles. In December
2017, Moscow also claimed that Japanese acquisition of U.S.-built Aegis Ashore systems also
constituted a breach of the Treaty. Since then, the allegations and counter-allegations from
both sides have done little to alleviate concerns over the viability of the Treaty.
Over the past two years, U.S. policy-makers have put the responsibility for INF issues
squarely in Moscow’s corner. Andrea Thompson, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, remarked in a recent speech “either you rid the system,
rid the launcher or change the system where it doesn’t exceed the range, in a verifiable
manner.”40 Similarly, the Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats stated, “Russia has
shown no sign that it is willing to acknowledge its violation, let alone return to full and
verifiable compliance.”41
40Press briefing on December 6, 2018.
41Press briefing on November 27, 2018. Full text is available at the DNI website: https://www.dni.gov/
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5.8.4 Design Matters
One of the intriguing, if unsurprising, aspects of remarks from U.S. policy-makers is the
focus on verification as part of a remedy for Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty.
As mentioned above, the INF Treaty’s inspection regime had three stages. The first lasted
three years and supported the elimination of intermediate-range forces. The second and third
stages each lasted five years, with a gradual drawdown in the number of on-site inspections
allowed by each side. After 13 years, in 2001, the inspection regime for verifying INF
commitments ceased (Article XI, par 5, par. 6). Following the sunset of the verification
regime, portal monitoring at a missile factory in Votkinsk, Russia, continued on the basis
of treaty commitments in New START, but the United States and Russia no longer had
the right to conduct on-site inspections at the INF facilities identified via the information
exchanges outlined in the Treaty text.
Of course, sunset clauses are not unusual in arms control and nonproliferation agree-
ments.42 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), START frameworks, and test ban treaties
have all included sunset clauses that provide an endpoint to member states’ respective com-
mitments. So, why include a sunset clause inside the verification regime of an agreement? In
theory, sunset mechanisms are meant to make negotiations more likely to succeed by limiting
the future obligations of states parties. Unlike many agreements, however, the INF Treaty
does not have a sunset clause for the treaty as a whole. Instead, the INF Treaty lasts in
perpetuity (or until such time as one party withdraws) but without a verification mechanism
13 years after its inception.43
To some extent, this design feature can be explained by the focus on INF facilities that
existed in the 1980s with no contingencies made for the potential of parties to the Treaty
building new facilities and/or capabilities—at least not without parties leaving the Treaty
entirely “if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests” (Article XV, par. 2).
The reality of the INF verification regime’s sunset clause presented three discrete chal-
lenges to policy-makers in addressing post-sunset violations and noncompliance.44
First, attributing noncompliance since 2003 has been complicated by the lack of an in-
spection regime. In the case of the SSC-8 missile system first deployed in 2008, attributing
noncompliance to Russia and communicating the allegation of a breach to allies and Moscow
took four years. While both Russia and the United States have adequate national tech-
nical means to analyze one another’s capabilities, uncertainty remains regarding weapon
capabilities and effects—particularly systems that are limited on the basis of range that
might otherwise look similar to smaller-range and larger-range systems. It is also worth
considering the “selection effects” associated with the decision to develop and deploy an
INF (or INF-adjacent system). A number of policy-makers noted that Moscow potentially
42Sunset mechanisms—or termination clauses—are the subject of Chapter 6 to follow.
43INF Treaty, Art. XV, par. 1.
44This analysis draws on a series of interviews with former policy-makers in a series of not-for-attribution
discussions from 2017 to 2019.
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viewed the violation of the INF Treaty as low-cost given the lack of attention paid to it
by Washington—exemplified by the fact that there had been no meeting of the SVC for a
decade. If a verification regime had existed during the development phase of a new INF sys-
tem, it may have influenced the decision to develop it in the first place, given the reputation
costs associated with a Treaty breach. Indeed, a number of former policy-makers noted that
the Russian decision to build and deploy the SSC-8 reflected bureaucratic politics as well as
long-standing concerns surrounding the viability of the INF framework amid the continued
development of intermediate-range nuclear and non-nuclear forces in China, India, Pakistan,
and others.45 Without the verification regime, attribution of the breach only occurred during
flight-testing and deployment of the system.
Second, there is limited information available concerning weapon system capabilities to
create new standards for compliance. For agreements that limit rather than ban weapons
systems, parties to an agreement need a basis to measure weapon characteristics in order
to attribute compliance or breaches. Without an inspection architecture and fewer weapon
systems are available to inspect, discussions of technical specifications related to missile and
payload capabilities are more limited—and there is no mandate to provide them. The ne-
gotiators of the INF Treaty in the 1980s had detailed knowledge of warhead and delivery
vehicle characteristics, in general, and of INF characteristics, specifically. These characteris-
tics informed the benchmarks and timeline for the destruction of 2,600 missiles. Today, the
characteristics and measurement of modern intermediate-range forces has become a point of
debate that has reached an impasse. Given advances in technology, it may also represent a
moving target for scientists and engineers tasked with designing technical verification mea-
sures. Russian allegations related to U.S. missile defence systems, for example, reveal the
extent of the problem in deciding where intermediate-range forces begin and end. In sum,
it remains unclear how to operationalize a measurable verification regime and how to build
a workable institutional apparatus (a` la the SVC) to support it.
Third, the sunset of the verification regime has meant that the scope and nature of any
renewed verification process are up for debate. There is, of course, no mandate within the
existing Treaty framework to restart an inspection regime. But, if a new verification regime
is deemed desirable, negotiators face a central question: should the INF’s verification regime
look the same as the historical version, or should it be replaced with something new and
improved? Advances in both verification technology and techniques suggest that there may
be considerable benefits to using new tools and practices. However, new methods may re-
quire different types of access throughout a missile’s lifecycle across production, deployment,
movement, storage, and dismantlement phases that parties may be reluctant to provide.
It is too simple an analysis to state that the INF worked when it had an information
exchange and on-site inspection verification in place and stopped working when that verifica-
tion mechanism disappeared. It does, however, make clear the downstream consequences of
45Indeed, this seemed to be the immediate focus upon the U.S. decision to renege on the agreement:
Sanger, David. “A Cold War Arms Treaty Is Unraveling. But the Problem Is Much Bigger.” New York
Times, Dec. 9, 2018
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design decisions taken during arms control negotiations that have an impact on enforcement
of the agreement.
5.9 Verification and Patterns of Compliance
The quantitative analysis above investigates the conventional wisdom that efforts to regulate
military technologies should include increasingly robust mechanisms to ensure compliance.
In the process, the analysis outlined above suggests that—given the design and performance
of existing nuclear arms control frameworks vis a` vis patterns of compliance and using the
model specifications outlined above—there is reason to question this conventional wisdom,
particularly when it comes to the use of challenge inspection regimes. Indeed, the analysis
suggests that there may be an n-curve in which information exchanges and on-site inspection
regimes maximize compliance.
As in Chapter 4, this analysis also demonstrates the degree to which compliance outcomes
vary on the basis of institutional design decisions undertaken by arms control negotiators—
whether to include a verification regime or not, of what type, and which types of organization
monitor the agreement. Future research ought to consider whether the patterns of compliance
and variation in institutional design concerning nuclear arms control reflect broader patterns
in conventional arms control and efforts to regulate conventional military technologies—
expanding the N available to researchers. Alternative analyses might also consider country-
agreement year rather than agreement-year as the unit of analysis to assess the role of
country-level co-variates such as regime type and measures of state power that are also
theorized to influence compliance via audience costs and rational calculations of the costs
and benefits of abrogating an agreement. Understanding the consequences of the arms control
design have consequences for considering the appropriate design of regimes moving forward—
and represents a particularly important avenue of future research given the uncertainty
surrounding the prospects of the existing nuclear arms control regime in the wake of INF’s
failure and the increasing prospect that New START will not be extended.
As noted above, these results reflect institutional design decisions facing diplomats in-
volved in arms control discussions today—whether surrounding lethal autonomous weapons,
cyber weaponry, non-lethal conventional weapons, and in efforts to reinvigorate contempo-
rary arms control following the collapse of the INF Treaty and growing concerns that New
START will not be extended. For those military technologies that are inherently difficult
to identify—such as software and machine learning algorithms—the desire for an “effective
verification” mechanism represents an obstacle to achieving an arms control agreement alto-
gether.46 Given the uneven distribution of compliance benefits associated with the inclusion
of various types of various verification mechanisms, the analysis above suggests that softer
agreements geared may still produce compliance benefits. Indeed, these empirical findings
46Both military applications of artificial intelligence and quantum technologies are discussed at greater
length in the concluding chapters of this dissertation.
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may be important in pointing out that compliance, drawing from historical cases, may not
predicated upon creating the most stringent verification regimes possible.
To revise Reagan’s proverb:
proveryay, no ne ver’—‘Verify, but don’t trust.”
Appendix
The choice to use probit or logit models is generally considered to be one of personal prefer-
ence when dealing with dichotomous outcome variables. As a reminder, OLS regressions are
inappropriate as the errors from a linear probability model with dichotomous outcome vari-
ables violate homoskedasticity and normality of errors assumptions, resulting in invalid stan-
dard errors. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is increasingly disagreement about whether
these drawbacks inherent within OLS methods necessitate the use of probit or logit estima-
tors.
Below, I carry out an identical analysis to those carried out using probit regression
methods using logistic regression. The number associated with each model remains the
same with those using a logistic regression denoting an L. For example, Model 1 above can
be compared to Model 1L, below.
Table 5.8: Logit model results for the effect of verification regime type on compliance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1L Model 2L Model 3L Model 4L
No Verification -0.39 (0.25)
Information Exchange 0.22 (0.25)
On-Site Inspection -0.01 (0.25)
Challenge Inspection -0.60 (0.25)∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -259.3 -260.1 -260.5 -257.7
Constant 2.98 (0.18) 2.69 (0.17) 2.81 (0.17) 3.03 (0.17)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.9: Logit model results for the effect of stringency of verification mechanism on treaty
compliance on agreement-year basis
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(5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5L Model 6L Model 7L Model 8L
Stringency -0.05 (0.10) 0.36 (0.13)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.10) 0.36 (0.13) ∗∗∗
Multilateral 1.02 (0.37)∗∗∗ 1.00 (0.34)∗∗∗
Sunset 1.51 (0.63)∗∗ 1.73 (0.76)∗∗
Type -0.94 (0.14)∗∗∗ -0.95 (0.14)∗∗∗
Cold War 0.73 (0.34)∗∗ 0.63 (0.35)∗
Successor 0.69 (0.53) -0.48 (0.69)
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.3 -226.8 -257.1 -224.4
Constant 2.87 (0.18) 4.18 (0.42) 2.64 (0.20) 4.10 (0.46)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.10: Logit model results for the effect of verification organization type on compliance
(9) (10)





Constant 3.11 (0.17) 2.92 (0.15)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As is the case in Chapter 4, the results remain the same in terms of both the sign
associated with the coefficient and the statistical significance of the results—suggesting that
the results are not sensitive to the choice of modeling approach.
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Chapter 6
Admiring Sunsets: The Effects of
Termination Clauses on Compliance
Abstract
In this chapter, I use the original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD) to track the design
characteristics of arms control regimes on an agreement-year basis to examine the effect of
termination clauses—a form of institutional flexibility—on compliance. In the process, I
also point to a number of empirical examples that vary in terms of their sunset mechanisms,
including the SALT Interim Agreement, START I, INF, and New START, as well as dis-
cussing the consequences of the analysis for future arms control agreements beyond nuclear
weapons. The study concludes that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, agreements that
have an indefinite duration have a a decreased probability of compliance.1
6.1 Introduction
On February 1, 2019, the United States announced its decision to withdraw from the Inter-
mediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Ostensibly, this decision was a response to Russian
noncompliance with the Treaty following its development of its 9M729 (SSC-8) weapon sys-
tem. Russia, in turn, accused the United States of violating the same Treaty by deploying
missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and on February 2 announced its own withdrawal.
Following Russian noncompliance with the the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,
the Budapest Memorandum, and U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion (JCPOA) as well as concerns over the extension of New START, there are significant
1I would like to thank participants at UC Berkeley’s Monday International Relations (MIRTH) seminar,
participants in the Junior Scholars Symposium at the International Studies Association Annual Conference
2019, and participants of the Center of Strategic and International Studies’ PONI Conference (December 3,
2018) for comments and feedback that have contributed to this chapter.
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questions being raised concerning the viability of the existing arms control architecture.2
At the same time, however, there have been sustained calls for the use of arms control
agreements to address the international security challenges posed by emerging technologies,
from autonomous weapons and genetic engineering to cyber-attacks and space weaponry.3
What these frameworks should look like, however, remains unclear—from “hard,” formalized
agreements to “softer” normative frameworks.4
Of the more than two hundred frameworks designed to regulate, constrain, or ban mili-
tary technology, there is considerable variation in their design—particularly in terms of their
scope, membership, verification mechanisms, and flexibility. The consequences of this varia-
tion, however, have yet to be systematically observed and examined—by academics or arms
control negotiators.5
This chapter, part of a broader scientific study of the consequences of the institutional
design of arms control agreements, seeks to address this gap in the literature and examines
how the presence of termination clauses affect compliance with arms control agreements.6
• What are the relative effects of sunset mechanisms on compliance?
In the process, I adjudicate between three arguments. First, I assess whether institutional
design characteristics and, by extension, termination clauses have an effect on compliance.
Second, I re-examine the conventional wisdom that arms control agreements that include
flexibility mechanisms like termination clauses are less likely to lead to compliance. Finally,
I argue that the empirical record to date suggests that termination clauses are, in fact, more
likely to lead to compliance than non-compliance.
The paper also make three contributions to the existing scholarly literature. The first
is theoretical and pertains to the existing scholarship concerning the costs and benefits
of including flexibility mechanisms in international cooperative mechanisms by exploring
institutional design as an outcome of the bargaining phase and a driver of compliance in
2Kingston Reif, “After the INF Treaty, What Is Next?,” Arms Control Today 49, no. 1 (2019): 26–29.
3Lewis, “The case for regulating fully autonomous weapons”; Paul Meyer, “Cyber-security through arms
control: an approach to international co-operation,” the RUSI Journal 156, no. 2 (2011): 22–27; Allan Dafoe,
“AI Governance: A Research Agenda,” Governance of AI Program, Future of Humanity Institute, University
of Oxford: Oxford, UK, 2018,
4Joseph S Nye, The regime complex for managing global cyber activities (Centre for International Gov-
ernance Innovation / Catham House, 2014); Alex Grigsby, “The end of cyber norms,” Survival 59, no. 6
(2017): 109–122; Urs Gasser and Virgilio AF Almeida, “A layered model for AI governance,” IEEE Internet
Computing 21, no. 6 (2017): 58–62; Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss, “Autonomous weapons systems and
changing norms in international relations,” Review of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2018): 393–413.
5The absence of a robust discussion pertaining to the causes and consequences of arms control agreements
have contributed to a reliance upon the heuristic inclinations of arms control negotiators as they take part
in arms control negotiations. In a series of interviews with previous U.S. and British negotiators of SALT
I, START I, CFE, SORT, and NPT extension, the personal and past experience of the negotiators in the
room was consistently heralded as a driver of the success in terms of reaching an agreement and of driving
the inclusion of various design characteristics in the agreements themselves.
6I use the terms “termination clauses” and “sunset mechanisms” interchangeably throughout the paper.
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the enforcement phase between state parties. The second is methodological as I introduce
a third application of an original Arms Control Design Dataset for scholarly inquiry in
which a number of design characteristics related to the inclusion of termination clauses,
escape clauses, membership, types of verification regime, and agreement scope are coded
for the first time. These characteristics included in the ACDD also represent a clearer
coding criteria than the categorical approaches taken to coding arms control agreements in
the past that aggregate institutional characteristics and introduce a source of inter-coder
disagreement.7 The third contribution is policy-oriented insofar as debates surrounding the
regulation and governance of strategic arms might also contribute to academic and policy
debates concerning the challenges posed by emerging technologies—from hypersonic weapons
to quantum computing.
In the following sections, I examine the existing theoretical approaches to problems of
compliance related to arms control. I then describe the variables to be measured and outline
the research design to address the effects of termination clauses on compliance. Finally,
I conclude that termination clauses, contrary to conventional wisdom, contribute to com-
pliance. A number of empirical examples—including SALT I, INF Treaty, START I, New
START, and the NPT—are included throughout.
6.2 Institutional Design and Arms Control
The academic debate surrounding the effects of international institutions has been driven, in
large part, by whether and how institutions shape state behavior.8 As a result, much of the
existing literature concerning the design of international institutions and their effects upon
international cooperation have leveraged comparatively rich empirical examples of inter-
national cooperation concerning economic cooperation—engaging with debates concerning
compliance with GATT/WTO rulings and state participation in supranational institutions—
and environmental agreements.9 The same is true of existing work related to escape clauses
that allow states to leave an agreement—and of which sunset clauses represent a subset.10
Building upon existing theoretical and empirical advancements and following the example
of Kreps—who first explored the institutional design of arms control in the context of the
7Kreps and Arend, “Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to Inter-
national Legal Regimes.”
8Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions”; Keohane and Martin, “The promise of
institutionalist theory.”
9Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Abbott and
Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”; Koremenos, “Loosening the ties that bind: A
learning model of agreement flexibility”; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international
institutions”; Mattli and Woods, The politics of global regulation; Young, Compliance & public authority: A
theory with international applications; Mitchell, “Problem structure, institutional design, and the relative
effectiveness of international environmental agreements.”
10Pelc, “Seeking escape: The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements”; Rosendorff and
Milner, “The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape.”
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role of legalization in driving the entry into force of agreements—this broader project asks
the question of whether design parameters theorized to affect state behavior in the realm of
“low politics” have effects in the domain of “high politics.”11
6.2.1 Existing Theory
Compliance under conditions of anarchy—particularly related to government decisions con-
cerning their security—has long been a focus of international relations scholarship.12 This
scholarship varies in terms of its focus, with much existing research examining trade, envi-
ronmental, and economic agreements. While this is understandable given the relatively high
number of these types of agreements, it perhaps ignores the class of agreements that are most
difficult to reach—that is, cooperative frameworks pertaining to security concerns. Indeed,
scholarly inquiry into the causes and consequences of arms control agreements have been
altogether more rare and have tended to focus on individual case studies of specific agree-
ments, historical accounts, and future-oriented policy prescriptions rather than empirical
inquiry.13 From these studies, there are two broad arguments concerning the consequences
of arms control. The first argument is that is has little to no effect on the conduct of states.
The second is that under certain conditions, it offers a tool that can successfully control an
arms race between nations. Below, I examine each broad argument in turn.
6.2.2 Epiphenomenal Arms Control Theory
Privileging relative gains concerns and characterizing the relations between states as a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma in which trust is difficult to achieve, realist scholars have tended to be
skeptical concerning the role of arms control, specifically, and international institutions, in
11Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
12Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Simmons,
“Treaty compliance and violation”; Simmons, “International law and state behavior: Commitment and
compliance in international monetary affairs”; Tomz, Democratic default: Domestic audiences and com-
pliance with international agreements; Abbott, “Trust but verify: The production of information in arms
control treaties and other international agreements”; Mitchell, “Regime design matters: intentional oil pol-
lution and treaty compliance”; Muller, “Compliance politics: A critical analysis of multilateral arms control
treaty enforcement”; Chayes and Chayes, “Compliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory
treaties”; Chayes, “An inquiry into the workings of arms control agreements.”
13Chayes, “An inquiry into the workings of arms control agreements”; Burns, “Arms Control and Dis-
armament”; Abbott, “Trust but verify: The production of information in arms control treaties and other
international agreements”; Adler, “The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the
international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control”; Croft, Strategies of arms control: a history and
typology ; Daalder, “The future of arms control”; Fuhrmann and Lupu, “Do arms control treaties work?
Assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty”; Gallagher, “Bridging the gaps on arms
control”; Krause and Latham, “Constructing non-proliferation and arms control: The norms of Western
practice”; Ranger, Arms and Politics, 1958-1978: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context ; Nye,
“Arms control after the cold war”; Trachtenberg, “The Past and Future of Arms Control”; Schelling, “What
went wrong with arms control?”
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general..14 Valentino, Huth, and Croco, for example, contend that “whatever pressures to-
ward restraint these treaties may exert on their signatories appear to be overwhelmed by the
strategic incentives that combatants face to prevail and limit the costs of war to their own
citizens.15 Similarly, Bohlen argues that “treaties are powerless to deter determined cheaters,
in part because they lack enforceable sanctions for violations.”16 Following this line of argu-
ment, a number of analysts and policy-makers continue to argue that arms control has been,
and will always be, a dangerous illusion.17 These scholars, perhaps unsurprisingly, rarely
take the institutional design of arms control agreements into account in their scholarship.
6.2.3 Utilitarian Arms Control
By contrast, others have argued that arms control agreements, like other forms of cooper-
ation, can offer tangible benefits to participants and that when they do, we should expect
them to be created—even among adversaries.18 Schelling alludes to the inherent cooperative
structure of these arrangements as “games in which, though the element of conflict provides
the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some
kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation.”19 What are these benefits? According to
Schelling and Halperin, arms control frameworks have three goals: to reduce the probability
of war by reducing uncertainty and crisis instability, to reduce the cost of war, and to reduce
the cost of preparing for war.20 In discussions with former arms control negotiators, they
note that negotiations have primarily focused on the ability of arms control to contribute to
crisis stability by allowing for greater predictability during crises.21 Yet others posit a more
tautological pursuit of arms control not for its benefits but as an end in itself: “the ‘arms
race’ is commonly believed to be a major cause of international tension; it follows that the
“control of the arms race” is to be sought as a kind of end in itself.”22 Scholars of institutional
design—of both functionalist and rational persuasions—have considered how the design char-
acteristics of international agreements reflect these utilitarian considerations. Others have
14Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma”; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Van Evera,
“The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War”; Mearsheimer, “The false promise of
international institutions.”
15Valentino, Huth, and Croco, “Covenants Without the Sword International Law and the Protection of
Civilians in Times of War.”
16Bohlen, “The rise and fall of arms control.”
17Gray, “Arms control does not control arms.”
18Bull, “The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age.(Studies in
International Security, II.)”; Keohane and Martin, “The promise of institutionalist theory”; Hansen, “Taking
ambiguity seriously: Explaining the indeterminacy of the European Union conventional arms export control
regime”; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”; Koremenos, Lipson, and
Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions”; Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic
Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries.”
19Schelling, “The strategy of conflict. Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory.”
20Schelling and Halperin, “Strategy and Arms Control.”
21Interview with Amb. Linton Brooks, March 19, 2018.
22Trachtenberg, “The Past and Future of Arms Control.”
CHAPTER 6. ADMIRING SUNSETS 112
also suggested that existing institutions adapt to new circumstances with shifting priorities
and institutional structures that reflect these utilitarian considerations.23
In the section below, I consider how this existing theoretical literature interacts with
theory concerning arms control design.
6.3 Designing Arms Control
Scholars have long noted the considerable variation in the design of international agreements—
whether related to their “bindingness,” formalization, membership, and degree of legaliza-
tion.24 This variation has driven questions related to why they occur (causes) as well as what
effects they might have (consequences). In this paper, I focus on the latter question of how
institutional design parameters affect state behavior.
Among arms control agreements, specifically, I point to the considerable variation across
a number of parameters. These include the scope, membership, enforcement, and flexibility
mechanisms.
In terms of scope, described in greater detail in Chapter 4, some arms control agreements
such as the Chemical Weapons Convention have been designed to ban the production of entire
categories of weapons while others like New START apply limits to the number of strategic
arms that the United States and Russia can deploy. Yet other agreements ban the testing
of weapons like the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) or the export of technology related to
particular weapons such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR).
There is also considerable variation when it comes to membership in arms control regimes—
described in Chapter 7. While many adversarial agreements like the Interim Agreement
Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I) cre-
ated during the Cold War are bilateral and involved the United States and USSR—latterly
Russia—there are also a number of examples of multilateral agreements, including the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Biological Weapons Convention, Partial Test Ban
Treaty, and COCOM designed to address strategic arms.25
The presence and types of monitoring, verification, and enforcement regimes included in
arms control agreements also vary widely and as the subject of the preceding chapter. A
large number of agreements—starting with the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement, also known
23Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting.
24Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Kahler, “Mul-
tilateralism with small and large numbers”; Raustiala, “Form and substance in international agreements”;
Vabulas and Snidal, “Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs)
and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements”; Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in interna-
tional governance”; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, “The rational design of international institutions.”
25The ACDD assigns membership type to the agreement at signing and updates the agreement vis a´ vis
its design parameters in each agreement-year.
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as SALT I—include only a promise not to interfere with the other parties’ efforts to em-
ploy their “national technical means” (NTM) of verification, which is a euphemism for the
use of measurement and signals intelligence (MASINT), image intelligence (IMINT) pro-
vided by satellite or aerial photography, and seismic or acoustic intelligence. Beyond NTM,
agreements can also include rules and procedures for information exchanges that allow an
additional data point to verify compliance with an agreement. As well as external moni-
toring, agreements also variously include provisions for internal monitoring. For example, a
number of agreements include mechanisms for routinized, on-site inspections of designated
military facilities. Perhaps most intrusive, challenge inspection regimes allow a state party
to an agreement to provide a list of facilities for inspection at short notice. To address the
rules and procedures associated with enforcement, a number of agreements, including the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, SALT I, START I, and the NPT, created processes
through which the rules, procedures, and conclusions associated with a specific enforcement
regime could be discussed. The Standing Consultative Commission (ABM), Joint Compli-
ance and Inspection Commission (START), and Special Verification Commission (INF) each
serve as examples of organizations used for this purpose.
While the design characteristics noted above are no doubt important, in this chapter I
focus on the presence of mechanisms designed to give an arms control agreement flexibility.
There are a variety of flexibility provisions related to agreement design including optional
protocols that add to state obligations in relation to an agreement, reservations that abrogate
the responsibility of a state party to a specific aspect of an agreement, escape clauses that
set out a process for a state party to withdraw from an agreement, and termination clauses
that designate a date on which the responsibilities of the state party to a treaty will end.
Of these flexibility provisions, some have comparatively little variation—reservations and
optional protocols are exceedingly rare and escape clauses omnipresent.26 As an example
of the latter, Article XV (par. 2) of the INF Treaty reads, “Each Party shall, in exercising
its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that ex-
traordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior
to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” The existence
of termination clauses, however, vary both in terms of their inclusion and in terms of their
length among arms control agreements. Existing scholarship focusing on environmental and
economic issues suggests that these flexibility mechanisms should make agreements easier to
reach but also potentially lead to opportunities for abuse.27 In the section below, I examine
why.
26Escape clauses are often included in the penultimate or final article in an agreement and provide the
process through which a state party can withdraw from an agreement.
27Rosendorff and Milner, “The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape”;
Koremenos, “Loosening the ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility”; Pelc, “Seeking escape:
The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements.”
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6.3.1 Cooperation Theory and the Shadow of the Future
Cooperation theorists drawing on liberal theory theorize that a longer shadow of the future
makes cooperation sustainable and, thus, more likely by increasing.28 This theory suggests
that longer interactions reinforce reciprocity between the parties to an agreement. In the
context of arms control, longer agreements should allow for trust-building and reciprocity in
terms of practice (from the provision of data using information exchanges or institutionalized
arms reduction processes).
A large number of arms control agreements reflect this conventional wisdom by placing
significant commitments upon states during the enforcement phase of agreements via inflexi-
ble agreements of indefinite duration. Contemporary debates concerning the appropriateness
or inappropriateness of creating non-binding codes of conduct for outer space activities and
cyberspace activities reflect this conventional wisdom. Critics of such frameworks have sug-
gested that while these types of regimes may be easier to create, they are impossible to
enforce—and consequently won’t affect state behavior.
In “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” however, Fearon argues in-
stead that the shadow of the future—necessary for the sustenance of international agreements—
presents states with a double-edged sword. In the paper, Fearon identifies the diverging in-
terests within players strategies across two temporal phases of conflict: the bargaining phase
and enforcement phase. Fearon notes that decisions taken by states parties to increase the
likelihood of success during the bargaining phase have a negative effect on the enforcement
phase of a game, and vice versa—representing a “bargaining and enforcement paradox.”
This paradox can explain the difficulty of reaching cooperative agreements and of reaching
agreements that last in perpetuity.29
To make this theoretical argument salient in terms of arms control, the bargaining and
enforcement paradox suggests that efforts to minimize state obligations during the negotia-
tion phase by allowing for reservations, escape clauses, termination clauses, and minimizing
a commitment to verification increase the likelihood of an agreement being signed. However,
these same features decrease the chances of regime survival as states leave the agreement or
cheat.30
28Axelrod and Keohane, “Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions”; Duncan
Snidal, “Coordination versus prisoners’ dilemma: Implications for international cooperation and regimes,”
American Political Science Review 79, no. 4 (1985): 923–942; Kenneth A Oye, “Explaining cooperation under
anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1–24; Robert Axelrod and Douglas
Dion, “The further evolution of cooperation,” Science 242, no. 4884 (1988): 1385–1390.
29Fearon measures this difficulty by using the time taken to reach an agreement as a proxy for the
bargaining challenge with those agreements that take longer to achieve designated as representing a more
difficult bargaining process.
30As in all cases of international cooperation, in arms control “there are multiple self-enforcing agreements
or outcomes that two of more parties would all prefer to no agreement, but the parties disagree on their
ranking of the mutually preferable agreements.”Fearon, “Bargaining, enforcement, and international coop-
eration.” See also: John F Nash Jr, “The bargaining problem,” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 1950, 155–162; Thomas C Schelling, The strategy of conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960).
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Table 6.1: Sunsets vs. Compliance (Examples)
Compliance Noncompliance
Sunset START I; New START NPT (pre-1995)
No Sunset PTBT; Hotline Agreement INF Treaty; ABM Treaty
In the analysis below, I find empirical support for Fearon’s proposition that the shadow
of the future is not necessarily the driver of positive externalities proposed by cooperation
theorists.
6.4 Hypotheses
In the section below, I consider a series of hypotheses associated with the theories concerning
the effect of including a flexibility mechanism within an arms control agreement.
On the question of whether flexibility provisions should yield higher rates of compliance,
the realist scholars noted above tend to suggest that institutional design is of little conse-
quence, thus termination clauses should have no meaningful effect on compliance. This offers
the null hypothesis:
• H0 Termination clauses have no effect on patterns of compliance and noncompliance.
As noted above, the conventional wisdom that flexibility provisions such as termination
clauses decrease levels of compliance by increasing the incentive to cheat and by reducing
the shadow of the future and endogenously signaling a lack of commitment to the agreement
prior to signing. This yields the following hypothesis:
• H1: If an agreement includes a termination clause, then compliance is less likely.
However, a cursory glance at the empirical record yields two observations. First, while
a majority of arms control agreements include escape clauses that address state party
withdrawal—as mentioned above—relatively few have a prescribed date at which the states
parties are no longer bound by the agreement—a sunset or termination clause. And second,
of those agreements that do include a termination agreement, a large number have been rel-
atively successful—particularly those designed to reduce the number of strategic warheads
and their delivery systems from SALT I to New START.
This observation leads to an alternative hypothesis:
• H2: If an agreement includes a termination clause, then compliance is more likely.
While the question of why flexibility mechanisms might increase the likelihood of compli-
ance is under-theorized, theory from political psychology concerning optimism bias regarding
the perceived prospects of state capacity at the time of renegotiation perhaps best underpins
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H2. Put another way, the shadow of the future is discounted by parties to an agreement
when they perceive that a future agreement is more likely to be to their benefit than the
current agreement given the expectation that they are going to be in an improved bargaining
position relative to other states parties in future negotiations. This “optimism bias” that
conditions might subsequently overcomes the negative prospects for the enforcement phase
of an agreement.31,32
In the next section, I use the original Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD) to test
whether termination clauses that make agreements easier to reach lead to diminishing returns
for compliance using the Arms Control Design Dataset. In the analysis of existing strategic
arms control frameworks, I find support for H2.
6.5 The Arms Control Design Dataset
To address the question of how sunset mechanisms impact compliance, I use a dataset of
all strategic arms control agreements that have been negotiated and entered into force be-
tween 1945 and 2019. The dataset is composed of cross-sectional panel data for longitudinal
analysis.
6.5.1 Introducing the Arms Control Design Dataset
For the purposes of this chapter, I use a subset of strategic arms control agreements that
entered into force from Kreps’ list of agreements used to examine the drivers of ratification
and non-ratification as the case selection criteria. 33 While this subset does not include
agreements that deal with other strategic threats such as the Chemical Weapons Convention
or those agreements with secondary strategic consequences such as the Open Skies Treaty, it
provides a useful tool for case selection with the intention of minimizing researcher-introduced
bias. It also allows for a comparison across a number of alternative categorical variables
related to nuclear weapons that are correlates of compliance.
31Tali Sharot et al., “Neural mechanisms mediating optimism bias,” Nature 450, no. 7166 (2007): 102;
Ronald R Krebs and Aaron Rapport, “International relations and the psychology of time horizons,” In-
ternational Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 530–543; Emilie M Hafner-Burton et al., “The behavioral
revolution and international relations,” International Organization 71, no. S1 (2017): S1–S31.
32There may also be normative, reputation-based, and domestic politics argument to be made regarding
the high costs of withdrawing from an agreement in both levels of a state leader’s “two-level game.” Putnam,
“Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”; Branislav L Slantchev, “Politicians, the
media, and domestic audience costs,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (2006): 445–477 It is also
worth considering the marginal gains of withdrawing from an agreement that includes a termination clause
and that will end in due course without a state party having to endure the costs of withdrawal.Miller,
“Politics over promise: Domestic impediments to arms control”
33Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements” This list also reflects those compiled by the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Federation of American Scientists, and Goldblat’s earlier work to detail the treaty
commitments included within each arms control framework.Goldblat, Arms control: a survey and appraisal
of multilateral agreements; Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements.
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Of the 48 agreements considered by Kreps, I leave out those that never entered into force
and those that are institutions rather than agreements in this analysis. For example, while
both the United States and USSR signed the SALT II Agreement designed to cap strategic
forces and curtail development of new missiles in 1979, it was not ratified by the United States
in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequently expired in 1985 without
entering into force. As a result, I do not include that agreement or those like it including the
Antisatellite Agreement of 1978 and START II.34 As noted in previous chapters, the primary
justification for this decision is that states cannot be reasonably expected to comply with
agreements that never entered into force—even if they made the decision to sign them. Using
this case selection criteria, the dataset used in this chapter include 40 agreements comprising
1,187 agreement-years.
Below, I introduce the variables coded within the Arms Control Design Dataset and used
in the quantitative analysis to follow.
6.5.2 Termination Clauses
The coding criteria for the design parameters of arms control agreements included in the
study call for an analysis of the use of specific language included in the treaty text. Article
XIV, par. 2 of New START serves as a useful example: “This Treaty shall remain in force
for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction
and limitation of strategic offensive arms.” For the purposes of this chapter, the sunset
mechanism is treated as a dichotomous variable signaling the inclusion or omission of a
termination clause.35
There are several examples of agreements that include termination clauses that outline the
length of an agreement. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty included a 25-year sunset clause
upon its entry into force in 1970 that concluded in 1995. Interestingly, the international
community made the decision to extend the NPT’s treaty provisions indefinitely upon reach
that milestone. Most adversarial arms control agreements that involve a cap on nuclear
warheads and delivery vehicles similarly include a sunset mechanism. SALT I, for example
include a series of five-year sunsets that were renewed three times before lapsing in 1985.
New START, which entered into force in 2011, also includes a 10-year sunset clause, with
the potential for parties to renew prior to the end of the performance period in 2021 for a
further five years.36
34I also do not include the IAEA. While it does provide a role managing nuclear safeguards under the
NPT and a monitoring role for other agreements it does not, in my estimation, constitute an arms control
agreement in and of itself.
35There is a second variable for analysis in future work that tracks the number of years until termination
that can be used to assess the marginal effects of the distance to agreement on compliance outcomes.
36Whether the United States and Russia will, in fact, extend or engage in future efforts to limit their
nuclear weapons numbers has been the subject of fierce debate amid fears that arms control may cease to
exist altogether.Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty? Risks and Options After New START
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For the negative cases, agreements that do not include termination clauses usually include
a provision noting the “unlimited duration” of the agreement as well as the withdrawal
process clause described above.37
6.5.3 Control Variables
In the quantitative analysis, below, I also include a number of control variables that may
account for compliance or non-compliance. Among these are a number of alternative design
parameters including whether they are bilateral or multilateral, a dichotomous measure of
whether there is a verification regime embedded within the agreement, a series of dichotomous
variables associated with specific verification mechanisms, as well as categorical measures of
verification, scope, and obligation—or “bindingness”—drawn from Kreps’s work. These
categorical variables are constructed by scoring each agreement in terms of its institutional
design parameters:
Obligation—Degree of agreement’s binding nature:
• 0 for “gentleman’s handshake”;
• 1 for formally binding;
• 2 for no reservations, declarations, understandings; and
• 3 no escape clauses.
Precision—Specificity of requirements embedded in agreement:
• 0 for aspirational in terms of numbers, behavior, timelines;
• 1 for specificity in terms of arms control behavior (e.g., action required on testing,
whether states can develop weapons or not); and
• 2 for specificity in arsenal numbers, thresholds, delivery vehicles, timelines for reaching
objectives.
Delegation—Degree to which states assign authority for the enforcement of the agreement
to third parties:
• 0 for no outside agency delegation, inspections, or specified monitoring;
• 1 for reporting of compliance through regular meetings or information exchanges;
• 2 for monitoring through states National Technical Means; and
37Where treaty language is unclear, cases are dropped from the sunset column—though this is not the
case among those agreements included for analysis in this paper.
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• 3 for verification through on-site inspections.38
This analysis presents a useful comparison of methods designed to test dichotomous
variables compared to categorical variables. Indeed, one of the methodological choices made
in the process of conducting this study was to reduce the potential for inter-coder reliability
problems by reducing the need for relative scoring metrics. For example, the criteria in the
obligation variable above are clear in terms of the difference between a formally binding
agreement (scored as a 1) and a “gentleman’s handshake” (scored as a 0) but less clear in
their attempt to address subsidiary obligations—particularly as escape clauses are ubiquitous
in formally binding arms control contexts.
The analysis also includes a dummy variable accounting for the Cold War time period in
which an agreement-year occurs and another accounting for whether the agreement builds
on an existing arms control agreement.39 There are a number of theories that point to the
relationship between the Cold War and compliance. On the one hand, compliance may be
more likely given the stable nature of the strategic competition between the United States
and USSR and the preponderance of power in Washington and Moscow that conditioned
third-party state compliance. On the other, compliance may be less likely (and allegations of
non-compliance more likely) during Cold War agreement-years given the adversarial relations
between the two superpowers whose relationship ebbed and flowed during the Cold War
period.
6.5.4 Dependent Variable: Measuring Compliance
Unlike treaty obligations that are spelled out in agreements and treated dichotomously and
temporally in the dataset, coding compliance involves taking into account allegations of
breaches from historical, journalistic, and government records.40 Where available, I use
accounts in popular U.S. and international presses to corroborate noncompliance on an
agreement-year and country-agreement-year basis. For example, the construction of the
Yeniseysk-15 phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk in 1980 led to allegations by the United
States in 1983 that the USSR was in violation of its commitments to the ABM Treaty. More
recently, Russian deployment of the 9M729 on the Iskander launcher in 2008 represented a
breach of the INF Treaty. Russia, in response, argued that U.S. missile defense forces were
also in breach of the Treaty. Compliance, for the purposes of this study, relates to a best
estimation of states abiding by the letter of their agreements.41
38Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements.”
39Ibid.
40The coding criteria for measuring compliance is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. The coding
criteria for the dependent variable is also consistent across the chapters—and is included in each for the
benefit of the reader and to go alongside the discussion of measurement concerning each independent variable
of interest.
41Where possible, each episode of compliance is cross-referenced against chapter 9, “Compliance and
Noncompliance,” in Richard Burns’ Evolution of Arms Control.Duffy, “Arms control treaty compliance”;
Burns, The evolution of arms control: from antiquity to the nuclear age
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Figure 6.1: The figure above provides descriptive statistics related to those agreement-years
that are coded as including sunset provisions (on left) and those that do not (on the right).
Those that are blue are compliance-years while those marked as red are noncompliance-years.
Within the dataset, there are a number of episodes of noncompliance from the 1980s
onwards related to actions undertaken by Russia, the United States, North Korea, Iran,
India, and Pakistan regarding their respective treaty commitments.
6.6 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I use the dataset described above to analyze 1,187 agreement-years among
arms control agreements that have entered into force. The first analysis is composed of four
probit models.
6.6.1 Probit Regression Analysis
As the dependent variable, compliance, is dichotomous, I use a probit regression model to
consider the effect of those agreements with and without termination clauses on compliance:42
42A probit model uses a cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
to define f (*)—rescaling the values of the dependent variable to fall between 0 and 1. Hence, whatever
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Yˆ = f(α + βx) (6.1)
In this model, Yˆ is a predicted probability of compliance given the presence or absence
of a sunset mechanism, x. The findings yielded across a number of modeling specifications
are summarized in Table 1, below.43
Table 6.2: Probit models examining the effect of termination clauses on treaty compliance
on agreement-year basis
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sunset 0.52 (0.24)∗∗ 0.56 (0.27)∗∗ 1.00 (0.26)∗∗∗ 1.05 (0.34)∗∗∗
Multilateral 0.35 (0.17)∗∗ 0.36 (0.17)∗∗
Verification 0.73 (0.18)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.50 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.11 (0.10)
Cold War 0.27 (0.18)
Successor 0.13 (0.32)
Obligation 0.92 (0.19)∗∗∗ 0.85 (0.23)∗∗∗
Precision -0.42 (0.12)∗∗∗ -0.35 (0.13)∗∗∗
Delegation -0.73 (0.10)∗∗∗ -0.65 (0.13)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.7 -222.2 -195.6 -191.2
Constant 1.53 (0.06) 2.29 (0.19) 2.57 (0.19) 2.35 (0.24)
Due to the fact that Kreps’s delegation variable includes verification mechanisms, the two variables are run
separately and the latter is left out of Model 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The first model regresses the presence of a sunset mechanism upon compliance and finds
that termination clauses have a statistically significant (p < 0.05) and positive effect upon
the predicted probability of compliance, providing support for H2. The finding is also in
line with a qualitative examination of successful agreements such as SALT I, START I,
SORT, and New START designed to set limits on nuclear warheads with explicit timelines
for elimination of material as well as for the termination of the agreement. Indeed, many of
these agreements have led to successor agreements with the goal of continuing the draw-down
of strategic assets by Moscow and Washington.
The second model controls for additional design characteristics of arms control agreements—
their membership, type of verification regime, and type of agreement itself. The model finds
α + βx equals, it can be transformed by the function to yield a predicted probability of compliance on an
agreement-year basis. Alternative model specifications for are included in the Appendix.
43These results are consistent with an analysis using alternative modeling approaches. In the Appendix
to this chapter, I include a parallel analysis using logistic regression rather than the probit model described
here.
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Figure 6.2: This figure graphs the results of the probit regression equation in Table 6.1.
once again that termination clauses have a positive and statistically significant effect upon
the predicted probability of compliance—providing further support for H2. Dichotomous
measures for multilateral agreements and the inclusion of verification regimes have a simi-
larly positive and statistically significant effect.44 As discussed in Chapter 4, the categorical
agreement type variable that distinguishes between technology control, test bans, arms lim-
itations, and arms prohibitions has a negative effect on compliance as the agreements move
from commitments that are easier for states to make to those that are more difficult.
The third model controls for a series of categorical variables that address the degree of
formality associated with an agreement (obligation), the scope of the agreement in terms of
the action required of states that are party to the agreement (precision), and an alternative
calculus of verification (delegation).45 Within the model, sunset mechanisms and increased
formality of an agreement have positive and statistically significant effects upon compliance
while precision and increased levels of delegations have a negative effect upon the predicted
probability of compliance.
Finally, I include additional control variables theorized to impact the predicted probabil-
ity of compliance in Model 4. In the model, the previous results remain the same. The model,
44Chapter 5 dives more deeply into the verification finding while Chapter 7 address membership issues.
45Each of these variables are described in detail above
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Table 6.3: This table notes the variation in the predicted probability of compliance for a
given agreement-year on the basis of the inclusion of a termination clause in the treaty design
using Models 1-4 and holding all control variables at their mean value.
Model No Sunset With Sunset
Model 1 93.7 % 98.0 %
Model 2 96.1 % 99.0 %
Model 3 97.5 % 99.8 %
Model 4 97.3 % 99.8 %
intuitively, suggests that adversarial agreements have a decreased probability of compliance
while successor agreements have a positive effect on the probability of compliance—both
without statistical significance. The variable denoting the Cold War has a positive though
statistically insignificant effect on compliance—a finding worthy of further examination in
future work that considers the structural environment in which arms control agreements are
reached.
The predicted probability of compliance in any agreement-year can also be calculated
using the coefficients noted in Table 6.1 to examine the effect of termination clauses on
compliance holding each of the control variables at their mean value.
For example, for Model 2:
ˆCompliance = F (2.29 + 0.56(Sunset) + 0.35(Multi) + 0.73(Ver)− 0.50(AgreementTyp))
(6.2)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
and 1 is the value of Yˆ associated with compliance.
This equation allows us to calculate the predicted probability of compliance for each
type of agreement on an agreement-year basis holding each of the co-variates at their mean
value.46 These results are reported in 6.3 and reflect the probit regression results above.
The results suggest that while the probability of compliance with arms control commit-
ments is high on an agreement-year basis, the addition of termination clauses has an effect
at the margins.
Across each of the analyses above, the inclusion of sunset clauses has a positive and
statistically significant effect on compliance outcomes.
46The equation can also be used to calculate the likelihood of compliance given a variety of design
characteristics. For example, once could consider the relative effect of an agreement that is bilateral, includes
a verification regime, does not include a termination clauses, with entry into force following the Cold War
to calculate the predicted probability of compliance in any given agreement-year.
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Table 6.4: This table shows the Variance Inflection Factor for the probit model including
all four design variables and the Cold War and Successor control variables used in Model 2,
above.
Variables Sunset Agreement Type Multilateral Verification
VIF 1.08 1.69 1.43 1.96
1.04 1.68
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform a series of sensitivity analyses related to the model specifications
above. In particular, I focus on those findings noted in Models 1 in which the sunset dummy
is modeled alone before analyzing each of the models carried out above.
6.7.1 Multicollinearity
First, I test the multicollinearity of the standard probit model. To do this, I use a variance
inflation factor (VIF) to measure how easy it is to achieve the same model outcomes from
a linear regression using the other predictors. The square root of the VIF tells you how
much larger the standard error of the estimated coefficient is in respect to a case when that
predictor is independent of the other predictors.
A general guideline is that a VIF larger than 5 or 10 indicates that the model has problems
estimating the coefficient..47 Table ?? shows the VIF for Model 2 described above. I use
Model 2 as it considers the effect of the presence of a termination clause on the predicted
probability of compliance on an agreement-year basis alongside the other institutional design
co-variates. In this case, the co-variates are the categorical agreement type variable and
dummy variables measuring whether the regime includes a verification regime and whether
the regime is multilateral.
The results of this analysis suggest that multicollinearity, in which the explanatory vari-
ables are highly correlated, is not a concern for the models above.48
6.7.2 Independence and Heteroskedasticity Probit Results
The existing methodological literature suggests that models using panel data may internalize
substantial cross-sectional dependence in the errors. This may occur due to the presence of
shocks common to the data points, unobserved phenomena that ultimately become part of
the error term, or temporal dependence. To address concerns surrounding the independence
47Thompson et al., “Extracting the variance inflation factor and other multicollinearity diagnostics from
typical regression results.”
48These results are slightyl different from those carried out in Chapters 4, 5, and 7 as Chapter 6 analyzes
the presence or absence of a verification regime rather than the type of verification regime.
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Table 6.5: This table shows the calculation of coefficients and robust standard errors (Huber-
White) using model 1.
Variables Coefficient Robust Standard Error p <0.05
2*Model 1 Constant 1.53 0.06 Yes
Sunset 0.68 0.28 Yes
of both the outcome variables and the regressors, I run a series of regression models with
clustered standard errors that adjust for non-independence across agreements and across
years.
To do this, I assess whether circumstances in which the variability of a variable is un-
equal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it exist in the underlying
data used in the probit models above. This test is particularly important given that het-
eroskedasticity in these models can represent a major violation of the probit (and logit)
model specifications, which assume homoskedastic errors.
Below, I use the probit regression equation in Model 1 to test for heteroskedasticity when
using the Sunset independent variable, shown below:
ˆCompliance = F (1.53 + 0.52(Sunset) (6.3)
Recall, the standard errors within the standard probit model associated with the constant
and the sunset variable are, 0.06 and 0.24 respectively.
I subsequently calculate the Huber-White robust standard errors—also known as heteroskedasticity-
consistent (HC) standard errors—reported in the Table 6.5.49
The results of this analysis along with the corresponding analysis for Models 2-4 are
shown below.
Table 6.6: Heteroskedastic probit models examining the effect of termination clauses on
treaty compliance on agreement-year basis using Huber-White robust clustered standard
errors
49I use the sandwich R package to carry out this analysis.Zeileis, “Object-oriented computation of sand-
wich estimators”; White et al., “A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct
test for heteroskedasticity.”
CHAPTER 6. ADMIRING SUNSETS 126
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Model 1HP Model 2HP Model 3HP Model 4HP
Sunset 0.68 (0.28)∗∗ 0.77 (0.36)∗∗ 1.18 (0.31)∗∗∗ 1.16 (0.58)∗∗
Multilateral 0.31 (0.16)∗ 0.34 (0.20)∗
Verification 0.81 (0.18)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.52 (0.06)∗∗∗ -0.13 (0.10)
Cold War 0.26 (0.19)
Successor 0.21 (0.59)
Obligation 0.92 (0.11)∗∗∗ 0.88 (0.19)∗∗∗
Precision -0.43 (0.11)∗∗ -0.38 (0.16)∗∗∗
Delegation -0.73 (0.08)∗∗∗ -0.62 (0.09)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -253.6 -216.4 -191.9 -187.4
Constant 1.53 (0.06) 2.35 (0.17) 2.58 (0.22) 2.38 (0.19)
Due to the fact that Kreps’s delegation variable includes verification mechanisms, the two variables are run
separately and the latter is left out of Model 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The results of the heteroskedastic model remain in concert with the findings derived from
the standard probit model—with the latter slightly under-estimating the magnitude of the
positive effect of an agreement having a termination clause on an agreement’s compliance.
6.7.3 Time Dependence
I now turn to the question of whether the findings outlined above are driven by temporal
dependence.
To address this, I use Carter and Signorino’s cubic polynomial approximation method
described in Chapter 3 to include t, t2, and t3 in several regression models described above.
In these models t represents the time since the last “event.”50 In this analysis, the specific
event at issue is a breach of an arms control agreement. Thus, t represents the time, in years,
since the last episode of non-compliance on an agreement-year basis.
Two models including t, t2, and t3 are reported in the Table below. The first model
presents the independent variable of interest while the second includes the independent
variable of interest alongside the additional design characteristics assessed in Table 6.2 above.
Table 6.7: Cubic polynomial approximation probit models for the effect of arms control
agreement on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
50Carter and Signorino, “Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data.”
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(1) (1) (2) (2)
Model 1 Model 1CP Model 2 Model 2CP
Sunset 0.52 (0.24)∗∗ 0.74 (0.35)∗∗ 0.56 (0.27)∗∗ 0.71 (0.40)∗
Multilateral 0.35 (0.17)∗∗ 0.12 (0.24)
Verification 0.73 (0.18)∗∗∗ 0.77 (0.24)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.50 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.50 (0.10)∗∗∗
t 1.10 (0.15)∗∗∗ 1.05 (0.15)∗∗∗
t2 -0.09 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.08 (0.02)∗∗∗
t3 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.7 -128.2 -191.2 -111.8
Constant 1.53 (0.06) -1.05 (0.22) 2.35 (0.24) -0.03 (0.36)
Due to the fact that Kreps’s delegation variable includes verification mechanisms, the two variables are run
separately and the latter is left out of Model 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Overall, the findings reported in Table 6.7 above are consistent with the findings above.
With that said, temporal dependence among observations may be strengthening the result vis
/‘a vis statistical significance associated with the role of termination clauses on compliance—
the coefficient estimates associated with the presence of termination clauses remains positive,
the p-value drops from p = 0.02 in Model 2 to p = 0.07 in Model 2CP controlling for temporal
effects.
6.7.4 Selection Effects
As discussed in Chapter 3 and as Downs et al. and von Stein have noted, when an indepen-
dent variable is itself a strategic choice on an outcome there are significant selection effects
that must be taken into account when analyzing observational data.51 In simplest terms, any
outcome variables (in this case, compliance) must be measured against the predilection of a
state taking the same action in the absence of the variable of interest (in this case an arms
control agreement).
In this agreement-year-based analysis of the ACDD, the analysis does not consider that
the inclusion of sunset mechanisms in an agreement as well as the underlying probability
of compliance for states parties varies and that this variation affects both the choice of
whether an agreement lasts indefinitely or for a fixed period of time as well as whether
states comply with the agreement (absent considerations of how long an agreement might
last). The analysis above, for examples, does not preclude that states might choose the
agreements of indefinite duration for the hardest cases and thus that it be unsurprising that
non-compliance is the result.
51Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?”;
Von Stein, “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.”
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Thus, the findings presented in this chapter have the caveat that they provide a first
cut at the causal relationship between institutional design characteristics and compliance
outcomes on an agreement-year basis—not the final word concerning the causal relationship
between the two.
6.8 Discussion
As outlined in the analysis above, the the empirical record provides scholars reason to ques-
tion the conventional wisdom that those agreements with a longer shadow of the future offer
the best avenue for reinforcing international commitments. Instead, this analysis of histor-
ical cases of predominantly nuclear arms control suggests that termination clauses increase
the probability of state compliance with their treaty obligations.
While this analysis points to patterns in new empirical data, it also relies on historical
accounts and elite interviews to discuss accounts for why this relationship occurs. As noted
above, the existing bargaining literature offers a useful place to start when considering the
result. But while cooperation theorists suggest that a longer shadow of the future is desirable,
the results reported above suggest that the inclusion of termination clauses decreasing the
length of time that states parties are committed to an agreement may not have deleterious
consequences during the enforcement phase.
Anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted over the course of this dissertation in
Washington, London, and Geneva suggest that states include termination clauses for a num-
ber of reasons beyond and including increasing the likelihood of concluding a successful
negotiation. Among them is the contention that the limited period of time in which states
are engaged with an agreement offer an opportunity to signal their strategic commitment
embedded in the agreement—with compliance reinforcing the message of this commitment
to the other player(s) and increasing the likelihood of engaging on beneficial strategic com-
mitments moving forward. In some ways, this logic mirrors the reputation costs theory
described by Tomz and others on a dyadic basis.52 It may also be the case that the inclusion
of a termination clause increases the salience of the political issue being negotiated over,
increasing the relative importance of compliance. In a series of interviews focused on the
question of the INF Treaty, one of the potential explanations for Moscow’s decision to ab-
rogate their Treaty commitments stemmed from the perception that Washington would be
unwilling to escalate non-compliance with the INF Treaty to the level of a political crisis.
Policy-makers in Washington and London suggested that the sunset of the INF’s verification
regime and the absence of a meeting of the SVC for over a decade served as evidence of this
perceived indifference.
Another theory concerning optimism bias and its impact on negotiation offers a similar
outcome but alternative logic, relying on the temporal elements of termination clauses and
the effect of time on both personal and institutional decision-making. Optimism bias theory
52Michael Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries (Prince-
ton University Press, 2012).
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suggests that parties to an agreement over-estimate the likelihood that their bargaining
position will be stronger in the future. As a result, parties comply with an agreement to reach
the subsequent renegotiation of their respective treaty commitments. The large number of
treaties that have been renegotiated and extended reflect this logic. A related logic suggests
that states parties undertake institutional learning (in terms of what states parties can live
with related to their commitments) during the course of time-bound treaties—particularly
those concerning arms reduction.
This chapter also makes clear that there are substantial avenues for further research. With
regard to data pertaining to arms control, expanding the agreement-year dataset to include
non-strategic arms, including additional co-variates as control variables that account for al-
ternative theoretical explanations for (non-)compliance, assessing spillover effects, tracking
data from the negotiation, signing, and ratification phases of arms control agreement devel-
opment, and building a country-year-agreement dataset that takes into account state-level
variables that drive non-compliance such as regime type and national material capabilities
theorized to affect the likelihood of a state to abide by its commitments.53 In democracies,
for example, some point to the audience costs of reneging on a commitment being larger
than in non-democracies while others suggest that this finding has been exaggerated.54
More work is also needed to grasp the theoretical underpinnings of the paper’s empirical
findings—whether rooted in optimism bias, a international and domestic audience costs, or
alternative explanations. Survey experiments, in which respondents address the strategic
consequences of complying or reneging on arms control commitments, may offer a useful
mechanism through which these causal variables might be usefully tested moving forward.
While unbounded flexibility may increase the complexity of international agreements and
fail to regulate the very activities that states parties are attempting to control, this initial cut
at the existing empirical data suggests that flexibility can offer substantial benefits to arms
control negotiators. The analysis might also be usefully extended to include other forms of
agreements including environmental, economic, trade, and financial regimes to consider a
generalizeable theory concerning how flexibility mechanisms affect state behavior. A meta-
analysis may also point to the differences between security-oriented cooperation agreements
and other types of international cooperation.
Understanding compliance, particularly in the context of arms control, has proven a
significant challenge for scholars of international relations. As the existing arms control
architecture recedes and governments are forced to address the challenges posed by emerg-
53Monty G Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, “Polity IV project: Dataset users manual,”
University of Maryland, 2002, J Michael Greig and Andrew J Enterline, “National Material Capabilities
(NMC) Data Documentation Version 5.0,” Correlates of War 27 (2017).
54Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M Grieco, “Attracting trouble: Democracy, leadership tenure, and the
targeting of militarized challenges, 1918-1992,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 6 (2001): 794–817;
Jessica L Weeks, “Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve,” International Organization
62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64; Jessica L Weeks, “Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation
of international conflict,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 326–347; Jessica Chen Weiss,
“Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China,” International Organization 67,
no. 1 (2013): 1–35.
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ing military technologies,55 understanding the options for replacing it are vitally important.
Taking stock of the causes and consequences of efforts to constrain state behavior thus far is
vitally important for the understanding both the potential and limitations of future agree-
ments. The findings outlined in this chapter suggest that agreements with more flexibility
mechanisms rather than fewer may lead to better news concerning compliance. This has
real consequences for the debates surrounding how “hard” or “soft” agreements ought to be
when addressing emerging technologies that are still in their nascent phases and the risk of
“locking-in” regulatory mechanisms that may not be fit for purpose. With regard to efforts
to regulate military technologies with strategic effects, there may be advantages to designing
regimes with shorter time horizons than previously anticipated.
Appendix
The choice to use probit or logit models is generally considered to be one of personal prefer-
ence when dealing with dichotomous outcome variables. As a reminder, OLS regressions are
inappropriate as the errors from a linear probability model with dichotomous outcome vari-
ables violate homoskedasticity and normality of errors assumptions, resulting in invalid stan-
dard errors. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is increasingly disagreement about whether
these drawbacks inherent within OLS methods necessitate the use of probit or logit estima-
tors.
Below, I carry out an identical analysis to those carried out using probit regression
methods using logistic regression. The number associated with each model remains the
same with those using a logistic regression denoting an L. For example, Model 1 above can
be compared to Model 1L, below.
Table 6.8: Logit models examining the effect of termination clauses on treaty compliance on
agreement-year basis
55Michael C Horowitz, The diffusion of military power: Causes and consequences for international politics
(Princeton University Press, 2010).
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(1) (2) (3) (3)
Model 1L Model 2L Model 3L Model 4L
Sunset 1.19 (0.60)∗∗ 1.36 (0.63)∗∗ 2.03 (0.61)∗∗∗ 1.76 (0.73)∗∗
Multilateral 0.76 (0.34)∗∗ 0.52 (0.33)∗∗
Verification 1.49 (0.35)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -1.01 (0.14)∗∗∗ -0.21 (0.22)
Cold War 0.63 (0.36)∗
Successor 0.70 (0.70)
Obligation 1.83 (0.44)∗∗∗ 1.86 (0.53)∗∗∗
Precision -0.90 (0.23)∗∗∗ -0.82 (0.27)∗∗∗
Delegation -1.49 (0.21)∗∗∗ -1.30 (0.27)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.7 -221.4 -195.8 -191.4
Constant 2.70 (0.13) 4.28 (0.44) 5.03 (0.44) 4.57 (0.57)
Due to the fact that Kreps’s delegation variable includes verification mechanisms, the two variables are run
separately and the latter is left out of Model 4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Using logistic regression rather than probit regression does not change the direction of the
effect associated with any of the results noted in the chapter above. It does, however, change
the statistical signficance associated with some of the models, most notably the statistical
significance (at p < .10) of the Cold War variable in Model 4 and Model 4L.
Broadly, the results from the logit models presented here are in line with the results from
the probit models above.
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Chapter 7
Membership Matters? Examinig the
Effects of Membership on Compliance
With Arms Control Agreements
Abstract
Among the myriad frameworks designed to control arms, there is considerable variation in
their design—particularly in terms of their scope, membership, and flexibility. The causes
and consequences of this variation, however, remain unexplained. In this chapter, I use
the original “Arms Control Design Dataset” (ACDD) that tracks design characteristics of
arms control regimes on an agreement-year and country-agreement-year basis to examine the
effect of membership numbers—from bilateral to minilateral and multilateral frameworks—
on compliance. In the process, I reflect on existing theoretical work concerning the effect of
membership numbers on patterns of international cooperation in the context of arms control.
Throughout, I point to a number of agreements that vary in terms of their membership before
examining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
7.1 Introduction
The collapse of the INF Treaty and continued fears that there will be no extension and
replacement of New START have led to a series of discussions of what a post-arms control
world might look like.1 As part of these discussions, global leaders—including U.S. President
Trump and Russian President Putin have noted the possibility of multilateralizing existing
arms limitation agreements via the inclusion of Beijing in the negotiations.2 While existing
1Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control Without a Treaty? Risks and Options After New START.
2China, for its part, made clear through Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang in a press con-
ference on May 21, 2019 that China did not view Chinese inclusion in arms control favorably. China often
points out that it has substantially lower numbers of nuclear warheads at its disposal when compared to the
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arms control frameworks include both bilateral and multilateral endeavors, little work has
been done to explain the causes of consequences of adding additional players to an arms
control agreement—either related to their impact on bargaining or enforcement related to
the regime. Interestingly, this debate mirrors anecdotal accounts of conversations in the
context of the New START negotiations between the United States and Russia in 2009.
Members of the U.S. negotiating team, in particular, weighed the benefits of providing an
opportunity for participants beyond Moscow and Washington to observe the negotiation
process with a view toward future participation in arms limitation and against the dangers
of creating yet another issue for Moscow and Washington to negotiate over before the “real”
negotiations were underway.3
The costs and benefits of designing a multilateral arms control agreement are reflected in
recent challenges associated with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) involving
Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States) that serves as a central case study below. In brief, the U.S. decision to withdraw
from the agreement, Iran’s decision to re-start uranium enrichment beyond the 4 percent
limits noted in the agreement, and the failure, at the time of this writing, of remaining
states parties to the agreement to bring Iran back into compliance engage with a number of
theoretical debates related to the effects of regime membership on compliance.
These developments raise the question, how should we consider the trade-offs associated
with choosing bilateral or multilateral agreements? Thompson and Verdier, in their work
investigating the determinants of regime design, offer a succinct account of these trade-
offs as multilateral agreements fail to address the varying compliance costs associated with
implementing the agreement while bilateral agreements are subject to increased transaction
costs.4 Multilateral agreements are also potentially subject to higher reputation costs,5 more
likely to have a professional staff or bureaucracy that report noncompliance,6 and—with
greater transparency—subject to increased domestic audience costs following leaders tying
their hands by signing onto an agreement.7
The majority of work on questions of compliance as well as the causes and consequences
of multilateralism have drawn on insights from environmental, trade, and human rights
regimes.8 Arms control has remained an under-studied phenomenon—despite a number of
United States and Russia.
3It is also worth noting that Tier 2 nuclear states have substantially smaller nuclear arsenals and, as
a result, have a different force composition and deterrence strategy than the United States and Russia.
Beijing’s reliance upon land-based mobile missile systems, for example, decreases the likelihood that they
would accept the verification and inspection requirements that are included in existing arms control treaty
architectures.
4Alexander Thompson and Daniel Verdier, “Multilateralism, bilateralism, and regime design,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (2014): 15–28.
5Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries.
6Peter M Haas, “Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and comparative
politics,” Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 1 (1998): 17–37.
7Slantchev, “Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs.”
8Thompson and Verdier, “Multilateralism, bilateralism, and regime design”; Chayes and Chayes, “Com-
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cooperation theorists pointing to arms control in their theoretical work.9
Concerning the specific question addressed by this chapter, Williamson notes that “fos-
tering compliance may be quite different in bilateral arms control than in multilateral arms
control” but an examination of the causes and consequences of different membership patterns
in arms control framework has yet to occur.10 In this chapter, I examine the patterns of com-
pliance outcome and assess whether they vary among bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral
agreements.
Specifically, I consider how states have used arms control agreements to constrain their
patterns of military technology development and deployment by posing the following research
question:
• Are states parties more likely to comply with multilateral arms control agreements
than bilateral arms control agreements?
In the chapter to follow, I present the finding that membership may not have as significant
an effect on compliance outcomes as some of the more optimistic accounts of multilateralism
suggest—at least in terms of compliance outcomes. I begin by examining the existing schol-
arly literature concerning institution membership and international cooperation and present
a series of testable hypotheses related to existing theory. Then, I analyze a the membership
characteristics of arms control agreements in the context of compliance using empirical data.
Finally, I consider how the analysis reflects lessons learned concerning the bargaining and
enforcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action discussed briefly above.
7.2 Multilateralism in Theory
The “institutional scope” of an agreement in terms of its membership represents a key
characteristic that conditions both the creation and performance of various institutions.11 In
pliance without enforcement: state behavior under regulatory treaties”; Mitchell, “Problem structure, in-
stitutional design, and the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements”; Young, Inter-
national cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the environment ; Ovodenko and Keohane,
“Institutional diffusion in international environmental affairs”; Joseph M Grieco, Cooperation among nations:
Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade (Cornell University Press, 1990); Jeffrey Kucik and Eric
Reinhardt, “Does flexibility promote cooperation? An application to the global trade regime,” International
Organization 62, no. 3 (2008): 477–505; Helen V Milner and B Peter Rosendorff, “Democratic politics and
international trade negotiations: Elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization,”
Journal of Conflict resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 117–146.
9Abbott, “Trust but verify: The production of information in arms control treaties and other interna-
tional agreements.”
10Richard L Williamson Jr, “Hard law, Soft law, and Non-Law in multilateral arms control: some com-
pliance hypotheses,” Chi. J. Int’l L. 4 (2003): 59.
11Aggarwal, Institutional designs for a complex world: Bargaining, linkages, and nesting ; Vinod K Ag-
garwal, Liberal protectionism: The international politics of organized textile trade, vol. 13 (Univ of California
Press, 1985).
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theory, the inclusion of large numbers of players may make bargaining in negotiations more
difficult and “lowest common denominator” agreements more likely. On the other hand,
reneging on commitments to larger numbers of players arguably becomes more difficult given
the reputation costs of doing so.12
As noted above, various studies have considered the determinants of membership patterns
in individual institutions or sets of institutions within various policy areas, including human
rights treaties,13 environmental treaties,14 international courts,15 alliance frameworks,16 and
economic agreements.17 There are, however, fewer studies that engage with theory concerning
the consequences of various types of membership—from bilateral to minilateral and multilat-
eral agreements—on arms control. Addressing this gap in the literature is important given
the contemporary salience of arms control agreements and the importance of engaging with
security-related (and, at times, adversarial) cooperation.18
Below, I engage with realist and neo-liberal critiques of multilateralism that have con-
tributed to the conventional wisdom that bilateral arms control agreements are easier to
enforce before exploring some of the benefits of multilateralism outlined in the rationalist
literature that point to the potential positive effects of multilateralism related to compliance
outcomes.
7.2.1 Critiques of Multilateralism
As Kahler points out in his seminal article on multilateralism, realist perspectives on cooper-
ation suggest that multilateral, cooperative frameworks are incompatible with the hierarchy
of the international system and that powerful states are more likely to pursue their interests
via bilateral bargaining “immune from the scrutiny of other states.”19 Instances of multilat-
eral cooperation are subsequently explained on the basis of structural determinism—in which
systemic factors drive the necessity for multilateral frameworks—to the benefit of powerful
states—when it suits them.20 This has been described in reference to international law as
a powerful state’s predilection to “pick and play” a role in those institutions that match a
12Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries.
13James Raymond Vreeland, “Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the
United Nations Convention Against Torture,” International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008): 65–101.
14Von Stein, “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.”
15Simmons, “Treaty compliance and violation.”
16James D Morrow, “Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of
alliances,” American journal of political science, 1991, 904–933.
17Edward D Mansfield and Helen V Milner, Votes, vetoes, and the political economy of international trade
agreements (Princeton University Press, 2012).
18A number of realist scholars, in particular, suggest that international cooperation occurs only at the
margins and in issue areas in which relative gains concerns are minimal.
19Kahler, “Multilateralism with small and large numbers.”
20Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique,” Journal of European Public Policy
13, no. 2 (2006): 217–234.
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state’s interests while eschewing other types of multilateral frameworks.21
Neo-liberal theory concerning membership in international institutions, on the other
hand, points to the obstacles associated with cooperation in large groups.22 Scholarship
that followed explored “recognition and control problems” theorized to exacerbate bargain-
ing problems—in which the ability of states parties to police compliance and apply sanctions
for noncompliance are theorized to decrease in multilateral contexts.23 The existing arms
control literature reflects this theory leading to the conventional wisdom that “compliance
is generally easier to enforce for bilateral than multilateral agreements.”24 This proposition
yields a testable hypothesis for analysis:
• H1: If an agreements includes more parties, then compliance is less likely.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of scholars disagree with this perspective.
7.2.2 The Benefits of Multilateralism
Disagreeing with the critiques of multilateral frameworks, scholars of political economy have
explored the substantive benefits associated with the consequences of establishing multilat-
eral cooperative frameworks. In terms of normative characteristics, these include an aban-
donment of “bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to... increase
international conflict.”25 Scholars have also argued that multilateral frameworks enhance
democracy by “by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual
rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation.”26
Rationalist scholars have also noted that states often use multilateral institutions to facil-
itate cooperation among partners with dissimilar—and even adversarial—preferences.27 This
logic concerning inter-state bargaining appears to apply to multilateral arms control, too,
as states parties design frameworks that prescribe and proscribe specific types of behavior
for different reasons. In the context of the NPT, for example, nuclear weapon states tend to
privilege the non-proliferation aspects of the Treaty while non-nuclear weapon states focus
21Allan Gerson, “Multilateralism a la carte: the consequences of unilateral ‘pick and pay’ approaches,”
European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000): 61–65.
22Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965).
23Michael Taylor, The possibility of cooperation (Cambridge University Press, 1987); Oye, “Explaining
cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies.”
24Guthe et al., “Securing Compliance with Arms Control Agreements.”
25Kahler, “Multilateralism with small and large numbers,” 681. See also: Richard N Gardner, “Sterling-
dollar diplomacy in current perspective,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-
) 62, no. 1 (1985): 21–33.
26Robert O Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik, “Democracy-enhancing multilateralism,”
International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 1–31.
27Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and soft law in international governance”; Kenneth W Abbott et al., “The
concept of legalization,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 401–419; Koremenos, “Loosening the
ties that bind: A learning model of agreement flexibility”; Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic
Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adversaries.”
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on the disarmament provisions in Article VI.28 Multilateral arms control agreements may
also provide a series of compliance benefits related to a “naming and shaming” mechanism—
most often discussed in the context of human rights provisions.29 Disaggregated verification
regimes that involve large numbers of state participants—typified by the CTBTO’s 321 mon-
itoring stations and 16 laboratories—and burden-sharing may also increase the likelihood of
detecting non-compliance and bolstering the regime.30
Scholars—predominantly in discussions surrounding climate change negotiations—have
also pointed the benefits of minilateral frameworks for addressing collective action problems
by seeking “club benefits” associated with an increased likelihood of achieving an agreement
by reducing the complexity of the negotiation process.31 In the context of arms control,
negotiations surrounding efforts to ban specific military technologies face similar obstacles
to those faced in climate change negotiations—particularly concerning the bargaining of
great powers and their outsized importance to achieving an accord. Like climate change,
however, the optimal number of parties to include within a minilateral framework remains
unclear. For those arms control agreements focused on nuclear weapons: Should all nuclear
states be included? Should only those states that have abided by their NPT commitments
be offered a seat at the table—omitting India, Pakistan, and Israel? Or should the “tier 1”
nations—Russia and the United States—continue to lead on arms control efforts until their
forces are more closely aligned with the rest of the P5 states?32
The theorized benefits of multilateralism also yield several testable hypotheses.
• H2a: If an agreements includes more parties, then compliance is more likely.
An additional hypothesis might also explore the theorized benefits of minilateral institu-
tions that derive the benefits of multilateral frameworks while having fewer collective action
problems:
28Muller, “Compliance politics: A critical analysis of multilateral arms control treaty enforcement.”
29Emilie M Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and stones: Naming and shaming the human rights enforcement prob-
lem,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (2008): 689–716; Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation:
sovereign debt across three centuries.
30Wolfgang Hoffmann, Rashad Kebeasy, and Petr Firbas, “Introduction to the verification regime of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors 113, nos. 1-4 (1999):
5–9.
31Robyn Eckersley, “Moving forward in the climate negotiations: Multilateralism or minilateralism?,”
Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 2 (2012): 24–42; Robert Falkner, “A minilateral solution for global
climate change? On bargaining efficiency, club benefits, and international legitimacy,” Perspectives on Poli-
tics 14, no. 1 (2016): 87–101; Robert Gampfer, “Minilateralism or the UNFCCC? The political feasibility of
climate clubs,” Global Environmental Politics 16, no. 3 (2016): 62–88.
32In discussions with New START negotiators in Washington, DC, they noted that multilateralizing arms
control faces substantial challenges given that China, France, and United Kingdom have each made clear
that they would not consider participation in arms limitation agreements given the contemporary disparities
in numbers between themselves and the United States and Russia. As a result, future bilateral reduction in
Washington and Moscow are considered a precondition for minilateral negotiations.
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• H2b: If an agreements is minilateral (involving three to nine states parties), then
compliance is more likely.
The analysis below also considers the null hypothesis in which:
• H0: The number of parties included in an agreement has no effect on patterns of
compliance.
7.3 Method
To examine these hypotheses, I provide a quantitative examination of the empirical record—
comparing agreement outcomes across bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral contexts to
yield the predicted probability of compliance in each agreement-year given the design choices
concerning membership made by arms control negotiators and their respective governments.
7.3.1 Introducing the Arms Control Design Dataset
For the purposes of this chapter, I use a subset of nuclear arms control agreements that
entered into force from Kreps’s list of arms control agreements.33
As in the previous chapters, I leave out those agreements that have not entered into
force and those that are institutions rather than agreements in this analysis. The primary
justification for this decision is that states cannot be reasonably expected to comply with
agreements that never entered into force—even if they made the decision to sign them.34
Using this case-selection criteria, the dataset used in this chapter include 40 agreements
composed of of 1,187 agreement-years.
Below, I introduce the variables coded within the Arms Control Design Dataset (ACDD).
7.3.2 Measuring Membership
I use two different criteria for coding membership of agreements. The first borrows from
Vaynman’s doctoral work that splits agreements into those that are bilateral (involving two
states parties), minilateral (involving three to nine states parties), and large multilateral
agreements (involving 10 parties or more).35
33Kreps, “The institutional design of arms control agreements” This list also reflects those compiled by the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, Federation of American Scientists, and Goldblat’s work.Goldblat, Arms control:
a survey and appraisal of multilateral agreements; Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations
and Agreements.
34Incidentally, both the United States and the Soviet Union both often abide by the limitations set out
in various arms control agreements that did not enter into force.
35Vaynman, “Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation between Adver-
saries.” It is worth noting that the definition of minilateralism varies beyond the methodological choice made
here. In some of the literature, it includes regimes and cooperative frameworks that include up to 30 states.
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The second criterion draws a dichotomous distinction between those agreements that are
bilateral and those are multilateral (involving three or more states parties). It is worth point-
ing out that as the dataset is composed of agreement-years, there are agreements that tran-
sition between the categories. START I, for example, negotiated between the United States
and Soviet Union, was multilateralized by the Lisbon Protocol upon the dissolution of the
USSR to address the 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons and 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons de-
ployed within the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—increasing
the number of states parties to the Treaty from two to five. COCOM, the Nuclear Suppli-
ers Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime also steadily increased their respective
numbers of states parties during the period covered by the dataset.
Among those frameworks included in the dataset, there is one case that does not fall
simply into a coding criteria. I code the Mongolian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone—in which the
Mongolian government unilaterally declared that the government would not pursue nuclear
weapons technology—as a multilateral agreement in the dataset following the recognition of
this status by the United Nations.36
These measures of independent variables investigating the type of membership within
an arms control agreement is subsequently used in an analysis of compliance with each
agreement.
7.3.3 The Dependent Variable: Measuring Compliance
Unlike treaty obligations that are spelled out in agreements, coding compliance involves
taking into account allegations of breaches from historical, journalistic, and government
records.37 Where available, I use accounts in popular international presses and government
documents to corroborate noncompliance on an agreement-year and country-agreement-year
basis. In the most recent example, Russian deployment of the 9M729 on the Iskander
launcher in 2008 represented a breach of the INF Treaty.38 Russia, in response, argued
that U.S. missile defense forces were also in breach of the Treaty. Compliance, for the
purposes of this study, relates to a best estimation of states abiding by the letter of their
agreements.39
For the purposes of this analysis, I use a range of three to nine states in order to compare my analysis and
findings with previous work.
36This status is enshrined within UN documents: A/55/56 S/2000/160.
37The coding criteria for measuring compliance is discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. The coding
criteria for the dependent variable is also consistent across the chapters—and is included in each for the
benefit of the reader and to go alongside the discussion of measurement concerning each independent variable
of interest.
38For a discussion of Russia’s breach of the INF Treaty, see the Bureau of Arms Control and Verification’s
Compliance Report released in April 2016: Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonprolifer-
ation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
39Where possible, each episode of compliance is cross-referenced against chapter 9, “Compliance and
Noncompliance,” in Richard Burns’ Evolution of Arms Control.Duffy, “Arms control treaty compliance”;
Burns, The evolution of arms control: from antiquity to the nuclear age.
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Figure 7.1: This figure provides a compliance count of agreement-years comparing bilateral
and multilateral agreements. Compliance agreement-years are noted in green while non-
compliance agreement-years are noted in red.
Within the dataset, there are a number of episodes of noncompliance from the 1980s
onwards related to actions undertaken by Russia, the United States, North Korea, India,
and Pakistan regarding their respective treaty commitments.
7.4 Quantitative Results
To assess the effects of membership scope on compliance, I perform a series of quantitative
analyses using the empirical data described above.
7.4.1 Bilateralism, Minilateralism, and Multilateralism
In the first analysis (Models 1-3), I use a probit regression model to assess the effect of
bilateral, minilateral, and large multilateral membership within arms control agreements on
the predicted probability of compliance.40 In this analysis, the membership type of interest
40A probit model uses a cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
to define f (*)—rescaling the values of the dependent variable to fall between 0 and 1. Hence, whatever
CHAPTER 7. MEMBERSHIP MATTERS? 141
is compared to all others in the dataset.41
Yˆ = f(α + βx) (7.1)
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.1. Interestingly, in terms of the theo-
retical disagreement concerning the effects of membership on international cooperation, none
of these model specifications present statistically significant relationships between member-
ship type and the predicted probability of compliance.42
Table 7.1: Probit models for the effect of arms control agreement type on treaty compliance
on agreement-year basis
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bilateral -0.12 (0.12)
Minilateral -0.01 (0.21)
Lg Multilateral 0.11 (0.12)
N 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.0 -260.5 -260.0
Constant 1.62 (0.07) 1.58 (0.06) 1.51 (0.09)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Among the models, Model 1—suggesting that bilateral agreements have a negative effect
on the predicted probability of compliance—comes closest to a statistically significant and
negative effect on compliance (p-value = 0.353). Examples of non-compliance involving
bilateral treaties include the ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, CFE Treaty, and the Helsinki Accords.
Looking across models 1, 2, and 3, it appears that while there is no statistically significant
effect of membership on compliance outcomes, there is an expectation that as an agreement
becomes increasingly multilateral, it has a positive effect on compliance—as 7.3 makes clear.
In the section below, I use a dichotomous coding of multilateral membership to examine
this effect further.
7.4.2 Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism
In Models 4-7 (summarized in Table 7.2), I use a dichotomous measure for bilateral and
multilateral membership (in which bilateral = 0 and multilateral = 1) to re-run the analysis
and include a series of control variables theorized to affect compliance.
α + βx equals, it can be transformed by the function to yield a predicted probability of compliance on an
agreement-year basis. Alternative model specifications for are included in the Appendix.
41Bilateral agreement-years are compared to minilateral and large multilateral agreement-years. Minilat-
eral agreement-years are compared to bilateral and multilateral agreement-years, and so on.
42These results are consistent with an analysis using alternative modeling approaches. In the Appendix
to this chapter, I include a parallel analysis using logistic regression rather than the probit model described
here.
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Figure 7.2: This figure shows the coefficient estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals
reported in Table 7.1 in graph form.
Table 7.2: Probit models for the effect of arms control agreement type using a categorical
variable on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Multilateral 0.12 (0.12) 0.46 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.20 (0.13) 0.43 (0.17)∗∗
Stringency 0.17 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.18 (0.07)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.46 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.46 (0.07)∗∗∗
Sunset 0.65 (0.27)∗∗ 0.72 (0.32)∗∗
Successor 0.42 (0.25)∗ -0.20 (0.31)
Cold War 0.35 (0.25)∗∗ 0.31 (0.16)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260 -227.6 -256.0 -225.1
Constant 1.50 (0.10) 2.25 (0.19) 1.34 (0.11) 2.22 (0.20)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In line with the first analysis, there is once again no statistically significant relationship
between multilateral agreements and compliance. As expected, given the results from Models
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1-3, Model 4 reports a positive correlation between multilateral agreements and the predicted
probability of compliance. As control variables are added to the analysis, this positive
correlation becomes statistically significant.
In Model 5, I include a series of design variables used in the previous chapters theorized
to affect compliance—including two categorical variables that assess the stringency of the
verification regime and the type of agreement along with a binary variable used to measure
the inclusion of a termination clause within the agreement. In line with the findings reported
in the prior chapters, termination clauses are positively correlated with the predicted proba-
bility of compliance while agreements that address more complex challenges related to arms
limitations and arms bans have a negative effect on the predicted probability of compliance.
In Model 6, I include two additional control variables related to the context in which an
arms control agreement is reached. First, I include a binary successor variable to consider
whether the agreement that follows a prior agreement regulating the same military technol-
ogy with a similar design has an effect on compliance. The logic for including this control is
that agreements modeled on past agreements that have already been negotiated and com-
plied with are more likely to be complied with in the future—this might be described as a
“practice makes perfect” logic. As expected, the successor variable is positively correlated
with compliance.
Second, I include a variable that categorizes each agreement-year in the dataset on the
basis of occurring during the Cold War—with 1991 as the cut-off point. Beyond being a
fairly normal control for social science analyses of this type, there are a number of theories
that suggest that its inclusion might impact the result. On the one hand, the Cold War—and
the intense strategic rivalry between the United States and USSR that it embodies—may
contribute to non-compliance given the incentives to cheat on agreements in pursuit of a
competitive advantage. On the other hand, the stabilizing features of Cold War competition
and dynamics of mutually assured destruction related to nuclear forces may contribute to
compliance. In Models 6 and 7, I find support for the latter hypothesis.
Taken together, these models provide limited support for the proposition that multilat-
eral frameworks have a higher predicted probability of compliance relative to their bilateral
counterparts. With that said, this correlation does not amount to a statistically significant
relationship and subsequently does not rule out the null hypothesis, H0. Incorporating ex-
amples of non-strategic arms control and continuing to track patterns of membership and
compliance in venues of broader international cooperation, it may be possible to characterize
the performance of membership design on treaty outcomes.
The predicted probability of compliance in any agreement-year can also be calculated
using the coefficients of Models 4-7 noted in Table 7.2 to examine the effect of membership
on compliance.
For example, for Model 5:
ˆCompliance = F (2.25 + 0.46(Multi) + 0.17(String)− 0.46(AgType) + 0.65(Sunset)) (7.2)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the inverse standard normal distribution
and 1 is the value of Y associated with compliance.
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Figure 7.3: This figure shows the coefficient estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals
reported in Table 7.2 in graph form.
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This equation allows us to calculate the predicted probability of compliance for each
type of agreement on an agreement-year basis holding each of the co-variates at their mean
value.43 The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: This table notes the variation in the predicted probability of compliance (Y = 1
for a given agreement-year on the basis of the treaty being bilateral or multilateral using
Models 4-7 and holding all control variables at their mean value.
Model Bilateral Multilateral
Model 4 93.3 % 94.7 %
Model 5 92.8 % 97.3 %
Model 6 92.9 % 95.2 %
Model 7 93.3 % 97.3 %
While multilateral agreements increase the predicted probability of compliance, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that these calculations of predicted probability do not take statistical
significance into account. To further consider the effect of verification on compliance, it is
worth considering empirical examples of non-compliance within bilateral and multilateral
contexts. This empirical record is considered below following the sensitivity analysis of the
statistical results noted above.
7.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I perform a series of sensitivity analyses related to the model specifications
above.
7.5.1 Multicollinearity
First, I test the multicollinearity of the standard probit model used in the analysis above.
To do this, I use a variance inflation factor (VIF) to measure how easily it is to achieve the
same model outcomes from a linear regression using the other predictors using Model 7 (that
includes both the independent variable of interest, membership, alongside design co-variates
and control variables. The square root of the VIF tells you how much larger the standard
error of the estimated coefficient is in respect to a case when that predictor is independent
of the other predictors.
A general guideline is that a VIF larger than 5 or 10 indicates that the model has problems
estimating the coefficient..44 Table 7.4 below shows the VIF for Model 7 described above.
43The equation can also be used to calculate the likelihood of compliance given a variety of design
characteristics.
44Thompson et al., “Extracting the variance inflation factor and other multicollinearity diagnostics from
typical regression results.”
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Table 7.4: This table shows the Variance Inflection Factor for the probit model including all
four design variables and the Cold War and Successor control variables used in Model 7.
Variables Multilateral Stringency Agreement Type Sunset Cold War Successor
VIF 1.51 1.87 1.74 1.50 1.03 1.57
Model 7 is used to predict the effect of the agreement membership (comparing bilateral and
multilateral agreements) on the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year
basis with institutional design co-variates. In this case, the co-variates are the categorical
agreement type variable, a categorical variable describing the verification regime, and a
dummy variable denoting whether the agreeent has a termination clause.
The results of this analysis suggest that multicollinearity, in which the explanatory vari-
ables are highly correlated, is not a concern for the models above.
7.5.2 Independence and Heteroskedasticity Probit Results
The existing methodological literature suggests that models using panel data may internalize
substantial cross-sectional dependence in the errors. This may occur due to the presence of
shocks common to the data points, unobservables that ultimately become part of the error
term, or temporal dependence. To address concerns surrounding the independence of both
the outcome variables and the regressors, I run a series of regression models with clustered
standard errors that adjust for non-independence across agreements and across years.
To do this, I assess whether circumstances in which the variability of a variable is un-
equal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it exist in the underlying
data used in the probit models above. This test is particularly important given that het-
eroskedasticity in these models can represent a major violation of the probit (and logit)
model specifications, which assume homoskedastic errors.
For any non-linear model (including the logit and probit models used throughout this
dissertation), however, heteroscedasticity has more severe consequences: the maximum like-
lihood estimates of the parameters will be biased (in an unknown direction), as well as
inconsistent. If this is the case, the likelihood function needs to be modified to take the
heteroskedasticity into account).
Below, I use a heteroskedastic probit model to re-assess the effect of membership on pat-
terns of compliance on an agreement-year basis using Huber-White robust clustered standard
errors.45
In the table, I am particularly concerned with whether there are differences in the direc-
tion of the effect, statistical significance, and departures from the standard errors reported
in Table 7.2.
45I use the sandwich R package to carry out this analysis.Zeileis, “Object-oriented computation of sand-
wich estimators”; White et al., “A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct
test for heteroskedasticity.”
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Table 7.5: Heteroskedastic probit models for the effect of membership type on treaty com-
pliance on agreement-year basis
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Model 4HP Model 5HP Model 6HP Model 7HP
Multilateral 0.10 (0.13) 0.44 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.13) 0.42 (0.16)∗∗
Stringency 0.18 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.20 (0.07)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.48 (0.06)∗∗∗ -0.46 (0.07)∗∗∗
Sunset 0.83 (0.34)∗∗ 0.86 (0.52)∗
Successor 0.55 (0.26)∗∗ -0.11 (0.43)
Cold War 0.36 (0.15)∗∗ 0.31 (0.17)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -257.4 -222.7 -252.7 -220.6
Constant 1.52 (0.10) 2.29 (0.14) 1.34 (0.11) 2.23 (0.09)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As is the case in the previous chapters, this alternative modeling specification does not
dispute the results above. Once again, multilateralism appears to have a positive effect on
the predicted probability of compliance though without statistical significance.
7.5.3 Time Dependence
I now turn to the question of whether the findings outlined above are driven by temporal
dependence.
To address this, I use Carter and Signorino’s cubic polynomial approximation method
described in Chapter 3 to include t, t2, and t3 in several regression models described above.
In these models t represents the time since the last “event.”46 In this analysis, the specific
event at issue is a breach of an arms control agreement. Thus, t represents the time, in years,
since the last episode of non-compliance on an agreement-year basis.
I report two models including t, t2, and t3. The first model presents the independent
variable of interest while the second includes the independent variable of interest alongside
the additional design characteristics and control variables.
Table 7.6: Cubic polynomial approximation probit models for the effect membership on
treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
46Carter and Signorino, “Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data.”
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(4) (4) (7) (7)
Model 4 Model 4CP Model 7 Model 7CP
Multilateral 0.12 (0.12) 0.10 (0.25) 0.43 (0.17)∗∗ 0.28 (0.24)
Agreement Type -0.47 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.40 (0.10)∗∗∗
Stringency 0.19 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.21 (0.09)∗∗
Sunset 0.73 (0.32)∗∗ 0.65 (0.42)
Successor -0.20 (0.31) 0.60 (0.45)
Cold War 0.31 (0.16)∗ 0.72 (0.22)∗∗∗
t 1.12 (0.15)∗∗∗ 1.00 (0.14)∗∗∗
t2 -0.09 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.08 (0.01)∗∗∗
t3 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗ 0.002 (0.0004)∗∗∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.0 -130.8 -225.1 -109.1
Constant 1.50 (0.10) -1.08 (0.25) 2.22 (0.20) -0.59 (0.39)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As is the case in the standard probit model analysis, the effect and statistical significance
of membership varies—with and without taking into account temporal dependence. Perhaps
most important is that the p-value associated with the membership variable in Model 7CP is
substantially larger (p = 0.06) than in Model 7 (p = 0.02). As has been the case throughout
the analysis of temporal dependence concerning arms control outcomes, compliance outcomes
in on period appear to be influenced by compliance outcomes in past periods. This, however,
has only a marginal effect on the results reported in this chapter.
7.5.4 Selection Effects
As discussed in Chapter 3 and as Downs et al. and von Stein have noted, when an indepen-
dent variable is itself a strategic choice on an outcome there are significant selection effects
that must be taken into account when analyzing observational data.47 In simplest terms, any
outcome variables (in this case, compliance) must be measured against the predilection of a
state taking the same action in the absence of the variable of interest(in this case an arms
control agreement). As both the choice of a state to undertake an arms control agreement of
a specific design and the decision to comply with an agreement on an agreement-year basis,
the research in question .
In this agreement-year-based analysis of the ACDD, the analysis does not consider that
the “enforce-ability” of the agreement as well as the underlying probability of compliance
for states parties varies and that this variation affects both the choice of which states should
be included in an arms control regime as well as compliance outcomes.
The the findings presented in this chapter like those presented throughout have the caveat,
common among observational studies, that they provide a first cut at the causal relationship
47Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, “Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?”;
Von Stein, “Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance.”
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between institutional design characteristics and compliance outcomes on an agreement-year
basis.
7.6 The Empirical Record
As noted above, the empirical record provides examples of both bilateral and multilateral
frameworks resulting in non-compliance.
7.6.1 Bilateral Non-Compliance
In the bilateral case, the reciprocal benefits of participating in and complying with arms
control obligations represent the most immediate driver of state behavior. In discussions with
prior arms control negotiators concerning Russia’s abrogation of INF, they point out that
arms control requires practice—and that the termination of the verification regime in 2001
combined with the cessation of regular meetings of the Special Verification Commission—
likely increased the likelihood of Russian abrogation of the Treaty due to a decrease in
the perceived costs of abrogating the Treaty.48 In the same discussion, past negotiators
suggested that compliance is best explained by the reciprocal and relative benefits provided
by an arms control regime—whether in the form of information exchange or in terms of
allowing a reduction of arms numbers and a decrease in information asymmetries between
states parties that ultimately strengthen the strategic position of the signatories.
7.6.2 Multilateral Non-Compliance
The IAEA, representing the first multilateral verification organization tasked with monitor-
ing nuclear safeguards agreements, has investigated eight cases of non-compliance.49 In the
cases of Romania, South Korea, and Egypt, a single public noncompliance report led the
governments of those three states to policy remedies. In five cases involving Libya, Syria,
Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, compliance issues were more complicated. Each of these cases
are fairly unique, with the IAEA establishing its own series of procedures and norms associ-
ated with inspections and compliance reporting.50 Findlay, examining the institutional role
of the Director-General and Board of Governors describes each case as “unique, dynamic,
and nonlinear” as well as noting that its 1957 Statute was “charmingly naive” in its ex-
pectation that states would quickly take steps to address noncompliance concerns noted by
48Interview in Washington, DC in March 2019.
49These cases have been outlined in a series reports of both the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board
of Governors.
50Indeed, the IAEA has in some cases provided guidance to the UN Security Council regarding the
appropriateness of responding to noncompliance. In both the Romanian and Libyan cases, the IAEA provided
noncompliance reports ‘for information purposes’ with the UNSC deciding not to take the cases to a vote.
Trevor Findlay, “IAEA Noncompliance Reporting And the Iran Case,” Arms Control Today 46, no. 1 (2016):
30.
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the IAEA.51 The episodes of non-compliance related to safeguards reported to the UNSC
also provide a window into the decision-making of members of the UN Security Council con-
cerning noncompliance resolutions. Upon the referral of the Iraqi (1991) and North Korean
(1993) noncompliance cases to the UN Security Council, the vast majority of states sup-
ported a resolution recognizing non-compliance. In more recent cases involving Iran (2005)
and Syria (2011), the majorities have become smaller, with an increasing number of states
abstaining from voting. In all eight cases, the public acknowledgement of non-compliance
via reporting by the IAEA and voting in the United Nations—presents a mechanism for
punishing non-compliant behavior—with mixed results. These reporting mechanisms reflect
the reputation-oriented theories outlined above.52 These cases also serve as an example of an
agreement involving an international verification organization that has a professional staff or
bureaucracy that publicly reports noncompliance.53 This process differs considerably from
U.S. annual reports concerning compliance mandated by Congress and managed by the De-
partment of State and the occasional Russian speeches and documents that used to monitor
compliance and non-compliance.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, contemporary efforts to address U.S.
withdrawal and Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed
in July 2015 and implemented in January 2016 provides a recent, compelling example of the
difficulties associated with multilateral—and in this case minilateral—arms control frame-
works.
The JCPOA includes various measures designed to limit the enrichment of uranium to
below 3.67 percent until 2030 as well as limiting the number (6,104) and specifying the
type and location of centrifuges in Iran. The IAEA was given responsibility for monitoring
and verifying Tehran’s compliance with the agreement. The agreement also terminated UN
sanctions in January 2016 with some U.S. and EU sanctions lifted following its signing with
full termination of sanctions due to follow in 2023. At the time of its signing the Agreement
was described by its supporters as the best possible deal to arrest Iran’s nuclear program.54
Since implementation, however, the United States has announced its withdrawal from
the Agreement and the re-imposition of sanctions despite the other members of the P5+1
calling for the United States to abide by the terms of the Agreement. Efforts by European
states, in particular, have failed to bring the United States and Iran back to the table. At
the time of writing in July 2019, Iran has responded by enriching uranium beyond the 3.67
percent threshold while calling on European states to do more to soften the impact of U.S.
sanctions. The IAEA has yet to announce Iranian non-compliance with the provisions of the
JCPOA though Iranian public statements suggests that further enrichment is likely.
While the JCPOA remains something of a moving target for analysts and scholars given
its uncertain future, it makes salient the difficulties associated with addressing compliance
51Findlay, “IAEA Noncompliance Reporting And the Iran Case.”
52Tomz, Reputation and international cooperation: sovereign debt across three centuries.
53Haas, “Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and comparative politics.”
54Nephew, “Triggers, Redlines, and the Fate of the Iran Nuclear Accord.”
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issues in a multilateral context—particularly when it remains unclear what the appropriate
venue is for addressing the non-nuclear aspects of the agreement pertaining to sanctions.
7.7 Conclusion
As noted above, a quantitative analysis of the empirical record of nuclear arms control
agreements finds limited support for the hypothesis that multilateral agreements contribute
to compliance outcomes—hinted at by the positive but statistically insignificant correlation
between multilateralism and compliance. With regard to the existing theory concerning the
relative benefits of bilateral and multilateral treaty design vis a` vis compliance, this analysis
suggests that the jury remains out and that more work is needed to provide empirical support
for the proposition that multilateral membership is more desirable than bilateral membership
in relation to compliance outcomes.
Indeed, there have been increasing calls for existing arms control processes to multilateralized—
with new efforts by the United States to include China in nuclear arms limitation agreements.
In terms of nuclear forces, however, the two-tiered nature of the contemporary context in
which U.S. and Russian forces are substantially larger than all others serves as a primary ob-
stacle to multilateral cooperation.55 The nuclear force postures and deterrence strategies of
the three remaining members of the P5 are substantially different from the United States and
Russia—not least in terms of warhead numbers.56 Given the divergence in nuclear posture
and strategy between the two tiers of nuclear states, it is worth considering whether arms
control frameworks that privilege robust inspection and verification regimes are likely to be
appropriate in multilateral contexts. Would Beijing, for example, acquiesce to inspections
of their mobile missile systems in which the location of the system is intrinsically linked
to the survivability of the force and its deterrence mission? Including additional parties to
these agreements may, as pointed out in the theory section above, complicate inter-state
bargaining—which in the context of contemporary arms control already takes months to
years rather than days to weeks.
With that said, the inclusion of second tier nuclear powers in negotiations surrounding
the extension of arms control beyond 2021 may offer enforcement benefits as well as providing
an opportunity for institutional learning for those states that are new to the arms control
architecture by socializing them to the process—as well as the fact that arms control provides
a strategic rather than normative benefit. This, according to a number of individuals involved
in the New START negotiations, represented one of the c most compelling arguments for
including China in future arms limitation talks.
55Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2013,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 69, no. 5 (2013): 75–81.
56The United States and Russia have approximately 1,400 warheads each under New START limits
while the Nuclear Notebook estimates for the rest of the P5 place their warhead numbers at approximately
300 each.Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Arsenals, 1990–2018”; Bruce Larkin, Nuclear Designs: Great Britain,
France and China in the global governance of nuclear arms (Routledge, 2018).
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There may also benefits to be drawn from focusing on minilateral frameworks that may be
easier to achieve than their broader, multilateral counterparts. With that said, multilateral
membership—based on the empirical record—does not offer a panacea.
Beyond the nuclear forces that were the focus of this chapter, there may be lessons
to be drawn from the analysis for non-nuclear arms control negotiations and agreement
design. The most obvious example of contemporary arms control negotiations that might
consider the consequences of regime membership concerns the regime to address and cyber
weapons amid efforts to regulate the use of cyberspace in inter-state conflict. Both Beijing
and Moscow have, perhaps mischievously, proposed intergovernmental, multilateral processes
to establish global norms of behavior involving several international institutions including
the International Telecommunication Union, a UN Group of Governmental Experts, and
UN General Assembly open-ended working group.57 The United States, on the other hand,
appears to have preferred a bilateral approach to establishing the inappropriateness of specific
behaviors in cyberspace—namely the targeting of critical infrastructure by Chinese actors.58
The United States has also latterly sponsored a UN resolution to create a new UN Group of
Governmental Experts to identify and promote compliance with cyber “norms of behavior.”
Within each of the forums set up to discuss military applications of Internet technology,
observers in Geneva (the location of several GGEs under the auspices of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD)) have noted that the composition of those around the table have shaped
the discussion—including disagreements related to the very definitions of what constitutes
cybersecurity.
As scholars grapple with the consequences of membership within international institutions
in general and arms control negotiations in particular, more empirical data is needed to assess
the historical effects of membership on treaty outcomes. Future work might also reflect on
how and why arms control may offer a peculiar example of international cooperation in which
the existing theories emanating from non-security domains concerning the consequences of
multilateralism may not apply.
Appendix
The choice to use probit or logit models is generally considered to be one of personal prefer-
ence when dealing with dichotomous outcome variables. As a reminder, OLS regressions are
inappropriate as the errors from a linear probability model with dichotomous outcome vari-
ables violate homoskedasticity and normality of errors assumptions, resulting in invalid stan-
dard errors. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there is increasingly disagreement about whether
these drawbacks inherent within OLS methods necessitate the use of probit or logit estima-
tors.
Below, I carry out an identical analysis to those carried out using probit regression
methods using logistic regression. The number associated with each model remains the
57Meyer, “Cyber-security through arms control: an approach to international co-operation.”
58Grigsby, “The end of cyber norms.”
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same with those using a logistic regression denoting an L. For example, Model 1 above can
be compared to Model 1L, below.
Table 7.7: Logit models for the effect of arms control agreement type on treaty compliance
on agreement-year basis
(1) (2) (3)
Model 1L Model 2L Model 3L
Bilateral -0.25 (0.26)
Minilateral -0.02 (0.44)
Lg Multilateral 0.24 (0.25)
N 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.0 -260.5 -260.0
Constant 2.89 (0.16) 2.80 (0.13) 2.67 (0.19)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7.8: Logit models for the effect of arms control agreement type using a categorical
variable on treaty compliance on agreement-year basis
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Model 4L Model 5L Model 6L Model 7L
Multilateral 0.25 (0.26) 1.02 (0.34)∗∗∗ 0.39 (0.27) 1.00 (0.34)∗∗∗
Stringency 0.36 (0.13)∗∗∗ 0.36 (0.13)∗∗∗
Agreement Type -0.94 (0.14)∗∗∗ -0.95 (0.14)∗∗∗
Sunset 1.51 (0.63)∗∗ 1.73 (0.76)∗∗
Successor 0.90 (0.55) -0.48 (0.69)
Cold War 0.76 (0.34)∗∗ 0.64 (0.35)∗
N 1187 1187 1187 1187
Log-likelihood -260.0 -226.8 -256.1 -224.4
Constant 2.64 (0.21) 4.18 (0.42) 2.31 (0.23) 4.10 (0.46)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
As is the case in each of the quantitative chapters, the conclusions drawn from the probit
analysis are not substantially different from those using a logistic regression model with no
changes in the direction of the effects for each of the institutional design co-variates. The
most notable change is that, in line with other models throughout the dissertation, the
successor characteristic is no longer statistically significant in Model 6L.
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Chapter 8
Design Matters: The Institutional
Design of the JCPOA and TPNW
Abstract
This chapter briefly examines the consequences of the quantitative analysis carried out in
the prior chapters by applying the ACDD to contemporary debates surrounding the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In the
chapter, I use the ACDD as training data to calculate the predicted probability of compliance
for each arms control agreement on the basis of their respective design characteristics.
8.1 Introduction
Discussions concerning the appropriateness or inappropriateness of arms control agreement
design too often occur in a vacuum and, as past negotiators have pointed out, are often driven
by heuristics rather than empirics. But, what if the empirical record offered clues about what
the consequences of arms control design might be? This chapter uses the lessons learned
from the analysis carried out in the previous quantitative chapters via an exploration of
two arms control agreements of contemporary importance: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) addressing Iranian nuclear proliferation and the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, also known as the “Ban Treaty”).
Below, I discuss the process of using the ACDD as training data before discussing the
background and design of each arms control regime. In the final section, I note the potential
of building out this dataset further to allow for an increasingly granular analysis of those
design considerations that drive outcomes of interest to both academic researchers and policy-
makers.
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8.2 The ACDD as Training Data
As mentioned above, the ACDD allows for an empirically grounded analysis of the conse-
quences associated with the institutional design of arms control agreements. With that said,
arms control agreements are not always borne from a utilitarian calculus of expected costs
and benefits. As analysts critique the design of arms control regimes during and following
the completion of negotiations, however, this work allows for a probabilistic, empirically-
informed discussion of institutional design using the empirical record as a guide.
Recalling that the quantitative chapters of this dissertation calculate the predicted prob-
abilities of compliance outcomes on the basis of institutional design characteristics produced
by a probit regression model calculated with empirical data in the Arms Control Design
Dataset, I use these same equations to assess each of the three arms control agreements that
are the focus of this chapter.
Below, I use the coefficients from a regression equation involving the all of the institutional
design parameters of theoretical interest that are the subject of this dissertation to calculate
the predicted probability of compliance in a given agreement-year for each of the arms control
regimes discussed in this chapter.1
ˆCompliance = F (2.25− 0.46(AgType) + 0.17(String) + 0.65(Sunset) + 0.46(Multi)) (8.1)
With this equation, I compare the predicted probabilities of compliance across each type
of agreement by coding each agreement’s design characteristics and using them to predict
the probability of compliance on an agreement-year basis. It is important to note that
this predicted probability of compliance with an arms control agreement on an agreement-
year basis is quite different from predicting non-compliance outright. Below, I begin by
considering the design characteristics of the JCPOA.
8.3 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
As discussed briefly in Chapter 7, efforts to address Iran’s nuclear weapons program over
three decades culminated in the negotiation and entry into force of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action in 2015. During this period, numerous scholarly works have sought to under-
stand Iran’s interest in nuclear proliferation.2 In the section to follow, I outline the design of
the JCPOA before assessing its design in light of the analysis carried out in this dissertation
thus far.
Iran and the P5+1 (China France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) signed the the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), colloquially
1The coefficient estimates for this equation are calculated in Model 5 described in Chapter 7.
2For a summary of existing quantitative work examining the causes of nuclear proliferation, see: Gartzke
and Kroenig, “Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons: Past Scholarly Successes, Contemporary Chal-
lenges, and Future Research Opportunities”; Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “Nukes with numbers:
empirical research on the consequences of nuclear weapons for international conflict,” Annual Review of
Political Science 19 (2016): 397–412.
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described as “the Iran Deal,” on July 14, 2015. The agreement was subsequently endorsed
by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and adopted on July 20, 2015. During the negotia-
tions between the states parties and upon signing, there was considerable debate concerning
whether the agreement was fit for purpose.3 On the one hand, scholars and past negotia-
tors suggested that the agreement represented and represents the best possible compromise
that uses sanctions relief to elicit a promise from Tehran to eschew the development of nu-
clear weapons.4 On the other, some doubted—and continue to doubt—the ability of the
agreement to arrest Iran’s nuclear program and indict the agreement for failing to address
broader geopolitical considerations in the region as well as not addressing Iranian nuclear
proliferation in perpetuity.5
Setting aside these debates, I turn to the institutional design of the JCPOA itself, before
examining how these design consideration may affect compliance outcomes.
8.3.1 Agreement Type
The first question for the purposes of this analysis are what the agreement sets out to do.
Is it focused on nuclear risk reduction using domestic law, banning nuclear tests, limiting
the number of nuclear arms (warheads or delivery vehicles) or prohibiting the development
of nuclear weapons altogether?
To make this determination, I draw on the Treaty text itself to note that the JCPOA
serves as an example of an effort to prohibit the development and deployment of nuclear
weapons. As the Preface of the Agreement notes, the JCPOA “will ensure that Irans
nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful... [And] consistent with international non-
proliferation norms.”6 In the Preamble, the Agreement also notes, “Iran reaffirms that under
no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.”7
For the purposes of my analysis, the JCPOA’s agreement type score described in greater
detail in Chapter 4 is a 4, as noted in Table 8.1.
3Fuhrmann explores this debate in: Matthew Fuhrmann, “When Preventive War Threats Work for
Nuclear Nonproliferation,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 3 (2018): 111–135.
4Mark Fitzpatrick, “Iran: A good deal,” Survival 57, no. 5 (2015): 47–52; Nephew, “Triggers, Redlines,
and the Fate of the Iran Nuclear Accord”; Henry Kissinger and George P Shultz, “The Iran deal and its
consequences,” Wall Street Journal, 2015,
5Concerns surrounding breakout of from the straitjacket imposed by the agreement are driven, in part,
by technical rather than institutional considerations. Because the JCPOA allows for enrichment of uranium
throughout the deal and because there is a gradual plateau in the amount energy required to enrich uranium
used in energy programs (LEU) to weapons-grade (HEU), a number of scholars and policy-makers have
argued that the agreement fails to go far enough. For more on the dissent related to the JCPOA, see: Bruno
Tertrais, “Iran: An experiment in strategic risk-taking,” Survival 57, no. 5 (2015): 67–73; Matthew Kroenig,
“The return to the pressure track: The trump administration and the Iran nuclear deal,” Diplomacy &
Statecraft 29, no. 1 (2018): 94–104.
6Preface, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
7Preamble, par. iii, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
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8.3.2 Verification Regime
I turn now to the verification regime included within the JCPOA and use the categorical
stringency variable that is the subject of Chapter 5 to score the Agreement.
As noted in the Treaty text, “The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be
requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this
JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,
and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council.” 8 The Agreement goes on
to note that:
Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary mea-
sures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency mea-
sures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a
long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate
produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; con-
tainment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of
IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment
measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy
resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.9
This monitoring and verification role involves continuous monitoring of uranium mines
and centrifuge production facilities among other sites. But while Iran commits to provi-
sionally apply the Additional Protocol, it falls short of applying an “anytime, anywhere”
standard provided by other arms control regimes. As a result, the JCPOA is scored as a 2
on the ACDD’s stringency scale.10
8.3.3 Termination
In terms of the termination of the agreement, most of the JCPOA’s provisions concerning the
limitation of nuclear activities have a 15-year term ending in 2030 with the Joint Commission
slated to continue to meet quarterly for a period of 25 years.
As the JCPOA notes, “Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out
its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded research and development
exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to
3.67 percent, and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment
research and development and from keeping any nuclear material.”11 Like other agreements
noted in Chapter 6 examining the use of sunset mechanisms in arms control, the inclusion
8Preamble, par. x, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
9Section C, par. 15, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
10As a reminder, the stringency measure is a categorical four-point scale that runs from 0 (no verification
regime) to 3 (challenge inspection regime) to assess the types of verification being carried out during treaty
monitoring.
11Section A, par. 5, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
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Table 8.1: This table describes the institutional design characteristics of the JCPOA
Institutional Design Description Score
Agreement Type








Various provisions of the JCPOA expire after
15 and 25 years
1
Membership
The JCPOA includes 8 signatories: P5 + 1, EU,
and Iran
1
of the termination clause has led to fears that Iran will decide to develop and deploy nuclear
weapons following the sunset of the agreement.12
The existence of a termination clause in the agreement yields a score of 1 for the dichoto-
mous sunset indicator used in the ACDD.
8.3.4 Membership
The negotiations of the JCPOA involved the P5+1, Iran itself and, upon signature, the Eu-
ropean Union via its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—providing
example of a, fairly rare, minilateral arms control regime. Using the dichotomous indicator
for multilateralism, this agreement receives a score of 1.
All four design characteristics are summarized in Table 8.1
Using the scores, above, I apply them to the general equation provided by the empir-
ical data from the Arms Control Design Dataset, setting the scores to match the design
characteristics of the agreement.
As noted above, I use the coefficients from the equation involving the all of the institu-
tional design parameters of theoretical interest that are the subject of this dissertation and
calculated in Chapter 7:
ˆCompliance = F (2.25− 0.46(AgType) + 0.17(String) + 0.65(Sunset) + 0.46(Multi)) (8.2)
Using the estimated coefficients from this equation, I set the values of each variable to
the score noted in Table 8.1 and then calculate the predicted probability of compliance using
the z-score provided by the probit equation. In this case, the JCPOA has 97.0 percent of
compliance on an agreement-year basis.
Bearing in mind that a country failing to comply with its arms control commitments in
any given year is fairly rare, is this predicted probability good or bad? To assess this, we
need a baseline to compare it to.
12Gary G Sick, “Iran After the Deal,” Foreign Affairs, 2015,
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Table 8.2: This table describes the institutional design characteristics associated with New
START.
Institutional Design Score Score
Agreement Type New START is primarily an arms limitation agreement 3
Verification Regime
New START employs both information exchanges and
on-site inspections for the purposes of verification
2
Termination Clause
New START was negotiated with a termination clause
and is slated to end in January 2021
1
Membership New START involves Russia and the United States 0
8.3.5 The New START Benchmark
In terms of its use of verification provisions, New START is often held up as the “gold
standard” of arms control agreements given it’s extensive information exchange provisions
and on-site inspection regime.
Using the same equation as above, I calculate the predicted probability of compliance of
New START’s design in any given agreement-year setting the coefficient values to the score
outlined in Table 8.2. The predicted probability of compliance with the New START regime
on an agreement-year basis is 99.0 percent.
Compared to the benchmark provided by New START using the ACDD dataset, the
JCPOA’s predicted probability of compliance on an agreement year basis is slightly lower,
though not significantly so. Other agreements with the goal of governing nuclear weapons
negotiated more recently perform worse.
8.4 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Like the JCPOA discussed above, debates concerning the appropriateness of the 2017 Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) have been polarized between those that
argue that existing disarmament efforts among signatories of the NPT are inadequate and,
thus, that a new agreement is necessary; and others who suggest that TNPW framework is
potentially dangerous both in terms of its lack of verification regime and its consequences
for existing arms control arrangements—including the NPT.13 The Treaty, grown from the
a social movement that outlines the humanitarian costs of nuclear weapons and highlights
the normative danger of nuclear weapons calls for universal nuclear disarmament.14 This
13Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The humanitarian turn in nuclear disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25, nos. 1-2 (2018): 11–36; Heather Williams, “A
nuclear babel: narratives around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation
Review 25, nos. 1-2 (2018): 51–63.
14William C Potter, “Disarmament diplomacy and the nuclear ban treaty,” Survival 59, no. 4 (2017):
75–108.
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movement led to support from a number of governments around the world.
Upon the completion of negotiations in New York, 122 states voted to adopt the Treaty
with ratification ongoing. At the time of writing, there are 23 states parties that have signed
and ratified the agreement with entry into force to occur upon the 50th signatory depositing
their instruments of ratification to the United Nations in New York.
The Treaty’s language has been the source of criticism both during the negotiations and
since, however, leading to uncertainty concerning whether the agreement will enter into force.
I examine the sources of this criticism below while describing the Treaty’s design.
8.4.1 Agreement Type
The TPNW seeks to prohibit the development, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. As
Article I, par. 1 notes:
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Develop, test,
produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nu-
clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly or indirectly; (c) Receive the transfer of or control over
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly; (d) Use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (e) Assist,
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited
to a State Party under this Treaty; (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any
way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Treaty; (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under
its jurisdiction or control.15
As a result, it is scored as 4 using the agreement typology developed in Chapter 4.
8.4.2 Verification
Article III calls for the use of existing or new comprehensive safeguards agreements moni-
tored by the IAEA (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) to verify the agreement. Article 4, par. 6
notes, “States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to
negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including
the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear -weapons-related facilities in accor-
dance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.” At the time of writing, however, the
specifics of this verification regime in terms of information exchange, the use of an on-site or
challenge inspection regime remains nuclear.
15Art. 1, par. 1, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
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Table 8.3: This table describes the institutional design characteristics of the TPNW
Institutional Design Description Score
Agreement Type
The TPNW seeks to prohibit the development and
deployment of nuclear weapons
4
Verification Regime The Treaty includes no verification regime 0
Termination Clause The Treaty is of unlimited duration 0
Membership
The agreement currently has 23 signatores with 50
required for entry into force
1
Given the lack of detail concerning the monitoring and enforcement regime used to ver-
ify compliance with the agreement, the agreement is scored as 0 against the categorical
stringency variable.16
8.4.3 Length
Article 17, par. 1 notes that the Treaty will be of unlimited duration. Interestingly, the
following paragraph includes a withdrawal provision ubiquitous in international agreements
but that is at odds with the language of the Preamble and first article:
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include
a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.17
The TPNW is subsequently scored as a 0 for the dichotomous sunset variable that cap-
tures whether an agreement includes a termination clause.
8.4.4 Membership
The TPNW, as currently drafted, intends to be multilateral in terms of membership and
universal in terms of its application. The Treaty, at the time of writing, has 23 signatories
and would enter into force with 50 states parties.
The TPNW’s design parameters noted above are summarized in Table 8.3.
As with the JCPOA and New START agreements above, I calculate the predicted prob-
ability of compliance for the TPNW in a given agreement-year using the scoring from Table
16Legal scholars have also pointed to the lack of an explicit verification regime as being a central flaw
in the Treaty design.Newell Highsmith and Mallory Stewart, “The nuclear ban treaty: A legal analysis,”
Survival 60, no. 1 (2018): 129–152.
17Article 17, par. 2, Treaty on the Prohibiton of Nuclear Weapons.
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8.3. In this instance, the predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year basis
is significantly lower than either the JCPOA or New STARt: 81.0 percent. This partic-
ular finding suggests that, in line with existing critiques of the institutional design of the
Treaty, there may be reason to worry about the institutional design of the TPNW and its
consequences for compliance with its provisions in the event that it should enter into force.
8.5 Discussion
As outlined in the chapter above, the ACDD can be used to examine the institutional design
of agreements that are not covered in the dataset—including agreements that are currently
in the process of negotiation, ratification, or entry into force. While the analysis above is
probabilistic based on the training data provided by the Arms Control Design Dataset rather
than being predictive, treating the ACDD as training data allows for an empirically grounded
discussion concerning the relative consequences of institutional design characteristics used to
create arms control regimes and offers an additional basis upon which to engage on questions
concerning whether the design of existing or future regimes are appropriate. For example, the
Singapore Joint Statement document that seeks to “work toward complete denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula” in a bilateral context without a verification regime or timetable has
a considerably lower 66.1 percent predicted probability of compliance on an agreement-year
basis compared to those agreements discussed above using the same probit model equation.
This type of analysis will also improve as additional examples and tracking data are
added to the dataset. Coding alternative outcome variables beyond compliance with the
agreement—from proliferation to conflict data—is also possible to address alternative re-
search questions.
While each of the examples above deal with nuclear weapon technologies, there is also
scope for an analysis that employs these methods to consider non-nuclear examples.
The results of the analysis in this chapter also make clear the degree to which design
consideration might shape compliance outcomes. In simple terms, and in line with the
broader argument of this dissertation, design matters. I reflect on this central proposition
in the final chapter to follow.
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Chapter 9
Arms Control in the 21st Century
9.1 Introduction: The End of Arms Control?
As I write in July 2019, the prospects of a number of existing arms control regimes ap-
pear poor. The United States will withdraw from the INF Treaty, following Russia’s non-
compliance, in August of 2019 per its exercise of the INF Treaty’s withdrawal mechanism.
At the same time, it remains unclear whether New START will be extended beyond January
2021. Indeed, the Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov made clear
at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in March 2019 that Russia prefers
re-entering negotiations prior to extension. The use of chemical weapons in Syria despite
its designation as a “weapon of mass destruction” and the failure of the existing regime to
address this use has led to serious questions concerning compliance within existing arms
control regimes. The isolated uses of chemical weapons in Salisbury and Kuala Lumpur
by Russia and North Korea, respectively, have also driven renewed calls for condemnation
alongside new regulation and governance mechanisms to address military technologies.
This “decline” of arms control has coincided with nuclear modernization in the United
States and Russia, the addition of inventory to Chinese nuclear forces, and renewed calls in
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to build new types of low-yield nuclear weapons.1 These
developments have led a number of former policy-makers to declare that the existing arms
control regime is coming to an end.
This reality is further complicated by the use of arms control frameworks by nuclear
weapon states (NWS) at past NPT Review Conferences as evidence that they are fulfilling
their Article VI obligations.2 In the event that the contemporary arms control regime involv-
ing the United States and Russia is weakened, the Review Conferences of 2020 and 2025 are
likely to become increasingly complicated. Furthermore, a majority of non-nuclear weapons
states (NNWS) have recently produced and a minority signed the TPNW discussed in the
1Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
74, no. 4 (2018): 289–295.
2Article VI calls for the future eradication of nuclear weapons by all states.
CHAPTER 9. 21ST CENTURY ARMS CONTROL 164
previous chapter. While this treaty has a variety of legal issues that potentially undermine
the existing nonproliferation regime, it makes clear that NNWS are increasingly impatient
with regard to recalcitrance among nuclear weapon-states vis a´ vis Article VI.3
Policy-makers are also faced with the question of how to govern new technologies with
various military—and, in some cases, economic—applications.4 At the same time, calls
for the creation of governance frameworks to address new military technologies including
drones, cyber weapons, space weaponry, hypersonic missiles, and technologies associated with
artificial intelligence continue even as what many have described as a renewed arms race heats
up.5 What these governance mechanisms should look like, however, remains unclear—despite
several discussions concerning arms control pertaining to frontier non-nuclear technologies at
the United Nations via various Group of Governmental Expert (GGE) processes and under
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons processes (CCW).
The combination of the realities noted above raises serious questions concerning the future
of arms control and how to appropriately design future regimes.6 To assess the prospects
and future of arms control in the 21st century in light of the challenges noted above, this
project sought to examine the effects of arms control frameworks first established to govern
dreadnoughts and submarines that were subsequently re-tasked to address the numbers of
intercontinental ballistic missiles, biological weapons, and directed energy weapons. This
final chapter serves as a summary of the analysis that came before and a call to action to
continue to work of tracking the design and use of arms control into the future. The chapter
also reflects on new questions for scholarly inquiry that stem from the analysis presented in
these pages.
9.2 Summary of Findings
The central theme that runs throughout the dissertation is that, design matters—at least as
we analyze and assess the effects of various institutional design characteristics on episodes of
compliance and non-compliance in the historical record. One of the strengths of the analysis
carried out in these pages, however, is the ability to isolate and begin theorizing around how
design matters.
3Highsmith and Stewart, “The nuclear ban treaty: A legal analysis.”
4The “dual-use” nature of a number of these capabilities represents a challenge to those wishing to
regulate the technology given the existence of private actors lobbying for nonintervention.
5Stuart Russell et al., “Ethics of artificial intelligence,” Nature 521, no. 7553 (2015): 415–416; Edward
Moore Geist, “It’s already too late to stop the AI arms race: We must manage it instead,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 72, no. 5 (2016): 318–321; Michael Horowitz et al., “Strategic Competition in an Era
of Artificial Intelligence,” Center for New American Security (Washington, DC: Center for New American
Security, 2018) 8 (2018); Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, “Regulate artificial intelligence to avert
cyber arms race,” 2018,
6Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The Future of the Nuclear Order,” Arms Control Today 49, no. 3 (2019):
12–16.
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9.2.1 Agreement Type and Ambition
In Chapter 4, I examine how the scope—or type—of an agreement shapes compliance out-
comes. In the process, I compare patterns of compliance and non-compliance among agree-
ments designed to prohibit the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, agreements
designed to limit the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, agreements designed
to ban testing of nuclear weapons, and softer agreements that seek to control nuclear tech-
nology for the purposes of nuclear risk reduction. In the analysis, I find that agreements
that are more ambitious in terms of constraining state behavior are at increased risk of
non-compliance. This is not to suggest that efforts to prohibit the development of weapon
technologies are inappropriate—only to note that prohibition represents a hard task, despite
the relative ease of monitoring these agreements compared to arms limitation agreements.7
9.2.2 A “Goldilocks” Level of Verification
In Chapter 5, I examine how varying types of verification regimes shaped patterns of com-
pliance to test whether the conventional wisdom that stringent and intrusive verification
regimes perform best. In the process, I also consider the variation in the types of insti-
tutions charged with monitoring arms control regimes. Interestingly, my analysis of the
empirical record finds that the most intrusive types of verification are not, as is currently
believed, more or most likely to lead to compliance. Rather, the past examples of arms
control agreements suggest that there is an “n-curve” in which those agreements with no
enforcement mechanisms and the most intrusive monitoring procedures fare poorly while
those with “just enough” verification perform relatively well.
9.2.3 The Sunset Benefit
In Chapter 6, I compare those agreements that are designed to last in perpetuity to those
agreements that include a termination clause after a specific period of time. Interestingly,
and again contrary to the notion that agreements of “indefinite duration” are the most
desirable, those agreements that include termination clauses perform better—in terms of
compliance outcomes—than those designed to last forever.
9.2.4 Membership May Not Matter
In the final quantitative chapter, I analyze how the membership of an agreement might affect
compliance outcomes—spending much of the chapter focusing on the relative performance
of bilateral and multilateral agreements and testing a number of theories associated with the
consequences of multilateralism on international cooperation.8 While there is documented
7States parties must determine and agree to mechanisms to count the numbers of warheads or delivery
vehicles being regulated in the latter.
8Kahler, “Multilateralism with small and large numbers.”
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disagreement in the existing literature over the relative benefits of bilateral, minilateral,
and multilateral frameworks, the analysis of existing arms control agreements suggests that
membership may matter less than currently believed.
9.2.5 Applications: JCPOA and TPNW
In Chapter 8, I apply the ACDD as training data to reflect on the institutional design of
several contemporary arms control negotiations. First, I examine the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) benchmarked against New START and find that its design yielded
a high predicted probability of compliance. Second, I consider the design of the completed
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or “Ban Treaty,” that attempts to
ban all nuclear weapons. In part due to the absence of a verification regime, the TPNW’s
predicted probability of compliance is substantially lower than either New START or the
JCPOA—though not as low as the Singapore Joint Statement that altogether lacks an in-
stitutional framework. In the process, I argue that this dataset represents a new tool in the
methodological toolkit with which to engage with scholarly inquiry concerning institutional
design and its consequences.
9.3 Theoretical Implications
For the purposes of institutional design theory, the analysis described above leaves us with
reason to question the conventional wisdom, driven in large part by scholarship on non-
security regimes,9 concerning the monitoring and verification, the desirability of termination
clauses, and the advantages of multilateral frameworks. Of course, and as noted in the
prior chapters, more work is needed to assess the “causes” of the patterns outlined in the
dissertation given the questions raised by the analysis in these pages. The chapter examining
verification, in particular, represents a useful source for further analysis given the surprising
findings and the potential for new theoretical concerning institutional pathologies applied
to arms control—particularly as non-strategic arms control agreements are added to the
dataset.
The dissertation also demonstrates a quantitative approach to the analysis of institutional
design that might be usefully mirrored in a treatment of non-security regimes—whether
related to climate change or international economics—to ascertain the degree to which a
“high politics”-“low politics” distinction drives these outcomes.
9There is, as I note in Chapter 2, a considerable literature related to the design of peace agreements
following war. While many of these agreements involve both state and non-state actors, multiple states are
often involved in the negotiation and enforcement of agreements. For more on this, see: Walter, “Designing
transitions from civil war: Demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace”; Fortna, “Scraps
of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace”; Werner and Yuen, “Making and keeping peace”; Mattes
and Savun, “Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design”; Matanock,
Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation; Fortna, Peace time: Cease-fire agreements
and the durability of peace.
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More broadly, the findings presented here also suggest that international institutions
have a role in mediating outcomes and that, even with unexpected outcomes, “form follows
function.”
As well as these theoretical considerations, the dissertation has at least two practical
implications. In the sections below, I turn to how this analysis addresses the future of
nuclear arms control before turning to the creation of governance arrangements for emerging
technologies.
9.4 An (Optimistic?) Future for Strategic Arms
Control
There is, as noted in Chapter 8, a series of practical, policy-relevant implications of the
research carried out in this dissertation when it comes to contemporary arms control design.
Taking the INF as an example, there are three options facing Washington and Moscow
outside of the United States, Russia, or both withdrawing from the Treaty, thereby removing
both sides from their Treaty obligations. Should withdrawal occur, however, Washington and
Moscow face the decision of whether to revisit arms control for intermediate-range forces,
individually, or as part of broader nuclear arms control negotiations. Each of the three
options come with its intrinsic costs and benefits.
The first option, previously rejected by Washington, is to continue to muddle through
the status quo INF Treaty regime without a verification regime to monitor compliance, but
keeping the existing treaty architecture intact in the hopes that Russia once again comes into
compliance. This outcome would represent a climb-down for the United States and poten-
tially require concessions from Moscow while failing to re-institute lapsed verification regime.
The second option is to amend the Treaty regime and reach an understanding concerning a
reinvigorated inspection regime. Past statements made by senior U.S. officials suggest that
this would be necessary for the INF Treatys survival. The analysis in the previous chapters
suggest that a combination of information exchanges and on-site inspections represent the
most appropriate path forward. The final, and perhaps most challenging, option would pro-
vide an opportunity to renegotiate the verification and enforcement architecture concerning
intermediate-range forces, while attempting to broaden the membership to other states. It
remains to be seen which option policy-makers choose, though it looks increasingly likely
that Washington and Moscow will allow the Treaty to lapse following the exercise of its
withdrawal in August 2019.
The likely end of the INF Treaty has also called into question the survival of the broader
arms control regime as the existing New START regime sunsets in 2021 unless both Washing-
ton and Moscow agree to extend the Treaty until 2026. Past negotiators, including the former
head of the U.S. delegation to START I, have described the current era as being the first in
which there are no limits on the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed by the United States
and Russia—despite arms limitation agreements representing the most successful types of
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arms control agreements included in the ACDD.
While the extension of formal, binding agreements with extensive verification regimes
and of infinite duration to limit the number of nuclear weapons is no doubt desirable, the
analysis presented here suggests that time-bound, informal, norms-based frameworks with
less stringent verification mechanisms and a larger number of members may adequately pick
up the slack. As the data included within the ACDD continues to grow, debates surrounding
the appropriate design of arms control agreements and enforcement regimes might better
consider how to maximize outcomes of interest and use institutional design as a vehicle for
doing so.
9.5 Governing Emerging Technologies
As noted in Chapter 3, the selection criteria for the ACDD involved using Kreps’s selection
of arms control regimes focused on nuclear weapons. Arms control, as the Geneva Conven-
tions and the Washington Naval Treaty attest, need not involve weapons with existential
consequences. Indeed, a number of contemporary conventional military technologies are the
subject of nascent intergovernmental efforts to regulate and govern their use. In this section,
I consider a number of technologies that have been mentioned throughout the dissertation as
well as nascent state of regulatory discussions surrounding them: unmanned aerial vehicles
or “drones” (UAVs), artificial intelligence technologies, cyber weapons, hypersonic missiles,
and space weapons.
There are multiple drivers of innovation in military technologies, not least the war-fighting
benefits associated with them including force multiplication and offset capabilities.10 New
technologies may also allow weapon to be more discerning or removing soldiers from the
battlefield, saving the lives of soldiers and civilians. The challenge for prospective governance
regimes, however, is to maintain the benefits of emerging technologies while minimizing their
costs—whether in terms of arms racing or destabilizing consequences. Taken together, these
emerging technologies present a number of challenges addressed throughout the preceding
chapters.
9.5.1 Drone Warfare, Artificial Intelligence, and the GGE
As Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann point out, separating fact from fiction amid the hys-
teria surrounding the proliferation of “drones”—unmanned aerial and, recently, underwater
vehicles—has become increasingly difficult.11 While some suggest that these technologies
change everything by reducing the costs of engaging in conflict, others are more sanguine
10Horowitz, The diffusion of military power: Causes and consequences for international politics.
11Michael C Horowitz, Sarah E Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating fact from fiction in the
debate over drone proliferation,” International Security 41, no. 2 (2016): 7–42.
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about their impacts.12 Nascent efforts to regulate unmanned vehicles have also found their
way into broader discussions in Geneva concerning the legality and ethics of using “killer
robots.”13
These regulatory discussions have taken place in intergovernmental forums under the
auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) with support provided
by the United Nations—via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The Group of
Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (GGE LAWS), established
in 2016, met most recently in March of 2019 with little progress made toward a pre-emptive
ban on lethal autonomous weapons despite sustained lobbying from Human Rights Watch
and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. As far as concrete accomplishments, the GGE has
focused the conversation on the degree to which humans have—or ought to have—control
over military technologies amid fears that “black-box” algorithms will determine who lives
and who dies.14 This has led to a series of discussions concerning the appropriateness of
maintaining a “human in the loop” or “human on the loop.” The U.S. Department of Defense
Directive 3000.09, for example, requires that all military systems “allow commanders and
operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”15
What this Directive and intergovernmental meetings fail to take into account, however,
is that autonomous systems have already been developed and deployed on the battlefield.
As a recent SIPRI study notes, there are upwards of fifty deployed autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapon systems currently used in militaries around the world.16 A number
of these systems—particularly missile defense systems—derive their very utility from the
very fact that they are autonomous in nature. Indeed, one of clear challenges facing efforts
to negotiate and design arms control to address autonomous military technologies are the
significant benefits derived from non-compliance and the potential for “race to the bottom”
dynamics as autonomous technologies proliferate.
9.5.2 The Difficulty of Defining a Domain: “Cyber”
The pursuit of arms control involving cyber weapons has been similarly difficult—particularly
in terms of defining the very military technology that some would like to see regulated. Un-
like bombers that can be monitored from satellite imagery or warheads that can counted by
on-site weapon inspectors, malicious software cannot be readily monitored. As a result, most
12Erik Lin-Greenberg, “Game of Drones: The Effect of Remote Warfighting Technology on Conflict Es-
calation (Evidence from Wargames),” Available at SSRN 3288988, 2018,
13Armin Krishnan, Killer robots: legality and ethicality of autonomous weapons (Routledge, 2016).
14Zachary S Davis, Artificial Intellience on the Battlefield (Center for Global Security Research, LLNL,
2019); Geist, “It’s already too late to stop the AI arms race: We must manage it instead”; Daniel S
Hoadley and Nathan J Lucas, Artificial intelligence and national security (Congressional Research Service,
2018); Amitai Etzioni and Oren Etzioni, “Should Artificial Intelligence Be Regulated?,” Issues in Science and
Technology, Summer, 2017, Matthew U Scherer, “Regulating artificial intelligence systems: Risks, challenges,
competencies, and strategies,” Harv. JL & Tech. 29 (2015): 353.
15U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, November 2‘, 2012
16Boulanin, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk.
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existing arms control efforts—including two competing UN GGE processes—to address cyber
weapons focus on their effects rather than regulating the weapon itself. The Obama-Xi San
Francisco Summit in September 24-25, 2015, for example, led to the U.S.China Cyber Agree-
ment. The agreement itself called for both sides to “provide timely responses to requests for
information and assistance concerning malicious cyber activities, refrain from conducting or
knowingly supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, pursue efforts to further
identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the interna-
tional community, and establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime
and related issues.” The agreement itself was borne out of efforts to address both economic
espionage and to address attacks to critical infrastructure—communication networks, energy
grids, water systems, and financial networks.
Overall, cooperative mechanisms to address subsidiary challenges such as cybercrime—
via the Budapest Convention—have been more successful thus far than efforts to create
an “International Cybersecurity Agreement” like the Paris Call for Trust and Security in
Cyberspace (“Paris Call”) that, while lacking an enforcement mechanism, attempts to spell
out appropriate and inappropriate behavior on the part of both governments and private
sector actors.
In many of the regulatory discussions, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) has been held up
as a model of arms control. However, space, too, is increasingly “congested, competitive,
and contested.”17
9.5.3 Space Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty
The OST, included in the Arms Control Design Dataset, seeks to address space as a venue
for military competition. The Treaty, signed in 1967, prohibits the stationing of weapons
of mass destruction in outer space. The Treaty also mandates that the Moon and other
celestial bodies be used only for “peaceful purposes.” The Treaty has not been without
controversy, however, as surface-deployed anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) of the missile and
directed energy variety as well as missile defense systems have been accused of falling afoul
of the Treaty’s terms.
The OST also does not prevent states from stationing conventional weapons in space. In
years past, this may not have been a significant problem. Recently, however, a number of
states have deployed space-facing ISR capabilities while also interfering with the operations
of adversary satellites. In response to these challenges France’s Defense Minister, Florence
Parly, outlined plans to deploy swarms of nano-satellites that patrol around French satellites,
a ground-based laser to blind snooping satellites, and anti-satellite projectiles to placed on
board future satellites as part of President Macron’s broader effort to protect its space assets.
The efforts are mirrored elsewhere as space becomes a domain for both intelligence collection
and kinetic effects.
17Roger G Harrison, Astropolitics 11, no. 3 (2013): 123–131.
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The militarization of space opens up an important venue for new cooperative mechanisms
to address the deployment and use of non-strategic arms in space. As states engage on the
appropriateness of deployment and use of military technologies, the design characteristics
alluded to throughout this dissertation are once again likely to be central.
9.5.4 The Limits of the MTCR: Hypersonic Missiles
The final technology considered in this section are a new class of long-range, maneuverable
missile systems designed to overcome both established and nascent missile defense capa-
bilities. These hypersonic capabilities—that travel at five times the speed of sound with
a capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads and evade existing missile
defense systems—come in two flavors. The first involves a hypersonic glide vehicle that is
launched on a ballistic trajectory and is maneuvered as it falls. The second is a re-designed
cruise missile powered by a supersonic combustion ramjet.
Like a number of emerging technologies discussed in this section, the development of hy-
personic missiles have led to fears that its deployment will have deleterious consequences for
strategic stability—and that existing Missile Technoloy Control Regime (MTCR) regulatory
framework that primarily relies on export controls is inadequate to arrest the proliferation
of the technology.18 While hypersonic missiles do not easily fall into existing arms control
arrangements, the reliance of most hypersonic missile designs on ballistic trajectories during
their boost phase and the regulation of the numbers of ballistic delivery vehicles under the
New START suggest that New START’s replacement—should it come to fruition—likely
offers the most appropriate place to start a regulatory discussion concerning this new type
of weapon. That said, it is also possible that an entirely new governance regime be cre-
ated to address hypersonic capabilities, specifically. It also possible, given the asymmetrical
investments in hypersonic capabilities, that they become subject to an asymmetrical arms
control regime in which capabilities in one area are traded off in another.
As the two sections above make clear, there are a large number of challenges facing arms
control in the coming decade at the same time as the cooperative frameworks that scholars
and policy-makers had previously taken for granted increasingly come under pressure. As
negotiators take part in the ensuing rounds of arms control negotiations and design the
institutions of the future, lessons can and should be learned from the past and applied to
the future.
Indeed, it is worth revisiting the arms control life cycle, Figure 9.1 outlined in Chapter
1.
Most of the emerging technologies noted above are in the earliest stage of this life cycle—
securitization. Artificial intelligence technologies perhaps offer the most obvious example
of a contemporary technology that is increasingly discussed in “security” terms—despite its
18Torben Schutz, “Technology and Strategy: Hypersonic Weapon Systems Will Decrease Global Strategic
Stability-and Current Control Regimes Won’t Do,” 2019, I also spell out these fears in a 2018 article for
the Center for Strategic and International Studies: Andrew Reddie, “Hypersonic Hysteria: Examining the
Hypersonic Hammer,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018,






Figure 9.1: This figure summarizes the stages of arms control as a process
long-time use in statistics and data analysis. While this study focuses on the negotiation,
design, and practice of arms control rather than securitization, the latter is, clearly, an
important subject for future study—particularly as it relates to “who” gets to decide “what”
is securitized.
9.6 Future Research
To address the emerging policy challenges as well as the older challenges posed by nuclear
weapons noted above, this dissertation project posits that there are a large number of arms
control frameworks from which to empirically draw lessons and comparisons—in terms of
both their respective designs and outcomes. There is also adequate empirical data with
which to conclude that, contrary to scholarship suggesting that international institutions
offer only epiphenomenal effects, design matters.
Moving forward, there are a number of avenues of further research that stem from this
project—not least continuing to expand the dataset to include new agreements, non-strategic
agreements, country-level data, and new types of design data.19
19Given the difficulties associated with creating qualitative indicators of Treaty performance, I focus my
analysis on those Treaty characteristics that could be directly coded from Treaty text with little interpolation.
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The first and most obvious avenue for future research involves treating the Arms Control
Design Dataset as an outcome variable rather than the independent variable to answer a
related but different research question: Under what conditions do states create arms control
frameworks with specific institutional design characteristics?
The second avenue for research involves a series of case studies engaged with contempo-
rary arms control debates that outlines the design choices under consideration and employs
machine learning approaches, one of which is outlined in Chapter 8, to consider the proba-
bilistic consequences of design decisions.
A third avenue for future research involves the application of these institutional design
considerations to venues beyond arms control. Other types of international agreements,
from ceasefires to trade agreements and environmental accords can usefully be analyzed on
the basis of their design characteristics and the record of compliance among states par-
ties. Examining contexts outside of arms control might allow for a generalizable theory of
compliance—or a renewed focus on the differences between “high politics,” on the one hand,
and “low politics,” on the other.
In closing, this analysis sought to augment a conversation concerning the design of arms
control that often relied on heuristics and personal experience rather than the empirical
record. In the process, it provides a scientifically and empirically grounded discussion con-
cerning the consequences of institutional design to answer questions concerning the conse-
quences of institutional design of arms control on compliance outcomes—combining both
the literature and methods of inquiry from international political economy and international
security. The dissertation provides answers to questions concerning the scope, verification,
length, and membership of agreements, while posing many more.
Future analysis may be more ambitious in this regard.
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